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Introduction 
The civil rights revolution of the 1960's produced a fundamental 
change in the attitudes of American businessmen toward Negro employ-
ment. Prior to the racial unrest of the sixties employers at their worst 
had practiced blatant racial discrimination against blacks. At their best, 
businessmen had been color blind, requiring that blacks conform to all 
the qualifications traditionally demanded of whites. However, after the 
civil rights revolution elements of the business community embraced the 
idea of "affirmative action," which meant that employers not only gave 
blacks equal opportunity but took positive steps to see that blacks were 
recruited, hired, and promoted. The affirmative action programs did not 
significantly reduce the level of black unemployment and underemploy-
ment. But whatever its lack of impact on black economic problems, busi-
ness acceptance of affirmative action marked a radical departure from 
traditional employment practice. Affirmative action was the result of a 
long and complex process in which businessmen altered their personnel 
policies in order to maintain the most satisfactory relationship with their 
changing socioeconomic environment. 
Through their protests, American Negroes were able to bring about 
increased government pressure for black employment. The combination 
of black and government demands changed the attitudes of the white 
public, which in turn created the setting in which the business community 
could alter its traditional discriminatory practices. As a result of black 
activism society as a whole came to accept employment discrimination as 
a social problem, and therefore business attempts to eliminate unfair 
employment practices became socially responsible activity. A thread of 
corporate social responsibility runs throughout American business history, 
but it was not until the late 1960's that the business community could 
count employment integration in its census of good deeds. 
While it took a social revolution to get employers to accept their 
responsibility t'o hire blacks, that acceptance did not permit the business 
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community to rest easily on its laurels. Black employment after the late 
sixties frequently embodied affirmative action which required the em-
ployer to extend more of an effort to employ blacks than he did to employ 
whites. Affirmative action meant additional costs for hiring sometimes less 
qualified blacks and ran counter to the two most fundamental values of 
the American businessman. The extra expense violated the Capitalist 
Ethic, which mandated minimizing costs to maximize profits, and the 
selecting of less qualified blacks over more qualified whites violated the 
American Creed of equal opportunity. Although affirmative action was 
the most socially responsible course of action in the lates sixties, it left 
the business community confused and divided because such social re-
sponsibility flew in the face of society's most cherished traditional values. 
Thus, in the twenty-five years after World War II businessmen went 
through three major stages of personnel policy in order to conform to 
changing social forces. Initially in the forties and early fifties, they re-
fused to apply the American Creed to blacks because they feared the costs 
of white opposition to black workers. During the late fifties and early 
sixties, employers hired qualified blacks for production jobs and token 
blacks for white-collar work. In this way they could exploit the manpower 
pool while conforming to both the American Creed and the Capitalist 
Ethic. Most employers refused to move beyond this state of ideological 
equilibrium, but some of the nation's most important firms adopted pol-
icies of affirmative action in the postriot period of the late sixties. These 
firms once more violated the American Creed, but this time for, not against 
blacks. They justified their action on the basis of the need for a calm and 
stable society. Although they were willing to accept some of the short-run 
costs of affirmative action, it quickly became apparent that voluntary busi-
ness action was not going to solve the black employment problem, and the 
business community began to call for increased government assistance 
either to make affirmative action profitable or to relieve the business com-
munity of the responsibility of solving black unemployment. 
The fact that businessmen were followers rather than leaders in the 
process of changing attitudes toward Negro employment in no way re-
duces the importance of these changes to the economic status of blacks. 
After a detailed exploration of the relationship between economic growth 
and employment opportunities for minorities, Dale L. Hiestand concluded 
that changes in employment patterns were "primarily determined by what 
are usually called noneconomic variables. These would include the impact 
of social changes, such as the decrease in racial prejudice and discrimina-
tion .... " 1 Altered business attitudes led, in turn, to changes in the Negro's 
economic situation. After 1945, income (whether in terms of real, money, 
wage-earner, or family income) increased more or less steadily. However, 
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relative to white income, Negroes made little, if any, measurable gain.2 In 
occupations, as in income, Negroes steadily moved upward after 1945. 
Unlike relative income, however, the relative occupational position of 
blacks did improve, particularly in the skilled trades and lower level white-
collar work.3 No analyst has explained why Negroes improved their rela-
tive occupational positions but did not also improve their relative incomes. 
The answer may lie in the fact that most of the breakthroughs into new 
jobs after 1945 were of much greater symbolic than numerical value. Em-
ployers placed blacks on jobs they had never held before, but the shortage 
of qualified black applicants plus the inability or unwillingness of indusiry 
to train Negro applicants minimized the economic impact of the changes 
in hiring policy. 
Critics often labeled postwar Negro employment breakthroughs as 
"tokenism." One or two isolated Negroes in a firm may have been tokens 
in the eyes of the black community, but to the employer they frequently · 
appeared bigger than life, and more numerous. The introduction of blacks 
into an all-white work force usually marked a major turning point in an 
employer's attitude toward minority hiring. The success of even a token 
Negro robbed the employer of his basic arguments against employing 
blacks. His work force did not walk out at the sight of a black face. His 
customers did not take their business elsewhere. Successful integration in 
one department set the stage for integration in other departments. Suc-
cessful integration in one firm provided a model for other companies to 
follow. Although second steps and third steps frequently had to wait for 
some form of external pressure, "tokenism" was a necessary first step in 
the integration of business. 
This study explores the reasons businessmen took steps toward equal 
employment, how their changing attitudes affected their employment prac-
tices, and how their changing personnel policies affected their attitudes 
toward Negro employment. To some extent I treat the "business com-
munity" as a single entity and in doing so I lump together big business 
and small business, privately owned and publicly owned firms, retail, 
manufacturing and service industries, unionized and unorganized com-
panies, and firms in diverse geographic locations. Where data permit I 
try to distinguish differences among the various kinds of business organ-
izations, but where such distinctions are not possible I believe that gen-
eralizing to the "business community" is still both useful and legitimate. 
Despite the important differences among companies there is a "business 
community" whose general attitudes toward employing blacks can be ex-
amined. Obviously at any one point in history there were companies, even 
large numbers of companies, which did not agree with what I term the 
business attitude of that particular time. Nevertheless, broad reading in 
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the general and business press, as well as investigation in private sources, 
does indicate that there is a mood, or spirit, which reflects business think-
ing at a given time. I will examine how and why that mood has changed 
since World War IL 
The question then arises, did the public expressions of businessmen 
accurately reflect their real attitudes? Public expressions of belief are 
voluntary. Businessmen had little reason to lie except if they believed that 
public profession of a particular set of values would enhance their posi-
tions. Unless we assume that all businessmen were chronic and compul -
sive liars, their printed comments refleckd either their own views or thf 
views they felt the public expected. My confidence in the legitimacy of 
public sources has been bolstered by the lack of conflict between public 
statements and their comments in private conversations. I have found no 
major discrepancies between the thousands of confidential interviews 
which the American Friends Service Committee held with businessmen 
over the last twenty-five years and the public remarks which many of the 
same individuals made. Further, in my own experience with businessmen, 
both in private interviews and at several conferences (where I was not 
known as a research interviewer) I discovered businessmen generally said 
the same thing in private as in public, although in more picturesque 
language. 
If we accept the proposition that public expression accurately re-
flected the attitudes of the business community, the question remains, did 
business attitudes reflect actual business practice? From the businessman's 
point of view the answer was yes. From the black community's point of 
view the answer was no. When employing his first black worker the busi-
nessman frequently labored mightily and brought forth a token. He was 
proud of his action, and to the businessman it represented meaningful 
implementation of his new racial policy. To the black community which 
expected solutions to broad economic problems tokenism was a "shuck." 
But whether they had hired one black worker or a hundred, by the late 
1960's most businessmen would probably have professed agreement with 
Arjay Miller, the president of the Ford Motor Company, who said in 1965, 
"In today's society the advancement of brotherhood is part of the business 
of business." Miller went on to claim that American business "had entered 
an era of entirely new dimensions in its relationships and responsibilities 
toward communities, the society, and government. "4 I will attempt to ex-
plain why and how the business community came to accept Negro employ-
ment as a legitimate manifestation of social responsibility in the twenty-
five years after World War II. 
1 
The Concept of Social Responsibility 
Two distinct but intertwined forces shaped businessmen's attitudes 
toward employing Negroes after the end of World War II. First, employers 
viewed Negro workers from an economic perspective. As a source of man-
power, blacks offered employers a large pool of workers willing to labor 
for artificially low wages. However, black wages were low, at least in part, 
because businessmen feared Negro employees would be an economic lia-
bility. The business community believed blacks in nontraditional jobs 
would produce unrest among white employees and a drop in sales to white 
customers. Thus the businessman had to weigh the benefits of cheap labor 
against the potential costs from white opposition. According to classical 
economic theory the businessman would make the decision designed to 
bring maximum profit. To the extent that he made decisions rationally 
based on profit maximization, the businessman was adhering to the 
Capitalist Ethic. 
The American Creed is the second force which influenced employer 
decisions to hire blacks. The creed is best summed up in the words of the 
Declaration of Independence, "all men are created equal" and have the 
unalienable rights of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Al-
though, as Gunnar Myrdal has noted, Americans have consistently 
slighted the ideal of equal opportunity in practice, they have nevertheless 
institutionalized it as part of the capitalist mythology of rags to riches. 1 
Despite the eighteenth century origins of the American Creed, it was 
not until after World War II that it was widely applied to Negro employ-
ment. The postwar period was one of transition in which public demands 
for equal employment began to compete seriously with public objections to 
black employment. The shift in broad social attitudes reduced the po-
tential cost of employing blacks and meant that businessmen could adhere 
to both the Capitalist Ethic and the American Creed. The favorable public 
reaction to equal employment opportunity for blacks marked the trans-
formation of Negro employment into a form of social responsibility. 
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Like many such catch-phrases the hotly debated and somewhat 
amorphous words "social responsibility" had no precise definition. Most 
users of the term agreed that socially responsible action by a firm included 
a concern for the good of society rather than an exclusive concentration 
on profit maximization. While socially responsible action might, in fact, 
benefit the company, immediate monetary gain was not its prime purpose. 
One corporate president said he made socially responsible decisions "not 
with expediency alone in mind, but with a real effort to judge rightness 
and wrongness. . . . "2 
Although the employment of blacks did not become a common mani-
festation of corporate public interest until the post-World War II period, 
the idea that businessmen had a responsibility to society has deep historical 
roots. Until the end of the nineteenth century, religious laws theoretically 
took precedence over economic laws. The church iin the middle ages lim-
ited the prices and profits of businessmen with the concept of the "just 
price. " 3 In preindustrial America the Protestant businessman was no less 
obliged to temper his search for profits with moderation and concern for 
the commonweal. In 1639 the city of Boston fined merchant Robert 
Keayne eighty pounds and admonished him "in the name of the Church 
for selling his wares at excessive rates, to the dishonor of God's name, the 
offense of the General Court, and the public scandal of the country."4 The 
growth of American cities decreased the control of the church over the 
activities of businessmen, while at the same time the development of cap-
italist economic theory gave business a philosophical rationale for its new 
freedom. The rise of industrialism not only freed businessmen from gov-
ernmental interference in pricing, but also gave them a freer hand to deal 
with their employees. As the factory system replaced earlier methods of 
manufacture, the traditional protection of rthe apprentice codes ceased to 
have any real meaning. Members of the white working class joined black 
slaves as victims of unbridled economic exploitation. 
In the early days of American industrialization employers made some 
attempts to control the damaging effects of the factory system. Business-
men had successfully thrown off the restraining medieval yoke of the just 
price, but not all employers were yet willing to treat labor as a commodity 
subject to the vicissitudes of the open market and the dubious protection 
of Mr. Smith's invisible hand. The textile mill operators of Massachusetts 
were among the earliest business practitioners of social responsibility to-
ward employees. The "Waltham System," in which mill owners erected 
dormitories and kept close watch on the manners and morals of their 
female operatives, is frequently cited as an early example of socially re-
sponsible employers' concern for the well-being of their employees,5 
although even here there is some question as to whether the boarding 
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school environments at Waltham and Lowell were not due more to the 
manpower needs of the companies and the cultural background of the 
workers than to the charity of the owners.6 This concern for employee 
welfare did not last long. The fierce competition of the postbellum period 
combined with social Darwinism to produce an age of industrialists who 
were less concerned with a fair return to consumers and employees, and 
more concerned with maximum return to investors. 
The concept of social responsibility, which had its sources in the 
religious domination of preindustrial society, virtually disappeared from 
business thought during the Gilded Age. Late nineteenth-century industri-
alists used the laissez-faire theories developed a hundred years before by 
Adam Smith to free themselves from any obligations to society. Instead 
they developed the rationale that unhampered capitalists operating in a 
free market would create the most perfect possible world. Inherent in this 
philosophy was the belief that businessmen could solve all of society's ills. 
Although in its purest form the laissez-faire philosophy did not require the 
businessman to do anything but single-mindedly pursue profit, it con-
tained the germ of the belief that when social problems arose, business, 
rather than government, should solve them. These closely related, if some-
what contradictory, philosophical solutions to social problems would re-
appear regularly during the twentieth century. On the one hand they 
prompted the business community to oppose any intervention into social 
problems, and on the other they led businessmen to claim that only they, 
and not the government, could alleviate social ills. 
By the end of the nineteenth century most industrial leaders accepted 
the idea that competition would ultimately produce the best society, and 
they completely disassociated their businesses from the specific problems 
of the country. With social controls on business lessened, and in the ab-
sence of effective legal or voluntary restraint, businessmen felt free to 
administer their enterprises as they saw fit. William H. Vanderbilt ex-
emplified the divorce of business from society when he informed a news-
man that the New York Central Railroad was run not "for the benefit of 
the dear public," but for the profit of the stockholders.7 Andrew Carnegie 
took a similarly isolated view of his business when he told the Stanley 
Investigating Committee, "I was in business to make money. I was not a 
philanthropist at all. " 8 Of course, like other Gilded Age moguls, Carnegie 
was a philanthropist. However, the captains of industry fulfilled their 
social responsibility with charity and considered their business affairs to be 
personal matters beyond either the concern or control of society. 
Had more Gilded Age employers shared Andrew Carnegie's "gospel 
of wealth" and returned their personal fortunes to the people from whom 
the money had come, perhaps businessmen could have forestalled the 
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anti-big-business aspects of the Progressive Movement. However, the brash 
statements of contempt for the public welfare and the brasher actions of 
the robber barons contributed to the rise of Progressivism. During the 
Progressive Era pressure from the consuming public, from organized labor, 
and from industrial leaders who wanted to rationalize the economic order 
forced the business community to become more concerned with the needs 
of the public. 9 It was a long step from the "public be damned" attitude of 
the Gilded Age moguls to the placating observation during the Progressive 
Era of Theodore N. Vail, president of the American Telephone and Tele-
graph Company, that "we feel our obligations to the general public as 
strongly as to our investing public, or to our own personal interests. " 10 
Vail's willingness to concede that business had to judge its actions accord-
ing to their impact on society as well as to their effects on profits was not a 
repudiation of the Capitalist Ethic. The antibusiness attitude of the Pro-
gressive Era had impressed upon business the necessity of recognizing that 
long-run profit depended upon public acceptance of business actions and 
that public acceptance would come only when the people believed business 
was acting in the public interest. Consequently businessmen began to 
emphasize the supposed social benefits of capitalism and social concern of 
capitalists. 
Business participation in World War I removed any lingering doubts 
in the mind of most of the public about the benign nature of American 
enterprise. For a decade, from the end of World War I until the crash, 
businessmen retained their positive public image. The 1920's were no less 
a period of business dominance than the 1890's. Taking their cue from the 
Progressive period, businessmen in the 1920's integrated their economic 
philosophy with a positive attitude toward the general welfare. As business 
historian Morrell Heald has pointed out, "The spirit of boosterism and 
'service' which Sinclair Lewis satirized in Babbitt filled innumerable busi-
ness speeches and articles. It was seen, by men who took it seriously, as 
evidence of a growing sense of responsibility on the part of those best 
qualified to provide leadership for a permanently prosperous America." 11 
Business paternalism toward employees and toward the community de-
pended upon substantial profits and widespread public acceptance of busi-
ness good intentions. The depression brought an end to both profits and 
good will. Despite the pressures of the depression, which tended to focus 
all business energy on mere survival, some corporate leaders retained a 
callous remnant of their sense of social responsibility. John B. Nicholes of 
the Oklahoma Gas Utilities Company devised a plan which would have 
provided the unemployed with five-gallon cans of restaurant table scraps 
in return for chopping wood. 12 
As World War I had rescued business from the bad press of the Pro-
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gressive Era, so World War II refurbished the depression-tarnished busi-
ness image. 13 With the war came recovery. War contracts once more al-
lowed business to earn high profits and praise for acting in a socially 
responsible manner. National mobilization created a unity of purpose 
which tended to obscure the profound changes the New Deal had caused 
in the relationship of business with the government and with the con-
suming public. Under Franklin D. Roosevelt, the government had usurped 
the role of industry as protector of the American way of life. During the 
twenties the business community had shouldered the responsibility of 
taking care of the unfortunate. Through welfare capitalism and wide-
spread support of private charity efforts such as the community chest 
movement, private enterprise kept the wolves of want from the citizen's 
door. When, during the depression, businessmen were unable to keep the 
wolves from the factory gates, employers were forced to concede the pro-
tection of the public welfare to federal legislation. 14 
While the war dominated the scene businessmen could work toward 
the common goal of victory and recoup some prestige they had lost during 
the 1930's. However, with the end of World War II the business com-
munity had to come to grips with the legacy of the New Deal. The people 
had come to look toward governmental leaders, not business leaders, when 
they wanted something done. The business community had suffered a 
sharp, and apparently permanent, drop in status. During the thirties busi-
ness had made a feeble attempt to counter its weakened image through a 
campaign to inform the people both of its good deeds and of the benefits 
of the American economic system. 15 Yet, despite their favorable war ex-
perience, businessmen continued to feel unappreciated in the postwar 
period, and the business community launched a second propaganda drive 
to convince the public that business had the nation's best interest at 
heart. The "sell-America" campaign of the early 1950's used magazine 
advertisements, movies, car cards, and flyers to inform the American 
people that the economic system of free market capitalism was the solu-
tion to all the country's problems. This quixotic crusade in public indoctri-
nation was partly a response to the Cold War, but it was also an attempt 
by businessmen to assure the people (and perhaps each other) that capital-
ism was a socially responsible economic system. 16 
The sell-America campaign went through two phases. During the 
first phase the business community reverted to Gilded Age arguments and 
tried to deny that it had any specific obligations to the general welfare 
while at the same time insisting that capitalism would benefit both workers 
and consumers. The business community explained, through the use of 
textbook homilies on the merits of the free market, that everybody would 
profit if each sector of the economy stuck strictly to its own proper sphere 
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of activity. However, the first phase failed to persuade the public that 
selfishness was good for the country, and it failed to persuade the first 
Republican administration in twenty years to roll back the economic re-
forms instituted by the New Deal. 
Unsuccessful at convincing the public that the invisible hand of the 
free market kept a sufficient check on the reins of free enterprise, business-
men tried to demonstrate that the visible hand of business was doing 
something besides lifting the consumer's wallet. The second phase of the 
sell-America campaign soft-peddled strict laissez faire and emphasized the 
business community's commitment to improving the quality of American 
life. When they discovered the country would not accept a return to the 
unfettered days of the Gilded Age, a small but articulate number of busi-
nessmen and business commentators joined with the Eisenhower adminis-
tration to try to recreate the climate of the 1920's by espousing increased 
business social responsibility. 17 The pressure for business to adopt the new 
approach grew slowly but steadily until the mid-1960's, when employers 
faced constant and unrelenting demands from the popular and business 
press to conform to the new norm. 
Although opposition voices in the business community continued to 
make themselves heard well into the 1960's, the concept of the socially 
concerned businessman became so acceptable that even the Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States, a conservative organization of small and 
medium-sized companies, financed major studies of social problems. 18 By 
1968 Esquire magazine believed so many businessmen wished to be known 
as socially responsible that it began to cash in on the social concern move-
ment. Esquire sent the nation's top five hundred corporations an adver-
tising prospectus which asked, "Can you answer these questions? What is 
the purpose of your business besides making money? How is your company 
involved in making this a better world? Of course you can!" answered the 
magazine to its own rhetorical questions. "Your corporation is probably 
very much involved in the solution of social problems. " 19 
There is no way of ascertaining either the depth or the quality of the 
business community's acceptance of the concept of social responsibility. 
The response to Esquire's advertising prospectus was not overwhelming, 
but the vast majority of the firms that did answer the magazine's appeal 
expressed agreement with its assumptions. Yet, two surveys conducted in 
the late 1960's discovered that while businessmen did feel a concern for 
the problems of society, they were more worried about business problems 
and less worried about social issues than the population at large. A 1967 
National Industrial Conference Board survey asked executives what na-
tional problems they felt were urgent enough to warrant company time 
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and money to solve. Very few of the more than one thousand businessmen 
who replied listed social problems. Businessmen worried most about eco-
nomic problems directly related to their firms.20 The fact that this spon-
taneous listing of national problems placed business difficulties ahead of 
social concerns was perhaps indicative of the understandably dominant 
role of the Capitalist Ethic in business thought. However, when faced with 
a list of fourteen specific social problems, well over half of the same busi-
nessmen said their companies would take the initiative to correct the 
problems.21 
PERCENTAGE OF BUSINESSMEN WHO SAID THEIR COMPANIES 
WOULD ACT TO SOLVE SOCIAL PROBLEMS 
Issue 
Improvement and expansion of local school facilities 
Improvement of local school curriculum 
Problems associated with school drop-outs 
Improvement of work / career opportunities for minority groups 
Retraining of workers rendered unemployed by automation 
Construction or improvement of medical facilities 
Medical care for the aged 
Provision for or improvement of low income housing 
More and better cultural facilities and activities 
Purification and improvement of water supply 
Reduction and control of air pollution 
Improvement of urban and interurban transportation 
Development of community recreational faci l ities 
Improvement of law enforcement at local levels 
All Respondents 
55.6 
48.5 
53.9 
69.2 
72.6 
62.1 
35.9 
31.3 
59.1 
68.3 
73.5 
60.4 
55.6 
61.4 
While most businessmen, in 1967, did not consider social problems 
high on their list of priorities, 95 percent of them did indicate a willingness 
to become involved in solving such problems. Even if the businessmen's 
support for action in the socioeconomic sphere was only public posturing 
for a national survey, it indicated that businessmen assumed that society 
expected them to be concerned with the common good. 
The following year, in 1968, another survey, done for the National 
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, found that 86 percent of a na-
tional cross section of employers felt an obligation to make a strong effort 
to provide employment for minorities. Nevertheless, when asked to rate 
the seriousness of a long list of social problems, in 90 percent of the cases 
the businessmen rated them as less serious than did a general sample of 
the population. 22 
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PROBLEMS IN THEIR CITIES RATED "VERY SERIOUS" BY 
EMPLOYERS AND BY THE GENERAL SAMPLE 
Problems Rated 
Control of crime ........... .. ... .. ... .. .......... .. .. .... ... .. .. .. .......... .... ..... .. . .. 
Unemployment ....... ........... ........ ............ ..... ............... ... .................. . 
Air pollution ... ....... ....... .... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ........ .... ........................ .. ....... . . 
Race relations ........................ ... .. ... .. ........ .. ... .......... ... . 
Providing quality education ......................... .. ........... .. 
Finding tax funds for municipal services ................. . 
Traffic and highways .................. .. .. .. 
Preventing violence and other civil disorder 
Lack of recreation facilities .. ............ .. 
Corruption of public officials .. .. .. ............................................. .. 
Employers 
64 
21 
26 
46 
35 
41 
31 
50 
11 
9 
General 
71 
36 
33 
52 
45 
42 
27 
55 
31 
19 
100 percent equals ... . . ... ................. 434 1,953 
Both studies indicate awareness and concern on the part of the busi-
ness community, although the second survey supports the proposition that 
businessmen were followers rather than leaders in sensitivity to social 
problems. Together, the two surveys indicate that by the late 1960's both 
management and the public expected business to be active in the field of 
social responsibility, although the studies are certainly no measure of how 
many businessmen actually were. 
Growing public demand for business social involvement in the 1960's 
conflicted with the traditional view that businessmen should be hard-
headed realists who did not confuse the needs of society with the rights of 
the stockholders. Thus businessmen were faced with what business scholar 
Thomas A. Petit has called "a moral crisis. "23 On the one hand their busi-
ness ideology told them they should ignore extraneous demands on their 
time, effort, and money. On the other hand, the real demands of law, 
customs, and morals pressured them to act in a publicly beneficial manner, 
even at the expense of profit maximization. Petit argues that because busi-
nessmen found it "easier to accommodate ideology to the operational ethic 
of social responsibility than to remake the world to fit the ideology of the 
profit ethic," they changed their ideology rather than their operational 
ethics. 24 In other words, employers preferred to alter their practices and 
reinterpret their values rather than maintain socially unacceptable tradi-
tional practices merely to conform to ideological orthodoxy. 
What Petit calls a moral crisis is merely another name for the tension 
between the laissez-faire belief that social problems should not even exist 
in a perfect capitalist state and the business community's belief that it 
could best solve those problems. Businessmen were thus torn between 
wanting to do nothing about social problems and wanting to make sure 
that they did whatever was done. This ideological paradox gave rise to 
several conflicting schools of business thought on social responsibility dur-
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ing the 1960's. The most conservative employers were those who defended 
the values of what Richard Eells has called "the traditional corporation. "25 
Managers of traditional corporations emulated the corporate leaders of 
the Gilded Age. They divorced philanthropy from business, pursuing the 
former as private citizens and the latter as pragmatic capitalists concerned 
primarily with maximizing profits. The traditional businessman was mor-
ally certain that the "corporation has no moral obligation nor social re-
sponsibility for any kind of joint management of a nation's resources."26 
Or, as Business Week editorially noted in 1967, "It is not the business of 
any corporate management to run a public welfare establishment. Efficient 
production of goods and services is the name of the business game. "27 The 
extent of tradition.al management's social concern was succinctly stated 
by H. L. Hunt, the Texas oil tycoon and patron of right-wing thinkers, 
when he said, "The most philanthropic thing a man can do is to provide 
gainful employment to as many people as possible. "28 
The laissez-faire philosophy of traditional businessmen precluded not 
only business social responsibility but also governmental action to alleviate 
social misery. Traditionalists viewed "intellectuals, 'do-gooders,' and re-
formers" as "naive about human nature and many of the reforms they 
propose are doomed as impractical by the self-interest of individuals."29 
Although opposition to welfare legislation was particularly strong in the 
immediate postwar period, it continued to appear in the writings of ex-
tremely conservative businessmen and right-wing ideologues well into the 
1960's. However, by the time of the civil rights revolution even many tra-
ditional executives had begun to take a more conciliatory attitude toward 
governmental action. For example, in 1968 the president of a major mid-
western company which manufactured heavy equipment took the tra-
ditional position when he explained that his primary obligation was to use 
company resources so as to insure maximum profits for shareholders. 
While he declined to accept business responsibility for social welfare, he 
did point out that high profits meant high taxes and taxes enabled the 
government to attend to the welfare of its citizens.30 
Theodore Levitt has been the most articulate spokesman of the "neo-
traditionalist" doctrine that the business of government is welfare. The 
neotraditionalists continued to reject business social responsibility but 
broke with pure laissez-faire by conceding the right of governments to 
intervene in social problems. In a widely discussed article that appeared in 
the Harvard Business Review, Levitt vigorously opposed any eleemosynary 
activities by business. He warned against the potential fascism that might 
arise from powerful corporations controlling programs outside of their 
traditional areas of competence. However, Levitt argued that there were 
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social problems which existed despite the benefits of free market capital-
ism, and he called upon businessmen "to accept the fact that the state can 
be a powerful auxiliary to the attainment of the good life. " 31 
The acceptance by neotraditionalist businessmen of government wel-
fare activity may have been an attempt to reconcile their moral dilemma. 
If it is true, as one scholar has said, that the business "rol~ sets certain 
norms which tell the businessman it is wrong to assume diffuse moral re-
sponsibilities," and at the same time society demands that "individuals 
should be guided by 'social conscience' as well as by private conscience," 
then businessmen could assuage their consciences by shifting the burden 
of welfare activity from the private to the public sector. 32 
A few large corporations claimed they simply ignored the short-run 
demands of the Capitalist Ethic and acted in the public interest with 
virtually no thought of corporate gain. When IBM announced it would 
build a cable manufacturing plant in the New York City slum of Bedford-
Stuyvesant, president Thomas Watson said he did not think the operation 
would realize a profit in the near future. IBM built the plant, said Watson, 
because, "a very large company has a responsibility to society as well as to 
its employees and stockholders.''33 Most corporations, however, were not 
willing to disassociate themselves so completely from the traditional 
entrepreneurial goal of profits, and some companies sought to solve the 
dilemma by pursuing socially responsible goals while at the same time 
turning a profit. Even the severest critics of business involvement in pub-
lic welfare conceded the propriety of action which showed immediate eco-
nomic return. In his otherwise all-out attack on social responsibility, 
Theodore Levitt hedged by saying, "Corporate welfare makes good sense 
if it makes good economic sense-and not infrequently it does. " 34 Show-
ing a profit resolved the moral crisis because it was the perfect laissez-faire 
solution-solving social problems through profit-making activity. 
Although at least one prominent businessman claimed that the self-
interest argument was a mailed glove over the velvet fist of humanitarian-
ism, most businessmen seemed unaware of their basically unselfish moti-
vation. 35 For example, Herbert D. Doan, president of Dow Chemical Com-
pany, told a group of college newspaper editors that Dow was concerned 
with "how we can make a buck at social change."36 Doan's mercenary 
approach to social problems was echoed by other leading corporate heads. 
R. V. Hansberger, president of Boise-Cascade, told a meeting that govern-
ment had failed "utterly with the monstrous problems of our new urban 
society and is turning to business for help . .. . There need be no compro-
mise of the profit incentive when business turns its attention to the rifts its 
technology has provided in society," said Hansberger. ·Even though he ad-
The Concept of Social Responsibility 17 
mitted that many social problems were the result of business, Hansberger 
promised "leadership responsible to a new image, to the total needs of 
society, and in the enormous and profitable markets represented by those 
needs. Society has no other place to go. " 37 
Statements about the profitability of social responsibility led some 
critics to accuse American businessmen of attempting to exploit social 
problems for corporate gain. 38 Indeed businessmen were trying to do pre-
cisely that. While the critics objected to corporations profiting from curing 
the ills they had caused, businessmen and politicians believed only industry 
could cure the problems and only profits could tempt them to do so.39 As 
one public administrator put it, "Frankly, we must bribe business into the 
slums."40 
Businessmen whose firms could not take direct economic advantage 
of the growing demand for business involvement, or who did not wish to 
appear exploitative, used the philosophy of Charles E. Wilson, president 
of General Motors, to justify their acts of public concern. Wilson found 
it difficult to distinguish between his own company and the nation as a 
whole and in 1953 told a Senate committee, "for years I thought what was 
good for our country was good for General Motors and vice versa. " 41 The 
idea that a firm would benefit from improvements to society at large was 
valid, but as Fortune pointed out in 1968 socially responsible acts by busi-
ness "will presumably benefit not only the corporation that originally 
shelled out for those good works, but other corporations too, including 
competitors that poured all their resources into mere profit maximiza-
tion. "42 Businessmen re-cognized the obvious validity of Fortune's observa-
tion and frequently felt compelled to demonstrate that their corporate 
good deeds would have some kind of immediate benefit for the company. 
John D. Harper, president of the Aluminum Company of America, be-
lieved that acting in the public interest would result in both monetary and 
nonmonetary gain. Harper told the National Association of Manufac-
turers, "If you reduce delinquency, crime and illiteracy you reduce your 
own corporate tax load, and you convert welfare cases into productive 
workers. You may even pick up some new customers in the bargain!" He 
went on to explain that a company could not only make more money but 
also gain prestige from taking the needs of the community into account. 
Harper claimed that business support for an orchestra or theater group 
would help in recruiting professional employees, and could "result in en-
hancing our reputation as advertising can never do. "43 
However, many business proponents of corporate concern contended 
that it was enough that social responsibility made for a better society. In 
the long run a better society would mean better business for everyone. 
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Henry Ford II told Ford Motor Company shareholders that company 
executives participated in welfare activities partly for citizenship reasons-
"business and industry have an obligation to serve the nation in times of 
crisis"-but more importantly because "whatever seriously threatens the 
stability or progress of the country and its cities, also threatens the growth 
of its economy and your company. Prudent and constructive company 
efforts to help overcome the urban crisis are demanded not only by your 
company's obligation as a corporate citizen but by your management's 
duty to safeguard your investment."44 Donald J. Gaudion, president of 
Ritter-Pfaudler, told his stockholders much the same thing, but in some-
what more explicit terms: "I have long been convinced that whether we 
like it or not, corporate management can no longer remain uninvolved. If 
we do we will find that extremists are taking over and we will be trying to 
do business either with fascism on the right or anarchy on the left. " 45 
Firms which engaged in public interest activities, whether for profits, 
for prestige, or for the long-run good of society, usually had one thing in 
common-high visibility. The companies which acted first were those in 
the public eye, either because of their size or because of the nature of their 
product or service. "Immature" corporations with fewer than one hundred 
employees were not active in "public service,'' presumably because they 
were still trying to obtain a minimum level of profit and growth. However, 
once a firm had grown to one hundred employees, other goals began to 
play a more important role in the corporate teleology, and the company 
was much more likely to become involved with the public interest.46 Not 
all mature corporations were concerned with the needs of the public nor 
did all immature businesses ignore social responsibility, but the mature 
corporation was more frequently the pioneer in social welfare action.47 
In firms with more than one hundred employees social responsibility 
was not correlated to sheer size. Large and highly visible firms felt the 
winds of change earlier and more strongly than their smaller colleagues, 
but whether a company moved with first breezes or held fast in the teeth 
of a hurricane depended less on size than on the temperament of the 
firm's chief executive. Men who owned the companies they managed 
found it easier to take a strong stand on matters of corporate involvement 
than professional managers. Social activism, however, was not limited to 
companies run by their owners. A dedicated and powerful executive, 
whether he were an owner or a hired manager, set and enforced policy ac-
cording to his own values. Ultimately the chief executive's beliefs about 
the proper role of business in society determined how the firm expressed 
its concern for the common good. 
Richard Eells has proposed four goals beyond profit maximization 
which influence business decisions. First, most businessmen want to be 
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leaders. That is, they want to be recognized by their colleagues as pace 
setters in all areas of corporate activity. They want to dominate not by 
power or by influence, but by reputation. Second, Eells says businessmen 
seek integrity, that is, an honest, ethical, and responsible business career. 
Although many business critics would claim that this goal is most widely 
honored in the breach, businessmen frequently use moral arguments to 
explain company policy. Third, businessmen seek amity. They want to be 
loved-or at least liked. Businessmen want the same kind of acceptance 
and approval for their firms that they seek in their personal lives. More-
over, businessmen recognize that community acceptance is essential for a 
favorable relationship with the local government and work force . Finally, 
Eells lists power and influence as a real, if unstated, goal of corporate 
executives. 48 
Businessmen who took socially responsible action during the years 
after World War II almost invariably justified their activity with one of 
the four goals discussed by Eells. The most important goal appears to have 
been power and influence. When the capitalist system did not automatically 
correct its own failings, businessmen wanted to be sure they, not govern-
ment , were in charge of the remedial activity. The top-level managers 
who made company policy enjoyed positions of leadership and power 
within the firm . Most of them quite naturally believed that businessmen 
should have power, not only in the firm, but in society as well. Business-
men's sense of personal and corporate power led many of them to oppose 
legislative solutions to social problems. After 1945 most businessmen 
opposed legislation because they believed business could initiate voluntary 
action to solve social problems and at the same time prevent the drift of 
power from the private to the public sector.49 
Although the public did not always agree, businessmen widely as-
sumed that they had the ability to lead the nation in the attack on social 
ills.so At the same time the business community feared that its power to 
lead the crusade against social problems was being usurped by the govern-
ment. In 1960 Keith Davis, a spokesman for the business point of view, 
said that business had the power to solve social problems51 and warned that 
unless businessmen exercised their power they would lose it. 52 The business 
community widely accepted the logic behind this "iron law of responsibil-
ity." Time and time again businessmen called upon each other to exercise 
their natural leadership and power. In 1967, Arjay Miller, the president of 
the Ford Motor Company, told a University of Illinois audience that the 
"efforts to meet the society's most pressing needs will move ahead regard-
less of what business does." Thus he noted, "Business has only two choices, 
to become an unwilling participant in policies and programs it had no 
20 Black Men and Businessmen 
hand in developing, or join sensibly and purposefully in helping to map 
out sound courses of action. "53 
The belief among businessmen that they were the natural leaders of 
society led easily to a "gospel of wealth" mentality.54 After World War II 
the gospel of wealth, or as it has been called more recently, the "public 
trustee theory," was practically never propounded in its unadulterated 
classical form. No businessmen claimed they had a God-given right (as did 
George F. Baer) or a special obligation (as did Andrew Carnegie) to de-
cide what was best for society. Businessmen no longer relied on their mone-
tary success to prove the religious worth of their ideas-at least not ex-
plicitly- although Meade Johnson , president of the firm bearing his name, 
came very close when in 1959 he said, "A free society rewards socially 
desirable institutions by permitting them to survive and grow." 55 The feel-
ings of paternalism that were almost inevitably associated with wealth 
and power were reborn into the postwar world in a much milder form. 
During the 1950's and 1960's businessmen acted more from a sense of 
personal commitment than from a belief in the divinely inspired obligations 
of the wealthy. 
The morality which inspired some businessmen to pioneer in areas of 
social responsibility in postwar America was more than the code of busi-
ness which Eells referred to as integrity. 56 Standard business ethics require 
fair and honest dealing with competitors, suppliers, and customers. Moral-
ity demands adherence to a set of usually religious values stricter than 
simple honesty. Morality is a code of conduct accepted by a businessman 
as a guide to total conduct, not just to his actions as a corporation execu-
tive. 57 Thus the morally motivated businessman is concerned not only 
with his corporate dealings, but also with the impact of corporate policy 
on society and is looking back to the preindustrial society when religious 
laws governed business practice. In 1968 George Champion, chairman of 
Chase Manhattan Bank, asked, "Isn't it time somebody stood up and said 
business should participate because it's the right thing to do-the humani-
tarian, the moral, the Christian-like thing to do?"58 Champion was not 
alone in wanting to keep Christ in commerce. In an emotional response to 
Theodore Levitt's call for a return to classical capitalist ideology, F. S. 
Connell, executive vice president of A. 0 . Smith Corporation, accused 
businessmen who operated exclusively for profit of being "bloodsuckers." 
"I believe," continued Connell, "that we must have responsible, God-fear-
ing, hard-headed businessmanship. . . . The fact-not theorem-that 
faces us now is that we have too much forgotten God, and our responsi-
bilities as His people. "59 
Businessmen who engaged in social welfare activity out of religious 
scruples placed themselves outside of the accepted capitalist frame of 
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reference. Traditionalist business critics of the Christian theory of public 
concern called it "startlingly naive" and said it "ignores some of the basic 
and fundamental realities of historical development and of the con-
temporary institutional setting in which business enterprise operates. " 60 
Most businessmen shrugged off religiously based pleas for action, but 
those few reached by religious considerations were frequently pioneers in 
initiating socially responsible programs. 
Religiously motivated employers frequently led the business com-
munity in demonstrating concern for social responsibility because they 
found it more difficult to reconcile the contradictions between the eco-
nomic demands of the Capitalist Ethic and the moral appeal of social 
responsibility. Like all men, businessmen sought to achieve a condition in 
which their actions were consistent with their values. Faced with a situa-
tion in which their expressed values were in conflict with their business 
policies, employers had a choice of three methods by which to bring their 
value-action systems into harmony. They could change their actions, they 
could change their values, or they could rationalize the discrepancy. When-
ever circumstances allowed, businessmen almost invariably chose to ration-
alize. Rationalization permitted them to keep their traditional ideals and 
to main_tain their established methods of operation, while at the same time 
explaining away any incongruity. However, where a businessman suffered 
from an acute case of cognitive dissonance, that is, where the inconsistency 
between values and actions was too strong to be explained away by sophist-
ical excuses, he had to adopt the more extreme solution of changing either 
his actions or his values. Businessmen with a powerful commitment to 
personal values would tend to change their actions even in the face of 
opposition from their colleagues, customers, or employees. Employers who 
placed less importance on ideology than on minimizing friction with their 
cultural environment would change their values to conform to the actions 
society forced on them. 
The healthy economic climate of the 1950's and 1960's encouraged 
businessmen to respond positively to the growing public demand for 
corporate involvement. As Eli Goldston, chairman of the board of Eastern 
Gas Associates, told a corporate audience at the Harvard Business School, 
"Almost anybody can show a reasonable profit in today's growing econ-
omy; the challenge is to combine the second ingredient, social benefit to 
society, and to achieve these while making a profit. "61 The Eisenhower, 
Kennedy, and Johnson years were good ones for business, and manage-
ment could afford to conform to the public's new expectations. The im~ 
portance of the social mood in determining business social responsibility 
was illustrated by the comments of ALCOA president John D. Harper when 
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he observed, "Business is involved right up to the neckline in hundreds of 
public problems, and the public- that is to say, our customers, our neigh-
bors, our employees and our stockholders [and he might have added, our 
colleagues] -expect us to accept the responsibility of helping to solve 
these problems. " 62 
In the final analysis, businessmen became more socially responsible 
after World War II in direct response to the demands of government and 
the public. Legally businessmen had to become more responsible, particu-
larly in the field of fair employment, but , equally important, businessmen 
sought what Eells called "amity," that is, respect from the community. The 
vice president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Robert N. 
Hilkert, put it frankly when he said, "social responsibility is 'in' and busi-
ness 'in-groups' are composed of men who are deeply concerned about 
social responsibility. . . . Modern business knows that society expects 
business to be socially responsible and business today recognizes the im-
portance, yes, the necessity, of being responsible to society's expecta-
tions. " 63 
2 
Integration and Legislation: FEPC 
The business community's first postwar encounter with the problem of 
employing Negroes came as a result of the drive to permanently legalize 
the wartime ban on discrimination in employment during the years 1945 to 
1948. While a few businessmen supported permanent fair employment 
practice legislation, most opposed it. Apart from hard-core conservatives 
who suspected FEPC was part of a communist plot, most businessmen rec-
ognized the inconsistency of their position and attempted to rationalize 
their opposition to a law that had proven successful in practice and with 
whose aims they agreed. Thus, right from the start of the postwar period, 
businessmen experienced the problem of reconciling the Capitalist Ethic 
and the American Creed. 
Since an FEPC law would apply equally to all and therefore eliminate 
employment policy differences based upon personal values, anti-FEPC 
employers could not hide behind the Capitalist Ethic by claiming that they 
would be punished in the market place for integrating their work forces. 
Instead, while giving lip service to the American Creed, businessmen rose 
above the relatively mundane argument that fair employment practice 
would give an advantage to competitors who did not employ Negroes, to 
more rarefied discussions of freedom of association and freedom from 
government coercion. 
Business aversion to a permanent fair employment practice act prob-
ably stemmed in part from a desire to roll back the regulatory encroach-
ments made by government during the depression and the war. Employers 
saw the battle over FEPC as a symbol of postwar power. If they could stop 
equal employment legislation, then perhaps they could recoup other ele-
ments of their erstwhile status. The business community had made some 
concessions to the unusual demands of the war, but for the most part they 
had limited blacks to semiskilled positions. The end of the war meant the 
end of emergency conditions, and the business community hoped to be 
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able to stop the momentum fair employment forces had generated during 
the war. 
Blacks, even more than most Americans, faced a bleak employment 
picture on the eve of World War II. World War I had blocked the flow 
of immigrant labor to American industry and at the same time had stimu-
lated greater production. Employers had met the new manpower needs by 
recruiting Negroes from the agricultural S0uth . Industrial prosperity and 
exclusionary immigration laws sustained the demand for black workers 
through the twenties . But the labor surplus that accompanied the great 
depression allowed employers to become more selective, and as a result 
they frequently substituted white workers for Negroes, wiping out earlier 
gains. 1 
The outbreak of World War II did not appreciably lessen the suffering 
of Negro workers. Despite the manpower shortage created by the draft 
and by high levels of wartime production, employers were reluctant to use 
black labor. Pressure from the black community compelled President 
Roosevelt to issue Executive Order 8802 on June 25, 1941 , which created 
the nation's first Fair Empl oyment Practice Cc mmittee2 and government 
pressure through the FEPC combined with the tightening labor market to 
force more employment of Negro labor. But, while industry employed 
more Negroes, black occupational distribution did not significantly im-
prove. Most of the movement, for both male ,:\nd female black workers 
between 1940 and 1944, was from the farm to the factory, not upward 
within the factory. 3 
Negroes found jobs primarily in the war-reiated basic manufacturing 
industries which held government contracts and were therefore subject to 
FEPC supervision.4 Widespread growth of black empl oyment in basic 
industries improved the economic position of Negroes, but the low quality 
of the jobs indicated employer reluctance to break traditional segregated 
patterns. Although there were large percentage increases of blacks in skilled 
and white collar jobs during the war, the actual numbers were so small as 
to be meaningless. 5 At the beginning of the war employers limited newly 
hired Negroes to unpleasant tasks with low status, such as janitorial and 
service work, or work with noxious and unpleasant material , such as that 
in foundries and paint rooms. 6 As the manpower shortage increased, how-
ever, Negroes began to find jobs as semiskilled operatives in manfactur-
ing plants . The wartime economic expansion opened up large numbers of 
more desirable (higher paying) jobs to white workers. The upward mobility 
of the white work force opened semiskilled, skilled, and even some white-
collar positions that could be filled by blacks without seriously altering the 
basically discriminatory makeup of the occupational distribution.7 
Nothing more clearly illustrated the inherent racism in the economic 
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system than the extravagant praise lavished on firms which made even 
minimal attempts to upgrade black workers. The Governor's Interracial 
Commission of Minnesota noted that only a lack of resources prevented it 
from compiling an "honor roll of every war industry in Minnesota that has 
upgraded any Negro worker," but it did feel compelled to "record the 
names of some of the larger corporations . . . that are now not only 
employing ten or more Negroes but offering positions above that of jani-
torial work and unskilled labor to the properly qualified."8 Even though 
companies were required by government contracts to practice fair employ-
ment, and even though only one firm in Mirnesota had a single Negro in a 
position higher than semiskilled production work, the commission praised 
the advances in Negro employment being made by Minnesota employers. 
Most of the first breakthroughs for blc1cks occurred in plants specifi-
cally created to meet military needs. Once the war-production industries 
set the pattern of employing blacks, other firms followed when they could 
no longer find white workers. 9 War indust ries may have hired Negroes 
first because they suffered the severest manpower shortages, but war in-
dustries were also the only businesses covered by Executive Order 8802. 
While actual impact of FEPC is impossible to measure , we do know 
that the thirty-one companies involveJ in FEPC hearings during the war 
sharply increased their rate of hiring Negroes. In 1942 almost all of those 
companies had a smaller percentage of Negro employees than the average 
for all firms reporting to the War Manpower Commission, but by the be-
ginning of 1944 all of them employed a greater than average percentage 
of black workers. Most of the increases were in semiskilled production 
work. The number of skilled workers remained almost unchanged, and the 
reports did not even bother to mention the number of Negro white-collar 
and professional employees. 10 
The shortage of labor and the fair employment practice requirements 
established the broad trend of increased black employment. Utilization of 
Negro workers in any given industry, however, depended on the policy of 
the individual employer. A few companies, like Ford at its River Rouge 
works, had a history of hiring black production workers and even some 
black skilled workers, 11 but most employers hired Negroes for production 
work for the first time during World War II. Firms which did not have a 
tradition of employing any Negroes at all hired them in larger numbers and 
promoted them more quickly than companies with some history of hiring 
blacks. Apparently employers found it more difficult to break the habit 
of only hiring Negroes for menial occupations than to start off the employ-
ment of Negroes on an equal basis. 12 
The industries which most readily assimilated new black workers were 
those that produced products unique to the war economy, such as tanks , 
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warships, and guns, and those which could expand the use of Negroes in 
such traditional black areas as the foundry. For example, in rubber pro-
duction, the percentage of Negro employees rose from 3.3 in 1942 to 9.5 
in January, 1945,13 but there was virtually no improvement in the kinds 
of jobs available. An industrial relations director recalled that when his 
firm attempted to install black workers in an all-white department of an 
Akron tire plant, "within minutes every machine in the department was 
silen1. The personnel man led the Negroes out, the machines were turned 
on, and that department remained lily-white." 14 
There were many war industries which neither set up new plants nor 
hired large numbers of new employees in the hot, dirty jobs traditionally 
reserved for black workers. Despite FEPC, opposition from white workers 
was frequently strong enough in these plants to prevent or severely limit 
the number of black employees. Opposition to hiring Negroes was some-
times so intense that companies went to the expense of recruiting and 
transporting unskilled, untrained whites from distant parts of the nation 
rather than hire the trained Negroes in their own communities.15 On a 
number of occasions when employers contemplated hiring Negro women, 
their white women employees exerted considerable pressure to prevent such 
a move. The white women feared that industrial employment of Negro 
women would dry up the supply of domestic labor, or at least drive up the 
wages for household service. In some communities middle-class housewives 
believed there were secret "Eleanor Clubs," named after President Roose-
velt's wife, subversively undermining the American way by persuading 
Negro women to leave their service jobs and seek work in industry. 16 
Usually, however, employees opposed black workers because they were 
black, not because of the impact their employment would have on the 
labor market. During the war black workers did not economically threaten 
white workers, but white workers protested the employment of Negroes 
nevertheless. When the pressures of technological change, labor shortage, 
and government supervision forced the automobile industry to upgrade 
its Negro employees, the companies experienced a series of strikes. Unlike 
the rubber tire plant mentioned above, however, the automobile companies 
stood firm, and Negroes moved into production jobs.17 
The aircraft industry was an important exception to the generalization 
that new rapidly expanding war production industries led in the hiring of 
Negroes, but it was the exception that proved an important aspect of the 
rule-Negroes only got low status jobs. Not only did the aircraft industry 
employ an unusually large number of skilled workers, but it was also a 
glamor industry which used the appeal of its prcduct to attract the highest 
quality workers. The aircraft manufacturers considered Negroes inferior 
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workers and feared the blacks would prevent the companies from securing 
the highly skilled whites they needed. 18 In 1941 North American Aviation 
officials said Negroes "will be considered only as janitors." Vultee was 
scarcely more progressive. Its management told investigators, "We may at 
a later date be in a position to add some colored people in minor capacities 
such as porters and cleaners."19 However, many northern aircraft plants 
abandoned some aspects of their discriminatory employment practices as 
the war progressed, the manpower pool grew smaller, and federal pressure 
increased.20 
FEPC played at least an indirect role in practically all breakthroughs 
in Negro employment. The wartime FEPC required government contractors 
to recruit, hire, train, and upgrade workers "without regard to their race, 
creed, color or national origin." Moreover, circumstantial evidence that 
indicated an employer sought data that could be used to discriminate 
counted against the company in a hearing. Thus, while it was not techni-
cally improper for a company to ask the racial, religious, or national back-
ground of a job applicant, such questions were thought to "create favorable 
conditions" for discrim'ination, and to "lend support to the conviction that 
discrimination exists."21 The same held true for the absence or near-absence 
of minority workers in any given plant. 
FEPC operated under the assumption that personnel techniques that 
singled out Negroes, such as requesting racial identity on application forms, 
would be used against the black applicant. But under its "color-blind" 
interpretation of equal employment, FEPC was unwilling to support any 
personnel policy which distinguished between blacks and whites, even if it 
benefited blacks. The commission unquestioningly accepted the philosophy 
of the American Creed. The ideal of FEPC, which would remain the ideal 
of fair employment forces until 1963, held that all workers, white or black, 
were to be judged purely on their objective merits. Executive Order 8802 
declared it the "duty of employers and of labor organizations . . . to 
provide for the full and equitable participation of all workers in defense 
industries, without discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national 
origin."22 FEPC interpreted this provision quite literally. Some employers 
attempted to hire Negro workers at a rate that reflected the percentage of 
Negroes in the labor pool area, but FEPC forbade such activity because the 
quota system worked "to the disadvantage of individuals in both minority 
and majority groups by permitting considerations of race rather than those 
of qualifications and availability to operate."23 The commission admitted 
that such quotas did occasionally benefit Negroes, but in its zeal to be 
democratically color-blind FEPC ruled that the executive order prohibited 
"discrimination against white as well as against colored employees."24 
During the 1960's a more sophisticated understanding of black employ-
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ment problems led the government to alter its disapproval of gathering 
racial background data and of the use of benign quotas. However, most 
other guidelines developed by FEPC stood the test of time.25 
The war markedly improved the Negro employment picture, but as 
the manager of a North Carolina cigarette plant said, "During the war we 
did things we wouldn't do normally."26 Wartime events did not necessarily 
have a lasting impact on the attitudes and activities of the business com-
munity. Americans accepted emergency measures, from rationing and bond 
purchases to fair employment practice, because they were temporary. The 
end of the war would mean no more brown-outs in the home and no more 
"brown-ins" on the job. 
The end of the war presented no problem to those employers who had 
hired blacks on strictly pragmatic grounds. They needed workers in order 
to produce. Blacks were the only workers available, so they hired blacks. 
Once the war was over and they could once again indulge their preference 
for white employees, they quickly slipped back into traclitional employ-
ment patterns. Southerners in particular had never considered the Amer-
ican Creed applicable to blacks and eagerly welcomed the return to normal. 
Northern employers, however, had frequently based their prewar re-
jection of black workers on assumptions that blacks would do poor work 
and prompt employee unrest. In other words, the northern businessman 
discriminated against blacks on economic grounds. As with their southern 
colleagues, northern employers hired blacks because of pressures generated 
by the wartime emergency. However, the end of the emergency did not 
restore the status quo ante bellum in the North because black workers had 
proven their ability not only to master the technicalities of factory work, 
but had also proven their ability to operate in the industrial social environ-
ment. Thus, it was more difficult for the northern employer to continue to 
justify discrimination under the aegis of the Capitalist Ethic. By proving 
that blacks could be successfully employed, the war had opened the way 
for equal employment forces to exploit the idea of fair play contained in 
the American Creed. Julius Thomas, director of the industrial relations 
department of the National Urban League observed, "It will not be easy to 
tell the average Negro youngster that he will not find employment in this 
or that vocation after the war. He will promptly reply that his father or 
mother held that job in a local war plant in 1944."27 
The status of the postwar economy was the dominant factor in deter-
mining the direction of Negro employment. Immediately after 1945 blacks 
were more afraid of losing jobs because of the economic slowdown in-
volved in the transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy than be-
cause of a reversion to prewar hiring patterns. To counter the expected 
layoffs of blacks, some manpower experts suggested that employers grant 
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Negroes adjusted seniority, or that they racially balance any layoffs they 
were forced to make. 28 But a system of proportional layoffs would not 
only have protected black workers in newly acquired jobs, it would have 
also threatened union seniority rights and the accumulated seniority of re-
turning veterans. The business community would not consider an attack on 
anything so fundamental as seniority rights. 
The Negro workers' position looked particularly perilous because they 
had made their greatest gains in those industries that would suffer the most 
during reconversion. "Nothing but another war would revive production in 
ammunitions, explosives and firearms, aircraft, and shipbuilding to their 
wartime levels," noted two students of the labor market. "Consequently, the 
Negro worker will be subjected to the hazards of finding employment in new 
industry and will have the additional difficulties of transferring his war-
learned skills or of obtaining retraining."29 Under the best circumstances 
economists expected severe layoffs of blacks in almost all industries, if not 
as the result of reconversion or of a general recession, then as the result of 
displacement by returning veterans.3° Fearing that extensive Negro un-
employment would contribute to a recession, create a dangerously depen-
dent group of people, and possibly lead to race riots, such as those that 
followed the end of World War I , concerned economists called for extensive 
federal control of the labor market through full employment legislation, a 
peacetime FEPC, federal control of industry location, and a fully coordi-
nated United States Employment Service to encourage labor mobility.31 
Reconversion had the expected detrimental effect on black employees 
in war industries. In several Connecticut war plants, for example, black 
workers had constituted between 8 and 25 percent of the work force during 
the war. By 1948 the number of Negro employees had fallen to less than IO 
percent in the plant with the most black workers and to less than 3 percent 
in the plant with the fewest. 32 However, the negative impact of reconver-
sion on black employment was mitigated by the continued expansion of the 
economy. Domestic consumption maintained production at a level high 
enough to allow consumer-oriented industries to absorb the black workers 
who had lost their jobs in war production plants. In the spring of 194 7 the 
occupational distribution of employed Negroes was unchanged from the 
war period, indicating that black workers had not lost the;,_ .. a• Jme 
advances. 33 
The continuing manpower demand meant that economic conditions 
were conducive to a movement for a permanent peacetime FEPC, but there 
was strong political opposition. Congress killed President Truman's at-
tempts to extend Executive Order 8802 into the postwar era and continued 
to oppose the idea of a federal FEPC during the late 1940's.34 However, 
several states and cities passed fair employment legislation prior to 1950.35 
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In 1945 New York consolidated and extended several previously existing 
antidiscrimination statutes in the Ives-Quinn Act, which was the nation's 
first FEPC law. Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
Oregon, Rhode Island, and Washington followed New York's lead and 
passed antidiscrimination laws during the late 1940's. 
Businessmen who supported FEPC legislation in the late 1940's were, 
for the most part, strong believers in the American Creed who were never-
theless cautious about hiring blacks because they feared such a policy 
would put them at a competitive disadvantage. Despite arguments that 
hiring blacks would be good for the economy,36 FEPC supporters had no 
illusions about their fellow employers and believed that only legal coercion 
could convince their competitors to engage in fair employment practices.37 
The American Friends Service Committee clearly recognized the inability 
of businessmen to live up to the American Creed and at the same time 
remain true to the Capitalist Ethic. AFSC consistently argued that legisla-
tion would strengthen the hand of those employers who wanted to act 
"democratically" but were afraid to do so. 38 
Many businessmen wanted an FEPC law because it would relieve them 
of having to weigh the relative merits of the American Creed and the 
Capitalist Ethic. Without a law, no matter what the democratically dis-
posed employer did, he lived in a state of cognitive disequilibrium. Either 
he sacrificed profits for equal opportunity or vice versa. The owner of a 
national chain of women's specialty shops who had been forced by com-
munity pressure to stop hiring blacks in a southern location said that more 
than half of the employers he knew wanted to desegregate but were afraid 
to. He felt that the lack of fair employment legislation gave "undue advan-
tage to the relatively few hate mongers," who could cause enough trouble 
"to discourage even the most stouthearted believer in democratic employ-
ment practices."39 
By the same logic the New York City West Side Association of Com-
merce opposed state FEPC legislation. The New Yorkers did not oppose 
fair employment. Quite the contrary, they believed that racial and religious 
discrimination should be declared unconstitutional. However, unless an 
equal obligation were placed on all employers in the nation, the west side 
businessmen warned that the state would lose business to areas unencum-
bered by compulsory adherence to the American Creed.40 
Despite the increase in business support for FEPC in the postwar years, 
the majority of businessmen opposed such legislation. However, northern 
businessmen could not oppose FEPC on the grounds that equal opportunity 
did not apply to blacks, and so they opposed FEPC legislation because it 
would constitute an infringement on their managerial freedom.41 The right 
of the employer to choose his workers was fundamental. Thus, northern 
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businessmen opposed a requirement to do what they all said they were 
already doing ( or at least in favor of doing) because it was a dangerous 
encroachment on their liberty. The various drives for state and federal 
fair employment permitted discriminatory businessmen to unite in opposi-
tion to Negro employment while maintaining a facade of propriety. Instead 
of confronting the fundamental issue of employing Negroes, the business 
community attacked the less embarrassing problem of government inter-
ference with their personnel policies. 
Obviously those hiring policies which business was so staunchly de-
fending were less than perfect examples of the American Creed in action. 
William R. Thomas, a member of Ford's industrial relations planning de-
partment, was unique only because he articulated the racist assumptions 
which stood just behind the shining shield of managerial prerogatives which 
so many discriminatory businessmen carried. Thomas voiced concern 
that FEPC legislation would disrupt informal work groups. He believed 
efficient work groups depended on good informal social relationships, 
which in turn depended upon ethnic compatibility. Thomas claimed that 
disruption of ethnic homogeneity among work groups would lead to un-
necessary disruption of production. He was not, however, so callous as to 
deny blacks any role in his operation. Thomas pointed out that "Negroes 
associate themselves with porter jobs; Irish with police positions; Poles with 
heavy construction work; and Greeks with food services."42 
Small businessmen, ever sensitive to their precarious position in the 
economy, and highly protective of what they considered their essential 
rights, objected strongly to the idea that they might have to hire those 
whom they did not like. F. A. Virkus, a spokesman for the Conference of 
American Small Business Organizations, complained, "Already it is diffi-
cult enough for small business to succeed financially, in the face of taxa-
tion, shortage of venture capital, government regulation, unionization with 
its accompanying rigidity of wage scales, material shortage, and a host of 
other plagues," and he was not sure small business could bear the addi-
tional burden of nondiscriminatory hiring. Virkus claimed that the right to 
hire and fire was the cornerstone of small business management and that 
any regulation of that right by the state was a blow to "the economic 
foundations of our country."43 
Virkus' comments were typical of the antigovemment position taken 
by many conservative opponents of FEPC. Conservative businessmen clearly 
saw equal employment legislation in the broader context of the battle be-
tween free enterprise (the very soul of the Capitalist Ethic) and collectivist 
totalitarianism.44 Donald R. Richberg, who had promoted business interests 
during the NRA days of the New Deal, was the most widely quoted anti-
FEPC theoretician. According to Richberg, "discrimination in the choice of 
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companions is the very essence of social liberty [and] discrimination in the 
choice of business associates is the very essence of economic liberty." Thus 
a fair employment practice law deprived the employer of his economic 
liberty and deprived his employees of their social liberty, thereby destroying 
freedom of association and liberty of contract.45 
The belief that FEPC threatened basic American freedoms fitted well 
into the mood of the business community during the Truman administra-
tion. That was the period of the "sell America" campaign which emphasized 
the automatic, self-correcting virtues of the free enterprise system. Profits 
depended on efficiency. Efficiency assumed a rational utilization of man-
power, and the rational utilization of manpower precluded racial discrimi-
nation. According to the true believer of the Capitalist Ethic the system 
structurally prevented unfair employment policies. Said one spokesman for 
the business community, "American businessmen are, for the most part, 
honest and fair in their dealings with others. They are universall y free from 
prejudice and they do not practice oppression upon their employees. The y 
would not be successful if they did those things."46 The very idea that 
there might be a flaw in the perfect jewel of capitalism aroused the ire of 
conservative employers like the speaker at a national small businessmen's 
meeting. "The battle line is drawn," he warned , "statism against freedom, 
dictatorship against democracy, communism against Americanism, pagan-
ism against Christianity."47 
The superpatriotic, "sell America" type of rhetoric which marked 
many of the attacks on FEPC legislation was derived in part from the in-
tense anticommunism which accompani ed the beginnings of the Cold War. 
It followed logically that if antidiscrimination legislation were an infringe-
ment of economic freedom , and if infringements of economic freedom were 
a dangerous blow at the free enterprise system, then F E PC must be a com-
munist plot since communists were the people most anxious to destroy the 
American economy. Referring to the FEPC referendum which California 
voters defeated in 194 7, one FEPC opponent told a Senate committee, 
"Communists, fellow travelers, parlor pinks, left wingers and radicals of all 
hues were its protagonists and FEPC propaganda emanated from those 
sources."48 But even hard-line anticommunist conservatives were unwilling 
to simply discard the idea of racial accord. Using a time-honored southern 
rationale, they stood the American Creed on its head by arguing that Negro 
workers were not unhappy with their situation and that FEPC legislation was 
"part of the Communist strategy to disrupt and disorganize the United States 
by causing friction between the colored and white races while pretending 
to be devoted to equalizing them."49 
Discriminatory businessmen preferred to attack FEPC legislation rather 
than to attack the idea of employment integration. Few of them would 
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publicly admit that they did not want to employ Negroes, so they had to 
reconcile their supposed opposition to discrimination with their opposition 
to legislation which would outlaw discrimination. As businessmen steeped 
in the conventional wisdom of the free enterprise system, employers right-
eously attacked encroachments of the state, but as moral men and as be-
lievers in the American Creed they had to demonstrate that FEPC would 
cause more harm than good, that it was the wrong way to achieve the 
right end. By predicting that an antidiscrimination law would increase race 
hatred, antiintegrationists could excuse their unwillingness to live up to 
the letter of the American Creed in order to conform to its broader spirit. 
The representative of several large southern industries made this point by 
quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, the 1896 Supreme Court decision which had 
upheld segregation: "Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts, 
or to abolish distinctions based upon physical differences and the attempt 
to do so can only result in accentuating the difficulties .... "50 In New 
York, the state Chamber of Commerce feared an antidiscrimination law 
would "attract an undesirable element from outside the State and it might 
give rise to burning resentment leading to possible race riots, pogroms and 
other evils."51 
Racist businessmen predicted an anti-Negro backlash because they 
shared the widely held belief that discrimination was an instinctive re-
sponse to racial differences which could not be eliminated by law. In a 
folksy "common sense" discussion of FEPC, George H. Fisher, the chairman 
of the labor committee of the American Society of Industrial Engineers, 
explained that "unlike some of our modern well-educated theorists," practi-
cal old-time personnel men were "scientists enough not to try to force 
elements toge,ther which were naturally antagonistic ... just as a farmer 
separates a horse and a mule when they refuse to pull together."52 Fisher's 
view of race relations left room for cooperation only when it occurred 
"naturally." He made his peace with the American Creed by endorsing 
equal employment when it sprang spontaneously from the heart of the 
white worker. 
Most businessmen, however, did not see pseudoscientific barriers to 
racial cooperation. They believed that a slow, patient evolutionary process 
of education and moral persuasion could eliminate discrimination but that 
legislation could not. Proper moral behavior, said the businessmen, was a 
matter between a man and his God, and it was up to the churches to 
instruct and enforce ethical activity. One business spokesman charged that 
church support for fair employment practice legislation was "nothing less 
than a confession of the bankruptcy of their own spiritual and moral 
leadership."53 
By emphasizing that economic integration would come only when 
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education and persuasion had changed the hearts of the people, "moderate" 
businessmen were placing their confidence in the basically democratic in-
stincts of the American people. Thus, they believed the ideal of the Ameri-
can Creed would triumph where force would fail. Pointing to a few isolated 
breakthroughs in Negro hiring as proof that progress was being made, 
Ralph Van Nostrand of the Merchants and Manufacturers Association of 
California contended that "good community public relation s, ed ucation 
and understanding are doing in a voluntary way, what the policeman's club 
cannot accomplish."54 
FEPC supporters relied heavily on the fundamental argument that the 
legislation was merely a legal implementation of a widely accepted ideal-
it was part of the American Creed. But because most business opposition 
focused on the law's presumed violations of managerial prerogatives, much 
of the FEPC propaganda was defensive. The most effective argument 
pointed to the success of the New York State law, which was not only the 
first but also the strongest state antidiscrimination statute. 55 The New 
York experience confirmed predictions that neither FEPC nor Negro job 
seekers would harass the business community. 
Proponents of FEPC laws implicitly conceded the argument that an 
FEPC limited the employer's freedom to run his business the way he saw 
fit. They countered along three lines. First, FEPC was only one of many 
laws which society needed to insure proper behavior, and it was the nature 
of laws to restrict the freedom of some to insure the freedom of others. 
Second, supporters of the legislation carefully explained that the employer 
could still apply all his traditional standards in aU areas except race and 
religion.56 Finally, pro-FEPC forces contended that the laws were not de-
signed to alter basic attitudes, but rather to proscribe specific kinds of 
activity. They were aimed not at prejudice but at discrimination. 57 On the 
other hand the supporters pointed out that "forced" integration could 
change people's attitudes by demonstrating the inaccuracy of the presump-
tions which underlay their discriminatory behavior. 58 But when pressed to 
the wall FEPC proponents had to concede, as did one businessman, "in the 
final analysis , perhaps the strongest arguments in favor of FEPC are neither 
economic nor political, but moral."59 In an age when religious values were 
generally banished from the business world, this was a weak reed upon 
which to rest an entire movement. 
3 
Business Counterattacks: 
Voluntarism and Breakthroughs 
During the early I 950's, growing public acceptance of black employees 
combined with the business opposition to FEPC legislation to produce 
some token steps toward equal employment opportunity. The break-
throughs of the Eisenhower era indicate an increasing compatibility be-
tween the demands of the American Creed and the Capitalist Ethic. The 
chance of a successful local FEPC law was directly proportional to public 
acceptance of Negro employees. Thus, as the businessman's social en-
vironment demanded a more rigorous application of the American Creed 
to black workers, it also reduced the potential cost of hiring Negroes. At 
the same time the businessman might be able to reap public acclaim by 
giving a few symbolic jobs to blacks and forestall government intervention 
in his personnel policies. 
Businessmen who had fundamental ideological objections to FEPC 
legislation, and who were not merely erecting respectable facades over 
their own racism, sought to demonstrate their genuine commitment to 
equal employment opportunity in the immediate postwar years by forming 
voluntary organizations to further the principles of fair employment. 
The idea of community voluntary race-relations committees had first 
become widespread during the war. After the Detroit race riot of 1943 
more than two hundred and sixty cities set up race relations committees. 
While most of the committees supported FEPC legislation, at the same 
time they urged businessmen to adopt voluntary fair employment codes. 
Critics claimed there was a contradiction in the committees' position, and 
feared that the voluntary codes would serve no function except to take 
'_'government off the spot, inhibit pressure for adequate legislation and 
replace an enforceable legislative device by a pious hope."1 
The wartime voluntary action groups were not notably successful in 
bringing about any degree of fair employment beyond that required by 
Executive Order 8802, which had established the wartime FEPC. Because 
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the voluntary committees were created as emergency war measures, their 
members frequently lacked a long-range commitment to the problems of 
the black American. A particularly nasty example was the Fair Employ-
ment Practice Forum in an Ohio city which was headed by the president 
of the city's industrial association, a man who blamed most of the city's 
race troubles on the municipal administration during the depression which 
"treated the niggers so well that they came here in droves. " 2 This ill-
starred experiment in voluntary fair employment activity collapsed when 
the group's black representative from the state employment service mar-
ried his white secretary. The director felt that such an act was more than 
he or any other member of the group could swallow and accounted for 
the city's continuing reluctance to do anything about employment dis-
crimination. 
The movement to establish voluntary fair employment practice com-
mittees reemerged after the war. Frightened by the growing trend toward 
municipal and state FEPC laws and confident that the public mood had 
softened sufficiently to minimize negative economic effects, a number of 
state and local chambers of• commerce began to discuss elaborate volun-
tary equal employment plans. The first, and most widely publicized, volun-
tary fair employment plan emerged in Cleveland, Ohio in 1949. Municipal 
FEPC legislation was pending before the city council. Although the city 
council had defeated an FEPC ordinance in 1947, the legislation seemed 
sure of passage in 1948 until the chamber of commerce suggested a vol-
untary plan in place of the legal requirements.3 Clifford F. Hood, presi-
dent of American Steel and Wire Co., and Elmer L. Lindseth, president 
of the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co., led Cleveland business opposi-
tion to FEPC. Lindseth, who was also president of the chamber of com-
merce, admitted that Cleveland employers discriminated against Negroes, 
but argued that a voluntary plan would reduce discrimination more than 
legislation. 4 
The city council agreed to suspend action for ninety days while the 
newly formed Cleveland Committee on Employment Practices attempted 
to tackle the problem of discrimination. The chamber of commerce fi-
nanced the committee, which consisted of sixteen members. The chamber 
appointed eight business members, and Cleveland's mayor, Thomas Burke, 
named eight others to represent unions and minority groups.5 Under 
chairman William L. Ong, assistant to the president of American Steel 
and Wire, the committee launched an intensive advertising (or, as they 
called it, "public education") campaign to persuade employers to volun-
tarily hire Negroes. The committee mailed information pamphlets and 
requests for cooperation to 8,200 businessmen. One hundred and fifty, or 
fewer than 2 percent, responded favorably. 
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In addition to contacting employers the committee attempted to con-
vince the public that voluntary fair employment was a viable alternative 
to FEPC. The advertising agency of Fuller & Smith & Ross, which itself 
had voluntarily begun to employ blacks, donated its services to prepare 
car cards, posters, spot announcements, and speeches to carry the message 
to the people of Cleveland. The committee spent more than thirty thou-
sand dollars in its fifteen-month public education campaign.6 
The voluntary plan failed to break down the barriers to black em-
ployment. Favorable coverage of committee efforts in the business press 
consisted almost exclusively of case studies and examples, a sure sign that 
the program was failing to place large numbers of Negroes in new jobs.7 
As a result of the campaign some individual firms did begin to hire 
Negroes in white-collar and professional jobs, but high visibility jobs in 
high visibility firms (especially in banks and department stores) remained 
closed to blacks. Supporters of the voluntary plan claimed that the edu-
cational campaign had broken down racial barriers and that a significant 
number of Cleveland businesses had revised recruiting, placement, and 
promotion procedures to eliminate racial bias. Critics welcomed any 
change in attitudes that may have occurred as a result of the advertising 
but pointed to the lack of actual job progress as proof of failure. 8 
Originally intended as a way to stop FEPC, the voluntary plan actually 
prepared the Cleveland business community to accept FEPC legislation. In 
January 1950, when the city council again considered an FEPC ordinance, 
the chamber of commerce reluctantly supported the move. Support was 
not unconditional, however. Despite a year and a half of "plenty of good 
will but practically no jobs,"9 the chamber of commerce initially opposed 
the legislation, but when it became clear that the ordinance would pass in 
any event, the chamber had second thoughts. Since it was no longer in a 
position to block FEPC through suggestions of voluntary action, the cham-
ber sought to soften the objectionable sections of the proposed ordinance. 
Businessmen feared the punitive aspects of the ordinance. They believed 
the commission might be antibusiness and that unscrupulous lawyers 
would use the ordinance to get new cases. To meet these objections the 
council gave businessmen one-third of the seats on the fifteen-man com-
mission which would administer the ordinance. They declared that only 
principals, not lawyers, could file complaints and required two sets of con-
ciliation hearings before any punitive legal action could be taken against 
an employer. 10 One newspaper accurately assessed the situation when it 
commented, "This ordinance is not just government regulating business, 
but it's business helping to regulate itself. " 11 
The Cleveland voluntary equal employment plan demonstrated busi-
ness reluctance to accept the idea of equal employment except under 
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pressure, and its ability to mold to its own ends those pressures it could 
not avoid. The voluntary nature of the Cleveland program, legitimized by 
the formal support of the chamber of commerce and some key business 
leaders, allowed businessmen to meet new community standards for fair 
employment with a minimum of action. By expressing support for the 
voluntary program businessmen demonstrated their allegiance to the 
values of the American Creed. By taking small symbolic steps such as 
removing racial designations from job application forms and help-wanted 
newspaper advertisements they could demonstrate their social responsi-
bility without significantly altering their traditional employment patterns 
and risking possible white disapproval. 
The failure of the voluntary plan to place significant numbers of 
Negroes in nontraditional jobs made it difficult for the business com-
munity to oppose the FEPC ordinance. Having tried and failed to solve 
the discrimination problem themselves, the logic of their position com-
pelled businessmen to accept legislation. Moreover, the successful volun-
tary integration that took place in a few firms reduced the fears other 
businessmen had about hiring blacks. The successfully integrated firms 
served as models for those companies forced to integrate by the ordi-
nance.12 But the business community accepted the ordinance itself only 
reluctantly and then only after a successful attempt to modify the legis-
lation to make it more acceptable to the business community and to give 
businessmen a dominant voice in the administration of the code. 
Despite its failure to prevent a municipal FEPC, the Cleveland plan 
prompted the lllinois State Chamber of Commerce to launch the biggest 
and most successful anti-FEPC voluntary fair employment plan. There was 
some precedent for business-government cooperation for equal employ-
ment in Illinois. During World War II the Chicago Mayor's Committee on 
Race Relations appointed a subcommittee composed of the presidents of 
sixteen of the city's most important businesses. These chief executives 
conducted a survey of ninety-four Chicago companies which employed a 
total of 50,000 Negroes to determine company experience with black 
workers. The subcommittee concluded that integration could take place 
successfully in Chicago plants and that Negro workers could perform as 
competently as white workers.13 
The mayor's committee gave blacks new job opportunities, but it 
certainly did not give them equal job opportunities. While virtually all 
Chicago businesses employed black workers in some capacity by the end 
of the war, significant gains were limited to semiskilled production posi-
tions and to some unskilled office jobs.14 
Postwar equal employment activity by the Chicago business com-
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munity appears to have been minimal. A staff member of the Chicago 
Association of Commerce and Industry claimed that the association reg-
ularly held conferences on fair employment practice, but if this was true, 
the meetings do not seem to have made much of an impact on the business 
community, or on the association itse!f. 15 The president of the association 
expressed a biased attitude toward Jews, and the organization did not 
have any black workers on its staff. 16 
Concern with the fair employment problem surfaced again in late 
1949, when , for the second time, the lower house of the Illinois state 
legislature passed an antidiscrimination bill. The Association of Com-
merce and Industry set up an informal committee on fair employment 
practice. The committee tried to persuade employers who were sympa-
thetic to the idea of increased Negro employment to act on their princi-
ples. The casual nature of this effort cannot be overemphasized, and it 
appears to have had little impact. Chicago businessmen who were widely 
known as leaders in the field of Negro employment refused to become 
deeply involved in the association's activities, and even their superficial 
participation aroused the suspicion of more conservative employers. 17 
The lllinois State Chamber of Commerce took the threat of FEPC 
much more seriously than the Chicago Association of Commerce and 
Industry. Unlike the desultory city group, the state chamber of commerce 
launched a major voluntary equal employment campaign to head off an 
FEPC bill that was given a good chance of passage in 1951. The state 
chamber of commerce knew of the Cleveland experience, but felt it could 
succeed where the Ohio city had failed . The Illinois chamber believed that 
the Cleveland plan had placed too much emphasis on educating the public 
on the problems of Negro employment (thus contributing to the passage 
of the FEPC ordinance) and not enough on convincing the business com-
munity to hire more blacks. 18 
A special seventy-five man committee of the Illinois chamber of com-
merce conducted a state-wide survey of business integration practices and 
attitudes. Questioning three hundred top executives, the committee dis-
covered that strong opposition to Negro employment was limited in the 
state, and that objections were strongest in the south. Of the firms con-
tacted, 57 percent employed no Negroes at all, and of the 43 percent which 
did hire black workers more than 80 percent barred them from all but 
unskilled jobs. Despite this overwhelming record of discrimination, 70 
percent of the employers indicated support for the chamber's voluntary 
equal employment opportunity program. 19 The businessmen probably rec-
ognized that a voluntary gesture of acceptance of the ideal of equal em-
ployment might forestall legislation which would require them actually 
to hire blacks. 
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The chamber of commerce voluntary program called for a series of 
regional conferences for top executives and personnel men. Training 
schools to instruct lower-level personnel men in the attitudes and tech-
niques of employment integration were to follow. The chamber planned 
to set up a counseling service to assist companies experiencing difficulties 
in the integration process and, with the help of outside groups, hoped to 
locate and place black workers. In conjunction with the counseling pro-
gram the chamber planned to set up a clearinghouse to circulate experi-
ences with employment integration.20 
The piece de resistance of the program was to be a movie demon-
strating the value of integrated employment and countering all the com-
mon objections to hiring Negroes. The original script for this film called 
for the chief executive of the fictional company to admit that he had not 
been forceful enough in expressing his support of equal employment op-
portunity when he discovered that his personnel department had regularly 
been turning away Negroes and Jews. In the final version the company 
president merely corrected his staff without admitting any responsibility. 
This cut was made because one of the employers financing the venture 
objected to the implication that the company president might have been in 
some way responsible for discrimination. The man in question was the 
chairman of the board of one of Chicago's most important firms, and an 
immovable hard-liner in his own refusal to give customer-contact jobs to 
Negroes in his company. 21 The executive's position was not hypocritical 
because the. chamber of commerce was not actually trying to implement 
an equal opportunity program. The chamber wanted to get more but not 
necessarily better jobs for Negroes. The film-makers deliberately shied 
away from any discussion of the existing lack of opportunity for blacks 
and refused to deal with the implications of the American Creed for em-
ployment practices. Instead the film took a very narrow Capitalist Ethic 
focus, emphasizing the economic benefits of using the entire pool of avail-
able labor.22 
The Illinois State Chamber of Commerce achieved its primary goal. 
In 1951 the state senate again refused to pass the FEPC bill. But because 
the threat continued (the state lower house passed an FEPC bill every other 
year until 1961 when the law was finally enacted) the chamber of com-
merce continued its program in at least a moderately active form until 
1954. 
Although the Illinois State Chamber of Commerce chose to ignore 
the implications of its integration activity for overall values, other busi-
ness supporters of voluntary fair employment practices faced the demands 
of the American Creed more squarely. Throughout the early 1950's busi-
nessmen argued that voluntarism and education would end discrimination 
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while preserving the individual flexibility necessary for maximum profit-
ability. 23 In 1954, the governing board of the National Association of 
Manufacturers adopted the following official policy: "Freedom of oppor-
tunity for every individual to work at an available job for which he is 
qualified is an objective of the American way of life. Employment of in-
dividuals and their assignments to jobs should be determined by matching 
the individual's skills and qualifications with the requirement<; of available 
positions. These objectives can best be achieved through voluntary meth-
ods. "24 States such as Wisconsin that passed FEPC laws without enforce-
ment provisions seemingly bowed to the irresistible logic of the voluntary 
compliance argument. In 1952 an Indianapolis businessman told a tele-
vision audience that compulsory legislation was "the easy way out. If we 
can just get someone else to take over our responsibilities. That does not 
build strong people, neither does it build a strong nation."25 Even in states 
which had an enforceable FEPC, the tide of business cooperation and vol-
untary action flowed strongly. In the mid-fifties, New York businessmen, 
who had lived with an antidiscrimination law for more than a decade, 
banded together to encourage each other to live up to the spirit of the 
law.26 
The voluntary integration programs of the early 1950's were a clear 
expression of business ambiguity toward equal employment opportunity. 
They were an attempt to comply with the spirit of the American Creed 
without living up to the practical requirements embodied in an equal em-
ployment policy. Most businessmen did not want to hire Negroes, or were 
afraid to do so. Yet pressure from fair employment legislation, or the 
threat of such legislation, and the growing number of successful pioneer 
employers meant that businessmen who had previously ignored the ques-
tion of employing Negroes had to come to some conscious decision about 
what they would do. 
The voluntary plans were designed to relieve pressure on the business 
community, not to solve the problem of employment discrimination. Thus 
the business response to FEPC reflected the anti-Negro feelings that still 
permeated the business community in the 1950's. In the more liberal areas 
of the Northeast and the Midwest employers frequently accepted the 
abstract ideal of fair employment, but even in states with FEPC laws, em-
ployment of Negroes in nontraditional jobs was token at best. For ex-
ample, immediately after the war, the liberal New York papers, the 
Herald-Tribune, the Times, the Post, the Eagle, and PM, each had one 
token black reporter. The conservative papers had none, and only the 
communist Daily Worker had a significant number of black staff mem-
bers. 27 In 1948, when 125 white editors were asked if they would hire 
Negroes for their professional staffs, only 20 bothered to answer and 14 
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said they would not. 28 The six who said they would hire Negroes may very 
well have been like the New York Post city editor who told a job-seeking 
Negro, "Oh yes, we expect to employ a Negro any day now, but it will be 
either Walter White or W. E. B. DuBois." 29 
A 1951 survey of Negro employment practices in Connecticut, which 
like New York had an FEPC, disclosed a systematic pattern of discrimina-
tion. Employers hired a few nonwhites in professional and white-collar 
jobs, but on the whole they relegated Negroes to semiskilled and unskilled 
positions. Most employers merely ignored FEPC, although businessmen in 
one Connecticut city actively opposed it with an educational campaign 
that taught managers how to legally circumvent the equal employment 
law. Businessmen there also circulated a letter which warned employers 
against cooperating with investigators who were trying to discover the 
effect of the law on black employment.30 
Reluctance to hire blacks was also reflected in a survey of minority 
employment practices in the San Francisco Bay Area in 1949. More than 
40 percent of the employers who mentioned Negroes as a minority group 
said they would not hire them, or would prefer not to hire them for any 
job, and fewer than 20 percent said they would use Negroes in white-
collar positions.31 Another survey of San Francisco in 1955 indicated that 
business attitudes toward employing blacks had not changed much in six 
years. More than a quarter of one hundred employers questioned did not 
even claim to have a fair employment policy. Of the remaining 75 percent 
only 12 percent actually had some sort of formal nondiscrimination policy. 
The others had merely responded affirmatively when asked if they favored 
an integrated work force. Needless to say, actual employment of Negroes 
was considerably below even these rather unimpressive expressions of 
good will. 32 
Even at the end of the 1950's many employers remained reluctant to 
extend themselves on behalf of black employment. A questionnaire survey 
by the Minnesota Advisory Commission to the U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights in 1960 disclosed not only severe underutilization of the black labor 
force, but a strong disinclination on the part of employers to take even 
pro forma steps to express their support of fair employment. Of 922 firms 
that responded, only 582 answered the question that asked what they had 
done to assure fair employment. Of these, almost half admitted they had 
done nothing. 33 
The growing willingness of firms to extend equal opportunity to blacks 
was clearly a function of the changing social and political environment. 
Business sensitivity to the American Creed was dependent upon continuing 
external pressure. For the business community as a whole demands for 
employment integration increased steadily after World War II. Employer 
Business Counterattacks: Voluntarism and Breakthroughs 43 
response in the isolated cases where pressure slackened demonstrated the 
superficiality of business commitment to the American Creed. 
Illinois Bell Telephone practiced just such equal employment op-
portunism in its treatment of black clerical workers in Chicago. In the 
late forties and early fifties, during the peak of the Illinois FEPC drives, 
Illinois Bell began hiring black clerical workers in its Loop accounting 
department, and by 1951 Bell employed Negroes in most of its downtown 
Chicago offices. 34 However, in 1952 Illinois Bell began transferring its 
downtown operations to suburban locations. Over a period of seven years 
outlying offices took over almost all the work done downtown. Each time 
an office closed the company transferred its Negro workers to one of the 
remaining downtown offices (which were closer to their homes) while 
the whites moved to the new location. At the same time, Illinois Bell 
almost stopped hiring any new Negro employees. Even after the inde-
pendent union which represented the clerical workers complained, the 
company did no more than install a token number of black workers in its 
suburban branches. 35 Unlike retail outlets which were dependent on 
walk-in customers and had to hire blacks to attract a growing black popu-
lation, the telephone company was able to follow the white population to 
the suburbs and leave its black employees behind in the central city. 
In 1952, a National Urban League survey of thirty industrial cities 
disclosed widespread discrimination against Negroes in skilled and white-
collar occupations. Discrimination occurred despite the manpower de-
mands of the Korean War, and despite the antidiscrimination clause in the 
government contracts which many of the offending companies held. The 
report noted that southern employers were particularly blatant in their 
discriminatory practices. 36 Whereas many northern employers appeared 
willing to employ a minimum number of Negroes in professional, mana-
gerial, and skilled occupations, southern managers maintained a much 
more rigid stance. In the Upper South Negroes managed to keep the better 
positions they had gained during the war, but in areas of the Deep South 
postwar formalization of employment policy and job standards actually 
led to a decrease in the number of black workers.37 Southern businesses 
continued widespread discrimination against blacks well into the 1960's, 
although instances of token Negro employment did begin to appear in 
individual firms in some areas. 3s 
Despite general business reluctance to remove the ceiling on Negro 
jobs during the 1950's, there were some employers who pioneered in 
placing blacks in nontraditional positions. The changing employment pol-
icies of retail store owners are particularly interesting because retail 
merchants were extremely sensitive to alterations in the public mood. They 
were highly vulnerable to protests from both the black and white com-
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munities and had to be sure the balance had tipped in favor of equal 
employment before they began hiring blacks. Moreover, the reaction of 
stores' low-paid, status-conscious, white-collar sales people was an ex-
cellent barometer of how sincerely the white publ,ic had accepted the 
American Creed. 
Some isolated Negroes held retail sales positions before the war, but, 
with rare exceptions, only in stores with predominantly black clientele. G. 
Fox of Hartford, Connecticut, was apparently the first major department 
store to employ Negroes in white-collar and professional positions. G. 
Fox started to treat black and white employees equally in 1942, and pro-
moted black workers to sales, clerical, and other nontraditional jobs. In 
1945, Fox placed a Negro in a management position on its personnel 
staff.39 
The G. Fox policy, although a major breakthrough in both the nature 
and number of jobs given to blacks, was not immediately followed by other 
northeastern department stores. Even after the passage of the New York 
State Fair Employment Practice Act in 1945 department store owners in 
New York City refused to hire blacks in other than stock and service jobs. 
In early 1946 there were few if any blacks in store jobs which required 
them to meet the public. However, by the spring of 1947, nine of the 
fifteen largest New York stores had at least one black sales person, and 
one had fifteen.40 A study done that year indicated that the public com-
pletely accepted the black sales help.41 
Breakthroughs in Negro retail employment were made in a number 
of northern cities in the years 1947-48. Besides New York, stores in 
Boston42 and Minneapolis43 began to hire blacks in response to FEPC laws, 
pressure from civil rights groups, or a combination of both. Philadelphia 
stores also hired their first black sales help in the late 1940's. Immediately 
after the war Philadelphia store owners had rebuffed attempts by the 
American Friends Service Committee to persuade them to hire black sales 
personnel. The manager of one of the largest Market Street department 
stores told an AFSC interviewer in January, 1946, that he would not employ 
a Negro unless all stores moved together. He feared a single pioneer would 
lose business to nonintegrating stores.44 His position was fairly typical. He 
accepted the ideal of the American Creed, but the practical constraints of 
the Capitalist Ethic prevented Negro employment. One personnel director 
explained that progress would come slowly, and although she did not ex-
pect to see such a revolution in her lifetime, eventually Negroes would 
hold every kind of job. Fearful gradualism marked most Philadelphia 
merchants but perhaps none more so than the president of a large depart-
ment store. After demurring for the usual reasons of customer and em-
ployee reaction, the store executive explained that the problem would be 
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solved only through "amalgamization," which he felt would take cen-
turies.45 
Employer fears of customer and employee reaction to black workers 
were reenforced when one of the largest of the Philadelphia stores unex-
pectedly found itself pioneering in Negro employment. In an advertise-
ment for sales help the store had neglected to include the usual "whites 
only" designation . One thousand two hundred people applied for the ad-
vertised positions. One-third of the applicants were black, and the store 
personnel department rejected them out of hand. The rejected applicants 
made their feelings known in the black community, and the store suddenly 
found itself under extreme pressure to hire Negroes in nontraditional jobs. 
To placate the black community the store agreed to employ Negro sales 
people, only to discover that its white workers began to object. The store 
backed down in the face of employee opposition, and the black workers 
were not hired.46 
Throughout 1946 and 1947 a coalition of Philadelphia civil rights 
groups made a concerted effort to persuade store officials to open up 
their hiring practices. Although the employers expressed sympathy for the 
movement, particularly when the efforts were of the gentle Quaker 
variety, they adamantly refused to move until the city passed an FEPC 
ordinance in March, 1948. Subsequently the stores, whose managers had 
predicted no substantial progress for generations, peacefully and success-
fully integrated their white-collar positions.47 
Despite the successful integration of the department stores in New 
York, Boston, and Philadelphia, store managers elsewhere were sure their 
cities, their customers, or their employees could not be counted upon to 
agree to the hiring of blacks. Although Philadelphia stores hired Negro 
sales people in 1948, as late as 1954 only one store in Chester, Pennsylvania, 
a small city with a large black population less than ten miles from Phila-
delphia, had a black sales person. Moreover, although she was a college 
graduate with professional social work experience, she worked in a second-
rate store.48 The same kind of discrimination existed in Wilmington, Dela-
ware, barely twenty-five miles from Philadelphia. In 1949, a store owner 
who had a strong personal commitment to the American Creed promoted 
a stockgirl to a sales position, but opposition from white employees forced 
her to request a transfer back to stock work. When she subsequently at-
tempted to help on the sales floor during peak periods, customers com-
plained and the employer stopped even that token gesture toward employ-
ment integration. It was not until 1953 that Wilmington public opinion 
had mellowed enough to permit a store to use a black stock girl in sales 
during peak periods without incident.49 
In the South blacks held nontraditional retail positions in a number 
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of isolated instances. Southern employers most likely to hire black sales 
people operated their own small stores which did not cater to an exclusive 
class of customers. These employers broke with the traditional southern 
pattern of employment discrimination because they worked closely with 
their employees and came to regard them as individuals. Once the formal 
employer-employee barriers were down it was easy for the southern shop-
keepers to fall into the paternalistic acceptance of blacks which remained 
as a legacy of the antebellum period. Ironically, this attitudinal anachron-
ism provided, in isolated cases, an alternative route to equal opportunity 
outside of the American Creed. During World War II, for example, the 
owner of a Greensboro, North Carolina clothing store had hired a Negro 
janitor. By 1955, the black man had become a salesman on a par with the 
store's white personnel. Despite the fact he had not finished grammar 
school, and reportedly spoke English very poorly, he got along with his co-
workers and was popular with customers. When asked if he employed 
Negroes at any of his other stores, the owner replied, "It has never oc-
curred to me. This boy came to me twelve years ago and showed so much 
ambition and aptitude that I let him grow as fast as I could. " 50 
Any guilt feelings businessmen may have harbored as a result of their 
unwillingness to live up to the American Creed usually surfaced only after 
their consciences had been pricked in the pocketbook. Businessmen inte-
grated their work forces most easily when there was minimum conflict be-
tween the American Creed and the Capitalist Ethic. When the public ex-
pected (or at least accepted) equal employment, and either blacks or the 
government demanded it, and there was sound economic reason for hiring 
blacks, then firms would fall into line quickly. Just such a situation 
emerged among downtown Chicago stores between 1950 and 1953. 
During World War II some Chicago stores employed Negroes in non-
traditional jobs, but still in a service rather than in a white-collar capacity. 
A department store manager found that wartime wage controls prevented 
him from getting eighteen-year-old, size-sixteen blondes for his store res-
taurant. Only older white women or Negroes would work for the govern-
ment-controlled low wages he was forced to pay, and the owner found 
younger blacks superior to older whites. The store manager did not ex-
tend his favorable experience with Negro waitresses to other areas of his 
firm, however.51 With the exception of one high-quality women's store 
which hired "medium brown" women for service positions, no other major 
downtown store in Chicago employed any black workers in a nonmenial 
capacity prior to 1950.52 
The drive for an Illinois FEPC and the shift of whites to the suburbs 
prompted Chicago retail employers to reassess their discriminatory policies 
in the immediate postwar years. Retail merchants in Chicago played a 
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major role in the fight against an Illinois FEPC. Both the city and the state 
merchants' associations lobbied effectively against equal employment op-
portunity legislation. At the same time they faced increased demands to 
hire Negroes from black and white civil rights groups, and from their own 
lobbyists. In 1950, one of the retailers' legislative representatives compen-
sated for his opposition to FEPC by pressuring the store owners to proceed 
with employment integration voluntarily. The lobbyist had agreed to work 
against FEPC legislation because he earnestly believed that voluntary action 
could bring about implementation of the American Creed while preserving 
maximum business freedom. But the failure of firms to begin hiring blacks 
placed him in a state of value-action incongruence which he resolved by 
threatening not to lobby when the legislature next considered FEPc.53 
While the store managers' own lobbyist pushed for voluntary action, 
downtown retailers discovered that their customers were also demanding 
black sales people. Although there had been no systematic exclusion of 
Negro shoppers from Loop stores during the war, relatively few Negroes 
had patronized the larger department stores.54 During the late forties and 
early fifties , however, larger numbers of black Chicagoans began to shop in 
the Loop as whites began moving to the suburbs. Black shoppers expected 
black sales people, and despite the fear that Negro clerks would offend 
their white customers, many employers were not willing to sacrifice the 
additional patronage by discriminating against blacks. 55 The manager of a 
chain of women's shops who was among the first to employ blacks boasted 
that his success led other specialty shop owners on State Street to come to 
him for advice. He told an interviewer, "These shops realize that the upper 
middle class is moving to the suburbs and large department stores are going 
after them with branch operations. They realize that to survive they have 
to cater to the people remaining in the city. " 56 
In 1949 the first major downtown department store decided to begin 
hiring Negroes in white-collar positions. Store management apparently 
beli,eved the propaganda of the retail merchants' anti-FEPC campaign and 
felt obligated to prove that voluntary integration could work. Moreover, 
the store's personnel director had a social service background and was 
instrumental in convincing management that black workers could work 
successfully in a major Loop department store. This moral commitment 
to hire blacks was undoubtedly strengthened by the steady pressure from 
black action groups, especially the Congress of Racial Equality, which had 
picketed the store in protest of its hiring policy.57 In July, 1950, the store 
hired a college-trained black man to work as an administrative assistant. 
When he became familiar with company procedure, the store moved him 
to the personnel department to help coordinate the integration of the rest 
of the firm. But management trusted him with the delicate task of hiring 
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other Negroes only after he cleared himself of suspicion on several counts. 
First he assured his employers that he was unsympathetic to communism 
even though he had worked on a black newspaper which was widely ac-
cused of being "communistic." He also demonstrated his conservatism on 
personnel matters by telling management that he "did not believe that a 
firm should go out and hire Negroes without considering problems generic 
to the hiring of Negroes and further should not push the matter if all 
factors were not propitious to the situation. " 58 
Although cautious before it began to integrate, the store moved fairly 
rapidly once the policy change was made. Within three months there were 
more than eighty blacks on its staff. A subsequent personnel director said 
overqualified applicants swamped the store. People with master's degrees 
were asking for stock jobs. But however qualified they were, the store 
found that their black workers suffered from the disabilities of ghetto cul-
ture. Management discovered a number of the new black employees selling 
marijuana, and subsequent investigation disclosed that others, including a 
store guard, had lied about police records. Despite these minor drawbacks, 
the bulk of black workers performed admirably and gained high accept-
ance from their supervisors. 59 
Rank and file employees reacted more negatively than supervisors to 
integration. Although there was little overt opposition, the Negroes felt , 
or were made to feel, unwelcome at employee social affairs, and on a 
number of occasions were told not to use certain lockers or rest rooms. 
Part of the problem may have derived from the failure of management to 
inform their employees of the new hiring policy. Older workers in particu-
lar felt threatened when they found management "sneaking" Negroes into 
the store. 60 
Whether or not it was true, store personnel believed that much of the 
initial difficulty was due to the activity of the pioneer employee. Other 
black employees believed he had hired too many blacks too quickly and 
without sufficient quality control. Many employees believed the pioneer-
ing black manager was "an entirely too bright young man." According to 
one source, the pioneer Negro lost his position after a couple of years when 
he became "too friendly" with white women and took one to lunch in the 
executive men's dining room.61 
Despite some initial difficulties, the store maintained its new employ-
ment policy and willingly became a symbol of racial progress on State 
Street. It accepted the annual human relations award of the mayor's com-
mission and freely shared its experience with others who sought guidance. 
It is indicative of the quick change of mood that once a major store had 
broken the ice, a smaller, less important firm complained that it had been 
hiring Negroes long before the big store and resented the larger firm 
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getting all tne good publicity.62 All the important State Street stores but 
one and many outlying stores followed the leader. They followed so 
quickly that the American Friends Services Committee, which had been 
instrumental in assisting the first store, found itself swamped by requests 
for qualified black employees. 63 Once they accepted the idea of hiring 
blacks, several shops discovered that they didn't have to do anything to 
implement their new policy because Negro workers who had been 
" passing" admitted their ethnicity.64 
Although most stores seemed eager to jump on the integration band-
wagon, some nonretail firms took a dimmer view of the break in the color 
line. The head of a Loop business organization expressed strong criticism 
of the department stores which had integrated (he admitted some of his 
objection was based on his southern background and personal aversion to 
Negroes) and contended that the stores had hired blacks only because 
there was a labor shortage and that integration would not last. 65 His cyni-
cism was not entirely unfounded since one of the State Street stores ad-
mitted that it indeed was employing Negroes because the labor market was 
tight. In fact , the market was so tight that the store wanted to wait until it 
loosened up a bit lest the personnel department be tempted to fill all open 
positions with available black applicants.66 
The one major holdout among Chicago department stores demon-
strated how a limited amount of personal bigotry and a great deal of in-
stitutional racism could combine to prevent action even in the face of 
overwhelming pressure to integrate. The most prestigious of the major 
downtown stores adamantly refused to follow the trend because manage-
ment believed that the store had a " distinct personality" which made it 
more susceptible to customer retaliation. While stores which catered to 
the general public might not suffer as a result of Negro sales people, a 
store which served an "exclusive" clientele operated in a more rarefied 
socioeconomic environment, farther removed from the American Creed-
but no less responsive to the Capitalist Ethic. 
Part of the store's reluctance to hire blacks arose from conflicting 
beliefs among the firm's administrators. Some executives, including several 
at the highest level, felt sympathetic to the equal employment drive, but 
they were stopped by a single highly placed individual whose racial atti-
tudes had caused him to withdraw his daughter from college because the 
school had a Negro guest speaker.67 
In mid-1950, the executives of the holdout store informed AFSC that 
they would hire blacks only when to do so was no longer a controversial 
issue. They explained that they could not even hire blacks in traditional 
jobs because the store had a policy of promoting from within , and since 
Negroes could not be promoted to customer contact jobs, it would not be 
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right to hire them for any jobs. The personnel director also claimed that 
he had received hundreds of letters from customers who had threatened to 
take their business elsewhere if the store were integrated. 68 Furthermore 
the store management objected to the pressure to hire blacks as an in-
fringement of their freedom to employ whomever they wanted.69 
By the end of 1952 other firms in the Chicago area began to apply 
strong pressure on the holdout. Its irreconcilable position had become an 
embarrassment to anti-FEPC forces and had caused a split in the previously 
unanimous opposition to FEPC. Several of the first firms to employ Negroes, 
including some which had actively lobbied against FEPC, came to the con-
clusion that voluntary integration activity had reached a dead end and 
that only legislation could bring about complete fair employment. Those 
employers who continued to oppose fair employment legislation sent a 
delegation to visit the holdout and explained that unless the store changed 
its policy the state legislature might very well pass an FEPC Jaw, in which 
case the high executive would have cut off his nose to spite his face.70 
The store's managers, however, would not budge. They admitted in early 
1953, as they had three years before, that they would integrate someday, 
but it would be at a time of their own choosing, when they could be abso-
lutely sure they would meet with no unfavorable reaction from either 
their current employees or from their customers. 71 
In fact, the store did integrate in 1953, but not because it was the 
date of its choosing. Sight unseen, the store hired an applicant for a 
management position on his merits. He turned out to be black. The store 
refused to honor its commitment to employ him, so he turned to the 
Mayor's Commission on Human Relations. Although the commission had 
enforcement power only when dealing with public contracts, it was able to 
hold public hearings on complaints- which it threatened to do. Faced with 
the adverse publicity of public exposure, and with a supertight labor 
market, the store hired a black clerk-typist and five other Negro workers. 72 
Lacking any fundamental commitment to the American Creed, this 
store was able to hold out against a wide variety of forces that normally 
pushed employers into providing better jobs for black workers. Sure that 
their establishment was unique and that it had a special image to uphold, 
the management refused to be persuaded by the examples of others. Fear-
ful and conservative, the employers assumed their customers shared their 
bigotry. Yet, three years of constant pounding by integrationist forces 
appeared to have had some effect. The problem of black empoyment had 
become a constant topic of discussion .in management circles, and manage-
ment had come to accept the inevitability of Negro employment someday. 
Thus when the city moved to expose, if not punish, their exclusionary 
policy, the store capitulated. The attitudes of the public and of the busi-
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ness community in Chicago had moderated sufficiently to make public 
hearings unpalatable enough to cause the store to violate its image and its 
principles, even in the absence of an FEPC law. 
Spurred perhaps by the continuing tight labor market, several major 
Chicago industrial employers joined the retailers in hiring either their first 
black workers or blacks for the first time in nontraditional jobs.73 Never-
theless, Negro employment in nontraditional jobs was spotty at best. 
Despite six years of organized support for voluntary equal employment, 
in 1956, a group of Chicago businessmen, the Mayor's Committee on 
Community Welfare, could not find a single firm in the city that did all its 
hiring entirely on the basis of qualification. Many firms expressed support 
for the idea of equal employment, but the committee concluded that sub-
stantial progress would not be made until an FEPC law was passed.74 
Voluntary plans, although designed to head off FEPC, convinced some 
employers that legislation was necessary. Operating under the threat of 
legislation, under pressure from civil rights groups, and under persuasion 
from their own voluntary fair employment groups, businessmen in the 
1950's placed a small number of black pioneers in nontraditional jobs. 
Such placements were tokens, and most employers continued to discrim-
inate against most black applicants. Nevertheless, in many industrial states 
and some municipalities, the early fifties saw a small but growing accept-
ance of the idea of fair employment and a tolerance of legislation toward 
that end. 
4 
Opposition to Employment Integration: 
The Plant 
The voluntary fair employment activity and token placements of the 
early 1950's were an attempt by some elements in the business community 
to live up to the American Creed without sacrificing profitability. These 
early postwar applications of the American Creed grew out of the develop-
ing popular and government demands for equal employment that had arisen 
during World War II. Where the pressure to integrate had become acute 
(but not yet law) businessmen who felt uncomfortable discriminating 
against blacks could satisfy both their consciences and the demands of 
society through a minimal change in employment procedure. 
Although the few breakthroughs of the 1950's were important indica-
tors of the kinds of general changes that would follow in the 1960's they 
were the exceptions rather than the rule. The business community widely 
opposed employment integration during the 1950's. For a significant num-
ber of businessmen the refusal to hire Negroes did not come from weighing 
the conflicting demands of the American Creed and the Capitalist Ethic 
and opting for the latter. These businessmen suffered no cognitive dis-
sonance when they discriminated because they were racists for whom the 
American Creed was a whites-only ideology. 
Racist explanations for excluding blacks from employment decreased 
during the 1950's and virtually disappeared during the following decade. 
Employers may not have changed their personal attitudes toward blacks, 
but they recognized a liberalizing public attitude toward race relations, and 
they sought to present a position more in line with the American Creed. 
Once employers recognized there was a growing public demand for 
fair employment they found themselves faced with a dilemma. Most whites 
( including many of the businessmen themselves) still opposed equal employ-
ment and presumably any attempt to hire blacks would be costly in terms 
of employee and customer reaction. On the other hand, articulate segments 
of the public, the government, and sometimes the employers them~elves 
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accepted the ideal of employment integration, and any refusal to follow 
that ideal required some rationalization. The mos,t obvious, the most ra-
tional, and the most frequently used explanation was that, whatever its 
abstract merits, fair employment would create unnecessary expenses and 
was therefore a violation of the Capitalist Ethic. 
Even though fears of high cost kept most businessmen from integrating 
their firms during the 1950's the period was marked by increasing demands 
for black employment and therefore an increasing amount of business 
rationalization as to why no blacks were hired. Although constant discrimi-
nation in the job market and inferior educational facilities had combined to 
severely limit the number of Negroes trained for skilled and white-collar 
jobs, there were almost always more qualified black workers than there 
were businessmen willing to employ them. The availability of qualified 
blacks and the pressure to hire them made it difficult for employers to 
ignore the problem and depend on established institutional procedures to 
deal with Negro job seekers. If blacks were denied jobs, managers had to 
have a policy to explain why. When the president of a large Chicago store, 
who later became a national leader in the fight to solve minority problems, 
was asked in 1955 why he did not employ any Negro clerical help, he ex-
plained that his staff had a predilection for beautiful red-headed Irish girls . 
In other words, it was the fault of the system, not his personal bias that 
had led to the racial imbalance. Additional discussion forced him to admit 
that having been confronted with the situation, he had to make a personal 
decision, and he promised to do what he could to promote integration in 
the future. 1 
The reasons businessmen refused to hire Negroes between the end of 
World War II and the beginning of the civil rights revolution in 1960 fell 
into three major categories: 
Personal racism-Some employers objected on inherently racial grounds 
to employing Negroes. These businessmen either simply did not like 
Negroes, or they objected to on-the-job social contact between whites and 
blacks, or they believed that Negroes had racial traits that made them 
inferior workers. 
External racism-Many employers, who usually claimed they had no 
personal objections to hiring blacks, assumed that their employees, their 
customers, or the community was biased. These businessmen feared that 
others would react adversely to black employees and that their business 
would suffer. 
Inertia-A third group of businessmen were afraid of being pioneers. 
They had no specific objections to employing Negroes, but they wanted 
to wait until someone else hired blacks first. Large numbers of business-
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men who would otherwise have been willing to integrate, refused to do so 
because others in their geographical region or in their industry had not. 
The statement of Paulsen Spence at the 194 7 Senate hearings on an 
FEPC bill reflected the full spectrum of racist thought as it applied to the 
employment of Negroes. Spence based his assessment of blacks on the 
belief that they were behind whites on the evolutionary ladder and had 
less experience with civilization. Specifically, Spence made the following 
generalizations about the habits and abilities of Negroes: 1) "The average 
Negro is dirty," 2) "A substantial portion of the Negroes are affected 
with venereal diseases ... no self-respecting white woman would use a 
toilet that had been used by a Negro," 3) "The Negro is completely un-
reliable," 4) "No matter how hard they try, there are few Negroes who can 
resist the temptation to steal," 5) "The Negro is further handicapped by 
the fact that he will not work for another Negro," 6) "Likewise, I doubt 
if there is a white man in the whole South who would work under a Negro," 
7) "The Negro ... has practically no mechanical aptitude, and figures 
such as are used by a bookkeeper are a complete mystery to him," 8) "The 
Negro is not an immoral person, but rather an unmoral person. I doubt 
if the average Negro of either sex has morals much different from Falla."2 
Spence was unusual in his forthrightness and willingness to sum up the 
racist's view, but many of the sentiments he expressed were shared by 
respectable businessmen both in the South and in the North. 
Investigating business race relations in 1946, Everett C. Hughes 
found that despite their experience with Negro employees during the war, 
businessmen continued to think of the Negro as "a creature unfit for any 
but the marginal positions in industry because of his laziness, primitiveness, 
and childishness, yet full of an unjustified desire to have what he does 
not have and should not want to have, up to and including marriage 
with the manager's secretary."3 Southern employers were particularly apt 
to hold racist stereotypes, but during the 1950's many northern business-
men also regarded blacks as racially inferior. As late as 1966, 21 percent 
of northern business managers and 68 percent of southern managers in 
one sample asserted that they did not think Negroes were as intelligent as 
whites.4 
Businessmen who believed that Negroes were biologically inferior 
found it not only easy, but natural, to support segregation, and they viewed 
integration as a violation of eternal truths. The spokesman for an ad hoc, 
small-business, anti-FEPC group explained that segregatiion was "natural 
law" because "even the birds of the air, the beasts of the field, the bugs 
and the worms in the ground choose to associate and work with their 
own kind."5 Belief in the inherent inferiority of Negroes or in the natural 
law of segregation were general values that manifested themselves in the 
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specific fear of social integration. Exactly what constituted social integra-
tion was, of course, a matter of individual interpretation. In the early 
1950's social integration frequently meant any contact as equals between 
blacks and whites, but in later years the line was sometimes more finely 
drawn. In 1962, an important Georgia manufacturer of office supplies 
who had integrated blacks into most areas of his company below the 
white-collar level explained that he was willing to extend economic oppor-
tunity on a nondiscriminatory basis, but he would not be "a party to any 
deviations which might savor of social integration." Apparently he believed 
that promoting Negro women to clerical positions was tantamount to social 
integration.6 If an employer believed, as did one Indiana businessman, 
that the framers of the "Constitution" [sic] were referring only to white 
Protestants when they said "all men are created equal," and that God did 
not intend intermingling, then the closer the contact between black and 
white, the more un-American and blasphemous such activity would be.7 
And in fact, the closer the form of contact between the races, the more 
employers (and whites in general) objected. Thus individuals who ex-
pressed no opposition to employing Negroes, nevertheless, refused to do 
so for fear that equality in employment would lead to more intimate per-
sonal contact, which the employers considered improper.8 
Since the closest socially recognized form of intimacy was marriage, 
businessmen frequently pointed to interracial marriage as the reason they 
would not hire Negroes. A New York employer who affirmed his strong 
support of equal opportunity indicated he would not hire a Negro secretary 
because he did not want his daughter marrying a colored boy. When asked 
what tne connection between these two situations was, he replied, "Well, 
the line has to be drawn somewhere, and I draw it at personal intimate 
relationships."9 Managers frequently objected to intermarriage in terms of 
their expectations for their own children, and then they transferred this 
concern from the family to the firm. Businessmen who viewed their 
employees in a strong paternalistic light acted in what they considered 
their employees' best interests when they refused to bring blacks into 
their corporate families. Both the chairman of the board and the president 
of a large Chicago financial institution liked to view their company as a 
cross between a social club and a family. They provided employees with 
all kinds of fringe benefits, including free meals in the corporation's own 
restaurant. Because many of the young employees married each other (the 
president had met his wife there), the management carefully screened 
all applicants as to "character and social acceptability." Whatever their 
character, Negroes were considered socially unacceptable as marriage 
partners.10 
In the South fear of intermarriage continued to be a deterrent to fair 
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employment well into the 1960's. During the early years of the civil 
rights movement the executive vice president of the Retail Merchants 
Association of a progressive southern city rejected the idea of employment 
integration on the grounds that "Martin Luther King and the NAACP has as 
its ultimate objective, intermarriage, and all other activities are directed 
toward this end."11 
The businessman who rejected blacks as potential employees because 
he did not want his daughter, or for that matter anyone else's daughter, 
to marry one, rested his argument on the cornerstone of American racism. 
Although some employers rejected blacks as suitable mates because they 
attached specific unacceptable qualities to them, most employers who 
refused to hire Negroes out of fear of intermarriage did not feel compelled 
to give reasons why they wanted their employees to avoid social contact 
with blacks. The fact that Negroes were Negroes was sufficient in itself. 
The discriminatory businessman had four hundred years of racial exclusive-
ness to support his position, and even the most persuasive proponents 
of integration seemed to be at a loss for an appropriate response. 
The employer who would not hire blacks because he wanted to 
protect the racial purity of whites was expressing his racism in a purely 
social manner. Businessmen seeking to prevent social relations between 
blacks and whites could not defend their positions from a strictly economic 
point of view. Whatever his employees did with each other after work was 
(barring negative community reaction) literally none of his business. 
However, when the employer's racism manifested itself by finding fault 
with specifically work-related traits, the racism cloaked itself in the 
Capitalist Ethic. If, due to biological shortcomings, Negroes were inferior 
workers, then opposition to integration made good business as well as 
good social sense. By and large, businessmen assumed Negroes were 
unreliable, unambitious, unintelligent, and unacceptable to white customers, 
and thus were incapable of filling responsible positions.12 The imaginative 
employer could find proof of these childlike characteristics in every aspect 
of black behavior. A Baton Rouge employer complained on the one hand 
that Negroes were lazy because they would not work longer hours when 
he offered them higher wages, and on the other hand that they were 
unreliable and undependable because they quit his employment to take 
higher-paying jobs.13 
While some employers attributed highly specific physical traits to 
blacks, such as the ability to withstand heat or an insensitivity to toxic 
chemicals, 14 the most consistent physical stereotype was the classic concept 
of "strong back, weak mind." Thus blacks were frequently considered 
only for jobs which required a maximum of stamina and a minimum of 
intelligence. So ingrained was this stereotype that firms which had sue-
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cessfully used Negroes for years, such as an Atlanta steel company, simply 
phased them out with the coming of mechanization on the assumption 
that blacks could not do any work of higher levels. 15 
To a limited extent businessmen's negative attitudes toward blacks 
during the 1950's stemmed from their experiences with Negro workers 
during World War II. But, while some employers generalized the poor 
performance of a few blacks to the entire race, many more employers 
unrealistically generalized their exceptionally good experience with pioneer 
black workers during the 1950's. Throughout the war, due to the severe 
manpower shortage, many employers hired poorly qualified blacks because 
they were the only workers available. Not surprisingly, these businessmen 
were dissatisfied with their Negro employees and used their unhappy 
wartime experiences to justify discriminatory postwar employment poli-
cies.16 In the decade after the war, however, business experience with 
blacks was, for the most part, favorable. Many pioneer black employees 
were overqualified, and their outstanding performance on the job gave 
rise to high expectations for black workers in general. Businessmen who 
employed blacks during the fifties rejected the racist stereotype because 
experience taught them it was not true. They could conform to the 
American Creed by offering employment opportunity to blacks while 
getting more than their money's worth in talent. 
Beginning sometime in the 1960's, however, as the pool of overquali-
fied black workers dried up, there appears to have been a resurgence of 
negative business expectations toward black capabilities. Unlike earlier 
racist stereotyping that grew out of ignorance, this later downgrading of 
black ability appears to have been based on experience. A study by 
Dwight Vines in 1967 found that both in the North and in the South 
managers who had no experience with Negro employees tended to expect 
higher quality work from blacks than managers who had experience with 
them. Vines found increasingly favorable managerial attitudes toward 
Negroes, but he also found increasing dissatisfaction with the performance 
of Negro workers.17 It would seem that despite some poor on-the-job 
performance by blacks, businessmen during the late 1960's were placing 
greater importance on equal employment than on equal performance. 
Some businessmen may have claimed they were getting inferior work 
from black employees, but the expectation of poor quality work from 
Negroes ceased to be a generalized stereotype. 
Whether or not they were personally biased against blacks, employers 
were often reluctant to admit that they had violated the American Creed 
by finding blacks unacceptable for employment. Businessmen preferred to 
see themselves as helplessly caught in the trap of other people's racism. 
Aversion to Negroes on the part of others was the single most important 
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reason cited by businessmen for their failure to employ black workers 
between the end of World War II and the beginning of the civil rights move-
ment.18 In 1953, the executive director of Minnesota's Fair Employment 
Practice Commission observed that "while we have encountered some 
evidence of prejudice, we do not find strong expressions of it on the part 
of those who make employment policy." He found that the problem 
was "a very general feeling of fear that prejudices on the part of fellow 
workers, union members or customers will cause friction in the company 
or the union or will cause a loss of trade."19 
Unlike the fear of blacks, which was racist and was condemned by 
the American Creed, the fear of losing trade was good business and was 
approved by the Capitalist Ethic. By transferring the source of discrimina-
tion from himself to others, the businessman not only absolved himself 
of guilt for acting unfairly, but also rationalized his unfair employment 
policy. The entire burden of responsibility fell from the employer's shoul-
ders when he attributed racial bias to others. He could adopt a position 
of moral purity while perpetuating an admittedly immoral policy. The fault 
lay in the system. Capitalism was responsive to the demands of the 
people and the capitalist could change only after the people had changed. 
Businessmen often ascribed the severest racism to their female em-
ployees. There was a persistent belief among employers that women were 
particularly prone to Negrophobia and the more women a businessman 
employed the more likely he was to reject the idea of Negro employment. 
The employers' expectations of female opposition to blacks was not 
necessarily based on an accurate assessment of the white women's actual 
feelings. Blood's study of the integration of Minneapolis-St. Paul retail sales 
personnel provides a good example of such unwarranted fear. A thir:d of 
the managers Blood questioned predicted difficulties when they introduced 
blacks into their white-collar, predominantly female labor force. In fact, 
when integration occurred, there was practically no opposition at all.20 
A 1955 incident in a North Carolina furniture company illustrates how 
far out of touch employers could become. The personnel manager of the 
company called one of his top secretaries into a conference in order to 
demonstrate to a visitor the extent of white aversion to working with blacks. 
Much to his chagrin he discovered that the secretary, although a local girl 
without a college education, had no objections whatsoever to working 
alongside Negroes. She explained to the incredulous personnel man that 
she entrusted the care of her children to a Negro maid-with whom she 
ate lunch-and therefore could not see why she should object to a similar 
pattern at work.21 
Because most women were white-collar workers who depended to 
some extent upon job status to compensate for the typical low pay of 
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clerical help, employers faced the double problem of status threat and 
female reaction when they employed Negro office help. The office manager 
in a Chicago garment factory said he had no objections to hiring black 
clerical help but doubted if he could "attract high class white personnel 
for employment after employing Negroes." It took a visit to a successfully 
integrated department store to convince him that job status was not in-
versely proportional to the number of Negroes on the staff.22 
Even businessmen who had successfully integrated their firms con-
tinued to believe that whites resented interracial employment. As late as 
1962, several Atlanta employers refused to allow their firms to be used 
as examples of employment integration because they said their white 
employees did not want it known they were working with blacks.23 There 
is some evidence to indicate that the introduction of blacks into an all-
white work force did have a detrimental impact on employee morale,24 and 
antiunion employers feared that white employee backlash might take the 
form of unionization.25 
Quite clearly some managers were placing their own prejudiced thoughts 
in the minds of their employees. Nevertheless, the pattern of employers as-
suming worker opposition was too consistent to imagine that it was based 
solely on the racism of businessmen. Employers who had been "burned" 
during the war, like the North Carolina mill owner whose workers had not 
only walked off the job when blacks appeared but who had also refused to 
touch any of the "contaminated" thread which the blacks had spun, con-
tinued to shy away from blacks in the postwar years.26 Throughout the 
1950's many employers who attempted to employ blacks found themselves 
facing vociferous employee opposition, and fainthearted employers who 
took their workers at their word remained opposed to integration. 
When employers did move to hire blacks and refused to be intimidated 
by white resistance, they seldom suffered any prolonged trouble.27 This was 
true partly because employers did not attempt to hire Negroes in regions 
where the white population was vehemently antiblack. Nevertheless, 
the extent of employee Negrophobia is certainly open to question. Even in 
a hard-line southern city like Dallas, at least one clothing store successfully 
integrated its work force as early as 1952.28 In most cases employers were 
not ready to test the depth of employee prejudice, but the case of a medium-
size machine shop in Dallas demonstrated that even a timorous move to 
employ Negroes could meet with unexpected acceptance from white 
workers. The president of the firm, which made gears, had suffered from 
high turnover among his white employees. In 1953, at the risk of being 
branded a "nigger lover," he decided to train blacks. He believed that 
Negroes would provide him with a more stable work force because they 
would not be lured away by the aircraft plants which were pirating his 
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other workers-aircraft companies did not employ blacks at skilled jobs. 
After secretly training the Negroes at night, the president broke the news 
to his day workers, apologized, explained his economic predicament, and 
assured them that the blacks would not get their jobs. He even admitted to 
the men that he was prepared to back down if there were widespread oppo-
sition. There was none.29 
Worker opposition to blacks did not necessarily die after the employer 
placed Negroes on the job. While most early fair employment policies 
were implemented smoothly, there were numerous instances of continued 
employee resentment even after blacks had begun to work. Particularly 
during the early fifties when virtually no blacks held nontraditional jobs, 
whites were extremely concerned about the structure of white-black re-
lations on the job. Established job patterns relegated Negroes to inferior 
positions. Therefore any job at which a Negro worked W<\S ipso facto a 
low status job and a threat to the white workers who shared it. When a 
Dallas retail store promoted a Negro employee to a cashier's position in 
1954, white girls complained and demanded that she wear a uniform. The 
store complied and satisfied the white objections by forcing the black girl 
to wear a badge of service. 30 This case was not unique. White employees 
frequently insisted on some kind of distinction between black and white 
workers, usually demanding segregation of work places, lunch rooms, toilets, 
and company recreation facilities. 
During World War II, Executive Order 8802 had prohibited discrimi-
nation in hiring in industries holding government contracts. The executive 
order, however, . did not deal with on-the-job segregation of working 
quarters and plant facilities and the wartime Fair Employment Practice 
Commission did not attempt to do what committee member Mark Ethridge 
said "no power in the world-not even in all the mechanized armies of 
the earth, Allied and Axis," could do, that is "force. Southern white people 
to the abandonment of the principle of social segregation."31 Wartime 
acceptance of on-the-job segregation was not limited to the South. When 
RCA brought the first Negroes into its Indianapolis plant in 1942, the com-
pany agreed to provide segregated facilities "as a concession to the ex-
pressed will of the white workers for the purpose of achieving the intro-
duction of Negroes.32 When integrated facilities had the support of 
management the War Labor Board supported such a move against the 
objections of the workers, but when management was willing to accede to 
their white employees' demands for segregation the government agencies 
went along. 33 
The physical demands of production militated against continued ex-
tensive segregation on the work floor after World War II. In the tradi-
tionally unpleasant or menial jobs assigned to Negroes, segregation existed 
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by department, but once blacks began to move into production-line work 
such segregation became difficult to maintain. It was awkward to try to 
turn white jobs into black ones and uneconomical to separate blacks and 
whites working at the same job. Some plants did try to keep their workers 
separated, however. In 1954 the personnel director of the Chicago branch 
of a major insurance company hired eleven Negro clerks and placed them 
in a separate office in the cellar. The manager supplied the segregated unit 
with its own air-conditioner and Coke machine and, in the absence of com-
plaints, was convinced that the segregated Negro women were happy. He 
was so sure that the black clerks were content that he invited a visiting 
antidiscrimination field worker to interview them. The personnel man 
seemed genuinely shocked and confused when the questions of the visitor 
brought the black workers' resentment to the surface. 34 
Managers explained the maintenance of on-the-job segregation by 
claiming that Negroes had certain characteristics that made them unaccept-
able to white workers. During World War II, workers in a Connecticut 
factory complained that Negroes were dirty, louse-infested, and diseased. 
"Diseased" in these cases was usually a euphemism for venereal disease, a 
belief which manifested itself in "elaborate efforts to avoid using the toilets 
Negroes used."35 Venereal disease particularly frightened whites and was 
a major theme in plant desegregation battles. A midwestern employer ex-
plained that he found that Negroes had a higher incidence of venereal 
disease than whites, but that during World War II he had hired them any-
way as long as they agreed to get the disease treated. Since the company 
hired its first black workers only at the lowest level, and gave them no 
opportunity to advance, it is hardly surprising that white workers con-
curred with the management's decision to segregate sanitary and eating 
facilities. 36 
When first employing Negro workers a number of employers instituted 
physical examinations, including blood tests, to forestall possible employee 
objections to dirty and diseased coworkers.37 Although a "hypothetical pro-
gram" for the integration of Negro employees, drawn up by the American 
Friends Service Committee in 1950, did not "recommend additional 
Wassermans unless all employees got Wassermans," it then cited the cost 
of these blood tests for venereal disease as the only additional expense a 
company might undergo as a result of employing Negroes.38 As late as 
1966 a southern firm required its black employees, but not its white 
workers, to obtain a report on their health from the public health office on 
communicable diseases.39 
White fears of Negro-borne diseases commonly led employers to 
separate "social" facilities for black and white workers. During the 1950's 
throughout the South and in many areas of the North dining rooms and 
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bathrooms were strictly segregated. Frequently the segregated facilities 
paralleled departmental segregation. The separate and usually inferior 
toilets and lunchrooms assigned to blacks matched their separate and 
usually inferior jobs. 
In several instances when employers attempted to integrate facilities 
during the 1950's opposition came from black as well as white employees. 
Some older black workers, fully aware of the social implications of inte-
grated bathrooms and cafeterias, feared the conflict they believed would 
ensue. When, in 1955, the vice president of a major Dallas department 
store suggested to an older black employee ( the head of the maintenance 
department) that the cafeteria be integrated, the employee, who had been 
with the firm for 25 years, demurred. He explained that as long as the 
black workers ate in the kitchen no white woman employee who might 
have a grudge against one of the Negro workers could use his proximity in 
the waiting line as an excuse for claiming he had gotten fresh with her. 
The vice president admitted he had not considered the problem in that 
light, and he called off the move.40 There were additional instances in 
Raleigh, North Carolina, and in Indianapolis where Negro maintenance 
workers refused to use company dining facilities which were open to all 
employees. In the Indianapolis case the black workers refused to attend a 
newly integrated company picnic in 1953 and asked that they be given 
their traditional separate outing.41 
Objections to integrated facilities on the part of black workers were 
relatively rare and limited to situations in which the Negroes were other-
wise relegated to an inferior status. By far the largest number of objections 
to integration came from white workers, and most of their objections cen-
tered on integrated toilets. In the South, part of the problem arose from 
southern laws, ordinances, and commission rulings that required plants 
to have separate bathrooms for black and white men and women.42 Such 
laws could be a real deterrent to smaller companies' considering the inte-
gration of their staffs. When a small firm employed Negro janitors a small 
third toilet met the legal requirements, but bringing black women into the 
labor force presented a more difficult problem. Employers thought they 
would have to construct another complete bathroom to meet the needs of 
the new black employees, and the expense was often inhibiting, especially 
when coupled with strong opposition from white women.43 A major national 
food chain fired the black women in several of its North Carolina branches 
in 1957 when the state inspector demanded that the firm add a fourth rest 
room. All the company's stores in the state had been built on the assump-
tion that Negro women would never be employed, and for reasons of room 
or expense, local managers were unwilling to expand their facilities to 
meet the demands of the law.44 
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Until the late 1950's employers in the North as well as in the South 
had to face the problem of integrating the washroom. Indeed, the problem 
may have been somewhat more acute in the North because, unlike south-
erners, northerners had no generally accepted method of dealing with white 
objections to sharing facilities. Southerners, whether or not under the aegis 
of the law, differentiated between economic and "social" integration by 
maintaining segregated facilities even for an integrated work force . North-
ern employers, on the other hand, faced either the ire of their white 
employees if they integrated social facilities, or the awkward alternative of 
establishing segregated facilities in a society that did not condone this 
kind of blatant racial discrimination. Well into the 1950's many northern 
employers continued to react with ambivalence and confusion when employ-
ment integration forced them to face the great water closet crisis. One 
Chicago insurance company tied itself in knots over the problem of social 
integration. The firm, which had traditionally hired Negroes only as 
messengers, agreed to open all positions to black applicants. But the messen-
gers had their own lounges and rest rooms, and the management was not 
sure what to do with the new black employees. On the one hand manage-
ment did not want to extend to black women the segregated pattern they 
had established for the black men, but on the other hand if the company 
did not provide the newly hired black women with separate toilets then the 
managers worried that they would have to integrate the men's rooms.45 
Toilet trauma did not strike southern employers widely until after the 
Kennedy administration. Most southern employers considered the employ-
ment of Negro workers sufficiently daring in itself without attempting to 
compound their troubles by integrating their nonwork facilities . In some 
cases southern management went to astounding lengths to assure their 
black workers of separate but equal toilets. In 1952, a Dallas food company 
was able to solve a minor personnel emergency by installing a sanitary 
napkin dispenser in the Negro women's rest room after difficulty had 
developed over the black workers using the machine in the white rest 
room.46 Frequently separate but equal toilets were more separate than 
equal. A small Dallas garment manufacturer hired his first black power 
machine operators in 1953. He set up a partition to divide them from his 
white workers on the work floor, and made the black workers use a small, 
inadequate toilet while his white girls used a much larger wash room.47 
Perhaps the most extreme example of the two-toilet syndrome occurred in 
1958 in an Atlanta company where the owner bowed to employee de-
mands and made his Negro porter use the segregated toilet of a company 
in the next building.48 
Under considerable pressure from the government, from elements 
within the business community, from some unions, from civil rights 
organizations, and frequently from parent companies headquartered in the 
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North, southern firms began to desegregate toilet facilities during the 1960's. 
By that time public opinion in the South had evolved to the point where 
many white workers could accept shared facilities, but employers did not 
always recognize that their employees' attitudes had changed. In 1963, the 
Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union forced the Suffolk, Virginia, 
plant of the Planters Peanut Company to integrate blue-collar jobs, plant 
entrances, water fountains, and the cafeteria, but the company balked when 
it came to desegregating the blue-collar rest rooms.49 The firm claimed it 
would lose two hundred of its two hundred and fifty white employees (it 
had 1,250 black workers) if it eliminated the separate toilet facilities. The 
union complained to the federal government's Committee on Equal Job 
Opportunity, which threatened to cancel the firm's government contract 
unless the company integrated its washrooms. Faced with the possible 
loss of business, the company complied with the union demands and did 
not lose any of its white workers. 50 
In the North, the attitudes of both employers and employees toward 
integration changed at approximately the same rate. However, in the vast 
majority of the cases reported from the South in the period after 1960, 
southern management appeared considerably ahead of the southern work 
force in accepting racial integration. This is not to say that southern busi-
nessmen were in the vanguard of social and economic progress in their 
part of the country, but rather that employers were vulnerable to external 
pressure and therefore made changes in personnel policy before their white 
work force was willing to go along. Employers faced with loss of contracts 
or legal action could and did enforce nondiscrimination and integration on 
the line, but social pressure was frequently sufficient to maintain segrega-
tion in work-related facilities even after racial designation signs came 
down.51 By and large southern management believed that southern white 
workers looked upon desegregation as inevitable. Employers thought white 
workers would try to delay integration by every means at their disposal 
but in the end would live with it. 52 And indeed there were examples of 
successful integration of facilities in southern companies. Workers in a 
southern industrial plant decided they would rather be clean than continue 
to boycott an integrated shower,53 and textile plants in Alabama reported 
that within a few weeks of integration in 1967 workers had ceased to use 
the paper cups at drinking fountains and the disposable toilet covers in trr 
rest rooms. 54 
The demands by employees for duplicate toilet facilities suggest trr 
fear of sexual contact between races that frequently complicated attempts 
to integrate employment. While the taboos against mixing the ra,'.es were 
stronger in social than in economic activities, many white workers and 
employers considered the mere presence of a member of the opposite sex 
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and race a potential social hazard. In 1952 a small Charlotte, North 
Carolina, manufacturer commented that he believed that Negro and white 
men could work together and that Negro and white women could work 
together, but that a white woman working with a black man would have 
"lost something," would have "been degraded."55 Even when employers 
allowed blacks and whites to mix on the job they could demand that male 
Negroes adopt a socially subordinate role in their contact with white 
women. For example, a long-time black employee of an Atlanta insurance 
firm was reprimanded for complimenting a white female employee on her 
hairdo and for addressing her by her first name-as she had always ad-
dressed him.56 
Since whites were most willing to accept integration in employment 
and least willing to accept it in purely social activities,57 employers fre-
quently feared that they would face their most difficult integration 
challenge in those areas where the company sponsored social activities.58 
By and large, however, these fears seem to have been ungrounded. Com-
pany-sponsored athletic teams usually had no problem absorbing blacks. 
The white bowlers of one midwestern firm even offered to dissolve their 
team when they could not find a bowling alley that would allow blacks to 
play.s9 
Sexually mixed social activities were somewhat more of a problem, 
but even at dances and dinners whites accepted the presence of blacks. 
A survey of forty-four firms in the upper Midwest in 1949 indicated that 
Negroes successfully participated in the social activities of 71 percent of 
the companies.60 However, the definition of "successful integration" has to 
be understood in context. In the mid-fifties an executive of a New York 
firm which "successfully" included Negroes in its social programs said, 
"I don't think they mix socially. You have to draw the line. They brought 
their own friends to the Christmas parties. They know their place."61 
Perhaps because of the tradition of paternalism toward the Negro, 
some southern firms allowed blacks to attend company social programs 
during the 1950's before they would give them full job equality.62 But after 
1960 the solutions to the problem of social integration appear to have 
polarized among southern firms. Firms which had traditionally sponsored 
extravocational social programs either continued them with full black 
participation or they were disbanded. One very thorough survey of man-
agement practices after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 indi-
cated that many southern companies folded their social programs in the 
face of employee resistance to black participation.63 But at the same time 
in the same states there were companies that successfully integrated parties, 
picnics, luncheons, and dinner-dances with no employee opposition.64 
During the late 1940's and the 1950's the personal racism of many 
Opposition to Employment Integration: The Plant 67 
employers prevented them from instituting fair employment policies. 
Although such men sometimes used economic excuses to explain their dis-
criminatory practices they were not in fact choosing the Capitalist Ethic 
over the American Creed but were merely catering to their own personal 
prejudices. Some of those employers who rejected blacks for reasons of 
external racism were in fact projecting their own personal hates onto their 
employees. Other employers, however, who might have personally ac-
cepted blacks, truly feared the costs of a negative reaction from their em-
ployees if they integrated. For these businessmen external racism was a 
genuine economic threat which forced them to choose between their in-
dividual acceptance of the American Creed and the Capitalist Ethic which 
prohibited unnecessary business disruption. This fear of friction between 
blacks and whites was so strong that many employers attempted to main-
tain separation on the job and in plant facilities even after they had begun 
to extend some measure of equal opportunity to Negroes. 
5 
Opposition to Employment Integration: 
The Community 
Even those businessmen who honestly believed that white workers 
would seriously object to integration, and therefore claimed economic con-
siderations prevented them from hiring blacks, were dissembling to some 
extent. External racism on the part of employees was rarely strong enough 
to significantly endanger company operations. After all, employers held 
the ultimate economic whiphand over their employees, and businessmen 
were not inclined to cater unduly to workers' whims except when they 
coincided with the employers' own interests. Thus, with only an occasional 
exception, when a strongly motivated employer put integration on a 
"take it or leave it" basis, white workers were not willing to sacrifice their 
livelihoods on the altars of bigotry. 
While employers feared the reactions of those over whom they held 
economic sway, they were even more afraid of the external racism of those 
upon whom they were economically dependent-their customers and the 
community at large. If a businessman were willing to fire a white employee 
who openly opposed integration, the worker had to have a profound com-
mitment to his racist values to undertake the personal disruption of leaving 
one job and hoping to find another. However, the customer who objected 
to blacks in a business had merely to walk into another firm and transact 
his business there. While there was usually a high correlation between the 
attitudes of the community and those of a company's employees, if there 
were differences, the community attitudes had a much stronger impact on 
business thought. From the perspective of the Capitalist Ethic the reaction 
of customers was much more important than that of employees. While 
the "customer is king" concept may have been overemphasized in the 
perpetuation of the myth of free market capitalism, it was nevertheless 
an important consideration in the minds of many businessmen, particularly 
in the retail and service industries.1 Employers, always sensitive to their 
customers' feelings, assumed that their patrons would object to Negroes 
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dealing with them as equals and catering to their intimate personal needs.2 
The vice president of an Atlanta credit company explained that his firm 
would not hire black investigators because it would be extremely embar-
rassing "for a white person to be asked personal questions about his friends 
and their habits by a Negro."3 
Prior to 1960, many employers were so convinced that their customers 
would reject Negro sales and service personnel that even firms with a black 
clientele excluded blacks from their staffs. Despite the fact that Negro 
organizations had been agitating for equal employment opportunity c:: t 
least since the 1930's,4 many employers continued to insist that Negroe : 
objected to being served by members of their own race. In fact , there are 
a few substantiated cases of black customers objecting to Negro sales or 
service personnel. In 1953 a Greensboro, North Carolina, furniture dealer 
claimed that his uncle attempted to allow Negroes to run an outlet in a 
black neighborhood, but that "not one of them called him to express 
appreciation for having given this sales position to a Negro but many of 
them complained to him for having sent a Negro to transact business with 
them. " 5 For the most part, however, managers merely assumed that their 
black customers shared the values of the white society and would feel 
demeaned if served by a Negro. In 1955 a Chicago insurance executive 
predicted that if he "opened a Southside office in the Negro section and 
hired Ralph Metcalf, Jackie Robinson or other famous Negro athletes to 
work there, the Negroes wouldn' t gc there. " 6 And as late as 1962 an 
Atlanta furniture store owner explained that in order to "satisfy customers 
of both races white salespeople only are employed. " 7 
As was so frequently the case in the history of American race rela-
tions, the black worker was discriminated against both coming and going. 
If some employers who had black customers refus.ed to hire black sales-
people because both their white and their black customers might object, 
many more refused to hire black sales or service personnel because they 
had few black customers and did not want to attract any. The general 
opinion in the business community until well into the 1960's was that 
Negroes could only be used to cater to Negro clientele. 8 If there were 
few or no potential black customers, then many businessmen shared the 
attitude of a Chicago broker who could not understand "why we should 
have to go.way down and look for employees from the Negroes when we 
are able to reach out and hire the best in the community."9 
A 1953 article in the trade magazine Sales Management aptly illus-
trated the assumptions which limited business use of Negro sales and 
service personnel. David J. Sullivan, a black marketing and management 
consultant, discussed in some detail the hiring and use of black salesmen. 
The entire article was predicated on the assumption that Negroes would 
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only be used to sell to members of their own group: "To sell effectively to 
retailers in Negro areas is it necessary to employ Negro salesmen? ... Do 
retailers in Negro neighborhoods prefer a Negro or a white salesman to 
call on them? ... The answer in both cases is 'yes' [sic]." Sullivan went on 
to discuss the cultural uniqueness of the black community, and concluded 
that only black salesmen could overcome the obstacles to profitable sales 
in Negro neighborhoods. Nowhere in the article did Sullivan even hint 
that blacks might be able to sell to whites. 10 The idea that Negro sales and 
service personnel should be used primarily with Negro customers con-
tinued to exert great influence on employers into the mid-sixties, especially 
in the South. As late as 1963, Negro baseball star and businessman Jackie 
Robinson encouraged businessmen to hire more blacks sales people by 
emphasizing, "you will demonstrate to the Negro consumer that you want 
his business ... [and] you will find you have won the consumer loyalty of 
the Negro." 11 
Employers based their fears of customers' objections to black sales 
people on the same stereotypes which made employers fear their em-
ployees' opposition to blacks. Employers widely held, for example, that 
Negro men could not serve in any position which brought them into con-
tact with white women, especially in the woman's home. In Columbus, 
Ohio, the manager of an office of a large life insurance company agreed 
in 1952 that Negro policyholders and employees should not be forced to 
do business in a special segregated office. Despite his inclination toward 
equal treatment, however, the manager resisted the suggestion that black 
men be used as premium collectors. He said that collectors called at the 
homes of policyholders and that they dealt mostly with white married 
women whose husbands would object and whose neighbors would talk if a 
Negro man visited them during the day.12 
Employers' fears, of course, were not entirely unfounded. The 
Columbia, South Carolina, branch of a national retail firm, somewhat 
atypically, used a black appliance repairman as early as 1952. During one 
of his house calls a white woman accused him of "frightening her." The 
man was brought to trial (the specific charges are unclear) and was found 
innocent only after his supervisor interceded on his behalf. The store itself 
assuaged the woman's fright with two hundred dollars and started keeping 
a file of complimentary letters on all its Negro employees to use in such 
cases in the future. 13 A similar incident occurred in 1954 in Chicago, when 
an investigating company which had been using Negroes in Negro neigh-
borhoods decided to use them in white areas as well. Not only did the 
clientele object, but one of their men was picked up by the police on a 
loitering charge after a woman complained about him being in a white 
section of town.14 
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Throughout the 1950's, in both the North and South businessmen be-
lieved the public still would not accept the implementation of the Amer-
ican Creed and they invariably sought justification in the Capitalist Ethic. 
In every kind of retail and service industry and in many manufacturing 
firms, the response to the question of integration was the same-"our 
customers would object and we would lose business." The comments in 
1952 of a man who was later to become one of the South's leading spokes-
men for moderation and integration are indicative of the depth of po-
tential opposition to black sales people. Not only did this Atlanta business-
man personally reject the idea of hiring Negro stenographers, but he said 
that if Rich's (the leading Atlanta department store) "put on a Negro 
sales girl I would never let my wife shop in that store again .... " He went 
on to bolster his self-proclaimed position as "a long way ahead of the 
others ... and a southern liberal" by praising Booker T. Washington's 
accommodationist Cotton States Exposition speech. 15 
It need hardly be said here that, for the most part, the fears of massive 
customer resistance in the North were unfounded. Stores which placed 
blacks in sales positions rarely experienced sufficient public disapproval to 
even warrant mentioning. A few dissatisfied customers occasionally can-
celled charge accounts and there were isolated incidents of unpleasantness, 
but by far the vast majority of employers discovered that the public was 
much more willing to accept Negro sales people than they were. 16 
It appears that both southern employers and southern consumers were 
slower to accept black sales personnel than northerners. Large numbers of 
southern employers continued to use customer nonacceptance as an excuse 
for not hiring blacks, at least until the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. Interviews with numerous businessmen in Atlanta, Georgia, during 
the early 1960's disclosed widespread agreement that firms would lose 
white business if they employed blacks in customer contact positions. 17 
Atlanta firms that had begun to integrate in 1962 were reluctant to ad-
vertise their activity for fear of alienating, or further alienating, their 
customers. 18 They need not have been. Under pressure from boycotts and 
sit-ins a group of almost a dozen stores in the city hired their first Negro 
sales help during the Christmas rush of 1962 and received no adverse 
public reactions. 19 The following year the manager of a home-delivery 
bakery not only agreed to hire his first black routemen, but also agreed to 
assign them without regard to the racial makeup of the neighborhoods, 
thus breaking the taboo against black men calling on white housewives.20 
By the mid-sixties many national firms had begun to use Negro out-
side salesmen without regard to the race of their potential customers. 
Public attitudes had changed to the point where Negro salesmen in the 
North and Midwest were in a position to tap the guilt feelings which a 
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hundred years of agitation against the evils of discrimination had culti-
vated. White customers were frequently eager to give orders to black men 
as a way of demonstrating their freedom from prejudice. 21 Nevertheless, 
even among the supposedly sophisticated and progressive giants of Amer-
ican industry old stereotypes continued to play a role in determining 
personnel policies. At the end of the 1960's, steel executives still felt that 
Negroes were generally so socially unacceptable that they could not be 
hired as salesmen because "certain social contacts away from a business 
place are important. For example, a salesman may be expected to take his 
client to dinner or discuss a contract over cocktails at a private club. "22 
Internal racism, that is, personal employer bigotry, was the first pos-
sible barrier to black employment. But even when they accepted the 
American Creed many businessmen rejected employment integration be-
cause of external racism from the white employees and customers. Public 
opposition to integration was the final category of external racism which 
stood in the way of black employment. The public can be defined as those 
people who, though not necessarily the firm's customers, influenced the 
social, political, and economic climate in which the company operated. 
Although businessmen frequently equated specific powerful local figures 
with the public, they could also mean the more amorphous collection of 
customs, social patterns, mores, and habits which established the intangible 
real boundaries of corporate action. 
The businessman who molded his actions to fit public opinion could 
not cite the immediate costs or profits of integrating. Nevertheless, the 
Capitalist Ethic underlay business decisions based on conformity to local 
values. The atmosphere of community respect and goodwill so necessary 
to smooth day-to-day operations was a product of good local citizenship, 
and that meant adhering to community hiring patterns. Two surveys 
taken a decade apart disclosed that when businessmen did integrate they 
counted "public image" and "favorable community relations" as the 
most important benefits gained from employing Negroes.23 
The search for public approval was indicative of the secondary role 
the American Creed played in the businessman's decision-making pro-
cess. Even when the employer personally accepted the ideal of equal 
opportunity and believed he could surmount the obstacles of employee 
and customer opposition, the fear that he might offend some vague com-
munity standard was frequently enough to preclude black employment. 
In such situations the businessman played a passive role and allowed 
social forces to determine the timing and extent of integration. By remain-
ing morally neutral the management of the company followed what it 
perceived as the path of least resistance. Such a stand gave maximum 
weight to organized power blocs within the community during times of 
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social flux, and maximum weight to local social patterns during times of 
stability. 
Because of their monopolistic status, public utilities offer a unique 
illustration of the relationship between public opinion and the Capitalist 
Ethic. Even though they were frequently among the first companies in a 
region to hire Negroes in nontraditional jobs, the utilities consistently 
soft-pedaled their pioneering during the 1950's. In 1950, a midwestern 
telephone company refused to allow the American Friends Service Com-
mittee to use it as an example of successful integration because they 
feared that other businessmen would accuse them of pioneering only 
because they were a monopoly that did not have to face competition.24 
On the other hand, those utilities which refused to integrate placed great 
emphasis on their vulnerability, as controlled monopolies, to public opin-
ion. In 1952, an eastern telephone company fired a newly hired black 
girl because white employees objected to her. Their personnel man ex-
plained that the white objections were indicative of public sentiment 
and that "a public utility could not crusade, nor could it be far behind 
nor too far ahead of the general community feeling. "25 
During the 1950's public opinion in the North shifted sufficiently to 
become a force for, rather than against, integration. In 1955 conserva-
tive businessmen in Indianapolis cited the "favorable climate" as the 
reason for initial black employment.26 Those employers who continued to 
resist integration were less able to hide behind the Capitalist Ethic. Racism 
could no longer be cloaked in acceptable economic terms, and business-
men began to experience the conflict of values that arose when violations 
of the American Creed went unjustified. A group of Columbus, Ohio, 
businessmen who had previously been able to hold off the demands of 
black pressure groups became "scared to death" when white groups 
began pushing for equal employment opportunity in 1953. They were 
afraid that there was a major movement behind the fair employment 
drive which would "some day bring forth a big editorial or publicity 
about their ,policy of discrimination. " 27 By 1958, the mood of the country 
outside of the Deep South had moderated enough to allow how-to-do-it 
b9oks on employment integration to discuss the pros as well as the cons 
of publicizing steps toward equal employment opportunity. 28 
In the South, where segregation and discrimination had not only 
been a long sanctioned historical practice, but where formal ideological 
justification for discrimination also existed, employers were likely to 
attribute discrimination to "local custom." Local custom reflected not 
only the desires of the dominant segment of society (not always the 
majority in the South), but also the quasi-legal mores of race relations 
to which all citizens were expected to conform.29 Southern employers 
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were fully aware during the early fifties that change was in the offing, 
and many of them expressed their willingness to begin hiring blacks 
when the time came-but not until then. 
Even when national companies hired integrated work forces in their 
plants outside the South, local custom dominated their employment pat-
terns below the Mason-Dixon Line. In 1954 a manufacturer of electrical 
equipment decided to open a plant in Raleigh, North Carolina. The 
industrial relations manager reported that the city's responsible citizens, 
"and I don't mean Rotary and Kiwanis," demanded that the firm agree 
to abide by the city's segregated employment practices. The company 
had three options: 1) not to move to the city, 2) move, but refuse to abide 
by local patterns, and 3) move and knuckle under. It chose the third 
option and operated under the constant scrutiny of the city's first citizens, 
who made sure that the firm towed the color line.30 
When a businessman was confronted by public opinion, either from 
common citizens or from pillars of the community, he was dealing with a 
tangible situation. The employer could judge the impact of his integra-
tion activity through community feed-back and adjust his policy accord-
ingly. So long as the Capitalist Ethic took precedence over the American 
Creed, public opinion was the final arbiter of whether or not to integrate. 
However, public opinion could change without the employer realizing 
it, and, as long as there was no pressure for integration, many businessmen 
clung to policies which were no longer demanded by community mores. 
Such employers were tradition-bound. A survey of more than one thou-
sand discriminatory firms by a special Pennsylvania commission in 1953 
revealed that well over a third of them listed "tradition" as the cause of 
their discriminatory policies.31 The report did not disclose what the 
firms meant by "tradition," but it is possible that in the early fifties some 
of them may have been entirely innocent of any conscious effort to ex-
clude blacks from their firms. An Indianapolis insurance executive ex-
pressed surprise in 1952 when an equal employment opportunity worker 
asked why he had no black clerical workers. The manager said it had 
simply never occurred to him to ask that question. He had no answer, 
and he promised to begin actively looking for Negro clerical employees.32 
For firms like these, discrimination did not exist because of a con-
scious decision on the part of management not to hire blacks but rather 
was the result of a failure of management to make a firm policy in favor of 
fair employment. As soon as such firms realized that no cost was involved 
in living up to the American Creed, the low-key, low-pressure tactics of 
pro-fair employment groups, including the usually circumspect activity 
of state FEPc's during the 1950's, were frequently strong enough to prompt 
them to adopt a formal fair employment policy. Tradition-bound corn-
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panies usually existed in northern industrial states where public opinion 
had come to oppose discrimination. In many cases it took only a minor 
incident to bring the shift in public opinion to the company's attention. 33 
A closely related, but somewhat different set of rationalizations and 
justifications came into play when the businessman perceived his role not 
as one of passive response to public opinion or community standards, but 
as a creative force within the community. Ideally, employers liked to limit 
their community leadership to broadly acceptable activities, such as sup-
port for charities, education, and noncontroversial civic improvement. 
Thus, there would be no conflict between a businessman's role as a power 
in the community and his need for good public relations. The equal em-
ployment issue placed the employer on the horns of a dilemma. While 
Negro employment was clearly a problem that called for decisive business 
leadership, it also threatened to expose the employer to adverse publicity 
no matter what he did, either from the opponents or proponets of em-
ployment integration. Joseph Ross, a Detroit department store executive, 
explained that the businessman had ''been trained all of his life in the 
tradition of his craft to be a useful citizen in his community, but never to 
get involved in controversial issues. " 34 Faced with the unavoidably contro-
versial issue of fair employment, during the 1950's businessmen usually 
decided that they owed greater allegiance to the patterns of the local com-
munity than to the ideal of the American Creed-at least when it came 
to hiring blacks. 
Even when equal employment was required by law, the extent to 
which employers hired blacks was almost invariably determined by the 
prevailing racial attitudes of the local community. Very rare were men 
like the manager of an Indianapolis variety store who said that he was a 
citizen of the company, not a citizen of the community, and would abide 
by community patterns only to the extent necessary to maximize profits. 35 
Much more common were remarks like, "our recruitment has been limited 
to white workers because of the responsibility we owe this community. " 36 
In 1953, when one of the nation's largest steel corporations was challenged 
by black leaders to do something about discrimination in the Philadelphia 
area the company assured them that it wanted to be a good neighbor and 
work along with residents and other businesses in the area. But the com-
pany made quite clear that because of its size and the potential impact of 
any of its decisions on the community, it would not take the lead in push-
ing to end discrimination.37 
Except for instances in which the business community feared eco-
nomic disruption, employers usually opposed attempts to alter community 
race relations patterns. The urge to conform to community patterns of 
employment was so strong that even firms which pioneered in placing 
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Negroes, thus deviating from the accepted norm, expressed their policy in 
conservative rather than liberal terms. International Harvester, which in 
fact did break community patterns, albeit cautiously, privately admitted 
that "when they went into a community they studied very carefully what 
other business practices were, then I. H. went just as far in its integration 
as the most progressive company in that vicinity and then just a little 
farther."38 In public statements, however, this policy was interpreted as 
meaning that "when Inte·rnational Harvester enters a new community its 
plant adopts policies generally in consonance with community patterns. " 39 
A series of events at the end of 1963 served to focus public attention 
on the problem of the corporate role in the community. In September, the 
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) accused the United 
States Steel Corporation, along with a number of other Birmingham, 
Alabama, employers, of encouraging by silence the racial violence that had 
recently led to the bombing of a church and to the death of four black 
children there.40 sNcc's charges were followed four days later by a similar 
accusation from Charles Morgan, Jr., a Birmingham lawyer. Morgan told a 
Yale University audience that Roger M. Blough, chairman of the board of 
U.S. Steel (and a graduate of Yale Law School), could telephone Ala-
bama's governor, George C. Wallace, and tell him, "frankly, a) the Birm-
ingham schools aren't good enough and b) the Negro children should be 
admitted by nightfall ... . " 41 Within a week groups were picketing U.S. 
Steel's office in New York City.42 
Under the threat of contract cancellation from the federal govern-
ment, Tennessee Coal & Iron, the U.S. Steel division in Birmingham, had 
begun to eliminate some of the more blatant forms of anti-Negro dis-
crimination practiced in its plant, such as its dual seniority system. How-
ever, Arthur V. Wiebel, president of Tennessee Coal & Iron, rejected 
suggestions that he exert pressure within the business community and the 
city to ease racial tension. Wiebel and other businessmen did talk with 
government conciliators and sign a newspaper advertisement calling for 
the employment of black policemen.43 But on the one hand Wiebel claimed 
that U.S. Steel did not have much economic power in the community, and 
on the other he insisted that the firm would not do anything "because the 
minute that would happen, people would say: 'There's U.S. Steel trying 
to run Birmingham.' "44 Roger Blough backed up Wiebel at a news con-
ference when he stated, "for a corporation to attempt to exert any kind 
of economic compulsion to achieve a particular end in the social area 
seems to be quite beyond what a corporation can do. " 45 Despite encour-
agement from newspapers and the President of the United States, the 
company stuck to its position that "any attempt by a private organization 
like U.S. Steel to impose its views, its beliefs and its will upon the com-
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munity by resorting to economic compulsion or coercion would be re-
pugnant to our American constitutional concept. ... "46 
While it may be questionable whether Roger Blough actually refused 
to exert his influence in Birmingham because of constitutional scruples, at 
least he cannot be accused of hypocrisy. Neither U.S. Steel nor its repre-
sentatives were in the forefront of the drive for economic civil rights or in 
the movement to promote social consciousness among businessmen. The 
same, however, cannot be said of the Crown-Zellerbach Corporation. For 
a number of years in the mid-sixties this San Francisco-based paper com-
pany was one of the important big business advocates of increased black 
employment. James P. Mitchell, Secretary of Labor in the Eisenhower 
administration, an important, socially concerned businessman and a senior 
vice president of Crown-Zellerbach, became a leading spokesman not only 
for extending equality to Negroes but for actively going out to recruit 
and train qualifiable Negroes. Mitchell based his advocacy on a number of 
the standard arguments: it was morally and socially right, it would under• 
cut radical demonstrators, and it was cheaper than other methods of 
solving the problem.47 As the head of a special committee appointed by the 
mayor to study the problem of Negro employment in San Francisco, 
Mitchell had recommended that the mayor establish another commission 
to set up a privately financed training program.48 
Mitchell's stand brought him and his company widespread recogni-
tion in the firm 's home city. By 1964 northern white attitudes had changed 
to the point where people not only accepted equal employment opportun-
ity but could applaud Crown-Zellerbach's call for extra assistance to help 
blacks achieve economic equality. However, when faced with a much 
cruder form of discrimination, in a much less enlightened environment, 
Crown-Zellerbach's vaunted liberalism failed to materialize. At precisely 
the same time that Mitchell was exhorting his colleagues in the Bay Area 
to go the second mile, Crown-Zellerbach was trying to turn its back on the 
racial problems of Bogalusa, Louisiana. Crown-Zellerbach had acquired 
its Bogalusa plant in 1955. For almost ten years it maintained segregated 
facilities and separate lines of promotion for blacks and whites. Not until 
the federal government began to put pressure on the company did it slowly 
and reluctantly begin to alter its discriminatory practices.49 
Crown-Zellerbach's reluctant acquiescence to the fair employment 
demands of the federal government may have been less impressive than the 
company's West Coast rhetoric, but it was positively radical compared to 
the firm's response to racial upheaval in the city of Bogalusa. Bogalusa 
had chosen to ignore the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Crown-Zellerbach, 
which provided 70 percent of the town's income, chose to stand back while 
the Ku Klux Klan intimidated the few whites who supported the law. 
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Not until word of Crown-Zellerbach's callousness got back to San Fran• 
cisco, where public pressure was exerted against the company, did the 
firm express its support for equal rights for all citizens in Bogalusa. Vio-
lence continued in Bogalusa, and the company continued to hide within its 
shell, insisting that civil rights were a community not a company re-
sponsibility. so 
The Congress of Racial Equality, which had come to Bogalusa to help 
the black com_munity gain its rights under the Civil Rights Act, instilled a 
new militancy in the people. In early 1965, the company which had only 
recently desegregated its water fountains, suddenly found itself con-
fronted with a black work force that challenged the firm, not in the com• 
munity, but within its own walls. The company may have been reluctant 
to act outside of its immediate jurisdiction, although it apparently would 
when sufficient pressure was brought to bear, but when blacks started 
protesting Crown-Zellerbach's employment patterns the firm could no 
longer hide behind claims of corporate noninvolvement in civic affairs. 
Demands by the black community for improved job conditions overflowed 
into general civic disorder which ended only after the home office sent one 
of its vice presidents to Bogalusa to oversee negotiations with the pro-
testers. Robert F. Collins, a lawyer for the black protest group, announced 
"the real issue is what, if anything, the company is willing to do to com-
pensate for the past discrimination. To merely say that at this point you are 
going to be fair is not enough." 51 The company, whose northern spokes-
man had been nationally honored for his calls for hiring qualifiable blacks, 
was reportedly "appalled" at this suggestion. The company, whose 
northern spokesman had urged his fellow businessmen to act in order to 
forestall government action, responded to southern demands for better 
economic treatment with the comment, "This company cannot be ex-
pected to solve these problems by itself. The government will have to lay 
down industry guidelines. "52 
The U.S. Steel and Crown-Zellerbach incidents illustrate the difficul-
ties faced by firms when they attempted to reconcile their internal em-
ployment policies, the demands and expectations of their immediate com-
munity, changing national standards, and the requirements of govern-
mental bodies. Executives of both companies had refused voluntarily to 
intervene on behalf of blacks in the community. When circumstances 
forced them to contend with the de facto power they wielded, they both 
chose to deny the obvious and retreat behind ideological arguments for 
noninvolvement. Writing in Harper's, David G. Wood, himself a steel 
executive, called U.S. Steel to task for failing to act. Using the same argu-
ment Crown-Zellerbach used in San Francisco, but not in Bogalusa, Wood 
called on industry to move ahead, both inside and outside the plant. If they 
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did not, Wood warned, businessmen were inviting government interference 
into the conduct of business "in a situation where it is right and we are 
wrong."53 
Wood was only one of a number of voices that began to call for in-
creased corporate participation in the social affairs of the community in 
the mid-sixties. Some of the calls for business involvement were exten-
sions of business' safe and long-accepted role as a mainstay of the Com-
munity Chest and a governmental ally in making noncontroversial civic 
improvements.54 More socially concerned employers, however, denounced 
individual action and called for corporate commitment to solving the 
community's social problems. In 1967, Elisha Gray, chairman of the board 
of the Whirlpool Corporation, said, 
We businessmen can put together more sheer power for good or for evil than 
all the rest of the elements of the community combined. Our, call it influence, 
call it clout, by any name it is the ability to get things done. Most of us, how-
ever, and you can include me until recently, have not wanted to throw our 
weight around. We have not felt it the province of business to get into social 
problems. Whatever personal comfort you may get from the individual ap-
proach it won't do a thing toward curing problems of such great dimensions. 
I believe the job can only be done by organized, unanimous, mass assault by 
businessmen.ss 
As government and public pressure grew during the 1960's firms 
increasingly began to ignore local custom and started to emphasize their 
responsibilities to a constituency beyond their immediate community. 
This new found sense of national social responsibility reflected the changed 
relationship of the Capitalist Ethic and the American Creed. The black 
revolution of the early 1960's and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made it 
economically wise to adhere to the American Creed. Leadership suddenly 
became a practical policy. Companies began to take positions like that of 
the Caterpillar Tractor Company, which told its management, "we should 
be prepared to contribute strong leadership to community endeavors to 
alleviate the long years of injustices which exist for so many minority 
group people. " 56 Thus businessmen brought pressure on their own to ex-
tend open housing to blacks in Chicago,57 lobbied for open housing legisla-
tion in Delaware,58 put pressure on the directors of local recreation facil-
ities to extend equal treatment to blacks,59 and generally began making 
themselves visible in areas traditionally considered outside the proper 
sphere of business. Things had gone so far by 1967 that Edward C. 
Logelin, Chicago regional vice president of U.S. Steel, told a college busi-
ness symposium, "more and more business is finding it must be concerned 
with other than its commercial aspects .. . . The problems [of society] can-
not be solved by government alone, but rather the private sector will have 
Opposition to Employment Integration: The Community 81 
to supply many of the answers and all of the wealth that will be re-
quired. " 60 U.S. Steel had at least learned the rhetoric of the new era. 
After 1960, leadership, that is, a willingness to be first, became a popu-
lar virtue in the eyes of businessmen. But prior to the Kennedy adminis-
tration even businessmen who fully accepted the importance of the Amer-
ican Creed (with some important exceptions which will be discussed in 
later chapters) were afraid to be the first to employ blacks. In a confi-
dential interview in 1955, one of the nation's most important management 
consultants observed that "most businessmen are not bigots, but they are 
cowards. " 61 
A detailed consideration of the variables responsible for a firm assum-
ing the leadership role in equal employment are beyond the scope of this 
study. However, as far as businessmen themselves were concerned, com-
pany size, length of time in the community, and sometimes the nature of 
its ownership seem to have been the most important factors in determining 
an employer's willingness to pioneer.62 
While large corporations were not necessarily in the forefront of 
social innovation, throughout the 1950's small businesses often waited for 
larger companies to take the lead in nondiscriminatory employment, and 
the limited available data indicate that larger companies were more likely 
to begin hiring Negroes than smaller firms. 63 The personnel director of a 
small Chicago packing house indicated in 1951 that he would like to pro-
mote blacks to supervisory positions but did not dare proceed until the 
large meat packing companies began doing so. 64 Similar views were held by 
many managers of smaller businesses, including the president of a Colum-
bus, Ohio, bank who refused to employ blacks because it would be "highly 
contrary to established Columbus tradition ... until some of the larger 
banks had made a move first. " 65 On the other hand, there were firms, like 
U.S. Steel in Birmington, which claimed they would not act precisely be-
cause they were dominant and did not want to be accused of trying to 
control the town. 
The herd instinct is strong in the business community. No employer 
likes to break a new trail into controversial areas, but once a pioneer indi-
cates a new direction many other employers are eager to follow his lead. 
Virtually all organized efforts to crack the employment barrier attempted 
to exploit the businessman's propensity to follow by holding up to re-
luctant firms examples of successful employment integration.66 Where 
leaders existed who were willing to be used as examples, this technique 
could be very successful since many employers quite consciously modeled 
themselves after the most progressive firm in town. 67 
In his study of department store integration in Minneapolis-St. Paul 
during the late forties, Robert 0. Blood, Jr., found that when one com-
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pany advanced a Negro to a job above the generally accepted level for 
blacks other firms usually followed suit. Blood referred to this process as 
the "domino theory of employment breakthrough."68 For the theory to 
work, not only did the dominoes have to be lined up, but the first one had 
to fall, or be pushed over. The first domino frequently had a very broad 
base and was not easily tipped. Indianapolis department stores were under 
pressure to upgrade Negro employees after 1951, when they began losing 
black workers to Indiana Bell Telephone and to the Finance Department 
of the Army which maintained a large office in that city.69 In May of 1952, 
the personnel manager of one of the city's major department stores de-
termined that the time had come to hire blacks as sales clerks. He had the 
reputation of being an "excellent combination of idealist and realist," and 
other managers had said that when he began hiring Negroes they would 
know that the time had come for action. The personnel manager took his 
leadership role in the business community quite seriously but preferred to 
give another store the opportunity to be the first in the city to move on this 
particular issue. He devised a plan whereby the other store would place a 
black worker on the selling floor on Monday morning and he would follow 
on Tuesday. He believed that a third store would then be willing to employ 
black sales people on Wednesday.70 
The other stores were not willing to conspire to integrate. They 
played Alphonse to the first store's Gaston, and nothing happened during 
the first part of the summer. Because the first store had always dominated 
patterns of retail conduct in Indianapolis, other employers refused to 
budge until it acted. 71 An American Friends Service Committee field 
worker in Indianapolis then accused the personnel man of the key firm of 
being "the greatest single obstacle to integration in the city." This charge 
apparently stung, and the personnel man showed the accusatory letter to 
the store's president. The president manfully suggested that the integra-
tion take place while he was on vacation. That way there would be no way 
of appealing the decision up the line. 72 
On September 16, 1952, the personnel manager announced at a meet-
ing of the merchants association that two Negro sales clerks were starting 
work that morning. He explained that he had held off, hoping that some-
one else would move first so that his store would not always get the credit 
for being the most progressive firm in town, but since none of them would, 
he felt compelled to take the step. 
Other companies in Indianapolis were favorably impressed by the 
experience of the pioneer, and within three months the Indianapolis outlet 
of a major national chain had promoted two blacks, one to head its service 
station, and one to a sales position in the store. The other two of the three 
big department stores in Indianapolis were a bit slow to come around, and 
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the personnel manager of the pioneering store jocularly, but significantly, 
teased their management as "being slow in recognizing that a new com-
munity pattern had taken place," to which one of them responded that he 
himself would begin employing blacks within a month. 73 
The pattern of integration in the department stores of Minneapolis-St. 
Paul, Indianapolis, and Chicago demonstrated the importance of leader-
ship, albeit reluctantly assumed leadership, in breaking with tradition. The 
inaction of the banks of Chicago is a good example of how the failure on 
the part of any businessman to take the lead could greatly impair progress. 
As early as 1950, one Chicago bank which did a large amount of business 
in the black community began hiring Negroes, but the president of the 
institution did no proselytizing himself and would not let his bank be used 
as an example by groups who were attempting to get other banks to adopt 
fair employment practice.74 In 1952, a second Chicago bank hired its first 
Negro white-collar worker. It had been the subject of extensive pressure 
from the black community which had exploited the bank's close ties to 
the labor movement to embarass it into employing blacks. 75 Since the 
situations of both banks were atypical, neither constituted a precedent for 
the rest of the financial community. 
At a meeting of Chicago bank personnel directors in 1952, those 
present agreed that when the time came they would all hire blacks simul-
taneously, but they could not agree on when the time would come. The 
vice president of the most important bank in Chicago, the institution 
which could set the pattern for the industry, refused to employ Negroes 
because he believed if he changed his policy the other banks would feel 
morally committed to follow him, and he certainly did not want to run 
the risk of being labeled a moral leader.76 Two years later, despite con-
stant requests from the black communi,ty and fair employment groups, 
Chicago area banks had still refused to hire blacks. Banks in outlying 
areas said that they were waiting for downtown banks. Middle-sizeg Loop 
banks said they were waiting for the industry leaders, and the industry 
leaders dragged out all the excuses in the book to explain why they were 
not ready to integrate. They feared their employees would object. They 
feared their customers would object. Negroes had too high a crime rate, 
and too many of them were on relief, and if the banks gave them jobs they 
would just attract more undesirable black immigrants from the South. 
Management said that such a controversial step had to be initiated by 
the banks' boards of directors, and the members of the boards said that it 
was an operational matter which should be decided by management.77 
Finally in the spring of 1955, the bank which had previou·sly refused 
to integrate because it did not want to exert undue moral pressure on its 
fellows began hiring blacks in nontraditional jobs. The bank had been 
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under fire from various Chicago organizations since 1950. The Urban 
League, the American Friends Service Committee, and the Chicago Com-
mission on Human Relations had all approached, cajoled, and threatened 
the institution, but to no avail. The deciding factors apparently were "a 
gentle prod by government people" and a meeting with executives from 
similar institutions throughout the nation, many of whom had successfully 
employed Negroes for some years and wondered why their Chicago coun-
terpart had not acted.78 Like the management of the first two pioneers, 
the leaders of the third bank to integrate refused to urge similar action 
on their colleagues. Each bank had started an equal employment policy for 
internal reasons, and while they might have been able to bring pressure 
on other banks, their managers apparently valued their friendships with 
other bankers too highly to endanger these relationships with social pres-
sure. 79 
The blame for the resistance of the Chicago financial community to 
integration cannot be laid entirely at the feet of the three pioneering 
institutions. One of the most influential of the Loop banks was controlled 
by an ardent racist, 80 and other internal factors undoubtedly played a part 
in preventing the dominoes from falling. The failure of the pioneers to be 
leaders also was extremely important. The pioneers were so circumspect 
about their employment policies that the neighbor bank of one of them 
could explain his lack of black workers by pointing out that because the 
bank's owners were Jewish they had to be extremely conservative and 
"conform to the standards set by other large banks in the community," 
even though an integrated bank was located next door.81 It was not until 
1957 that some of the more important downtown banks began to hire 
Negroes. This was more than seven years after the first breakthrough, and 
almost three years after the second. 82 
The emergence of plans for cooperative action to achieve integration 
simultaneously among businesses reflected the businessman's fear of 
moving ahead of his colleagues in the controversial area of equal employ-
ment. Both the Indianapolis retail stores and the Chicago banks made 
abortive attempts to coordinate the introduction of black workers. This 
hide-in-the-crowd approach had wide business support and was recom-
mended by some integrationist advocates. 83 In the 1950's employers as 
divergent as a Philadelphia banker and a North Carolina shoe manufac-
turer called for coordinated action in order to protect individual employers 
from customer retaliation and from the charge of breaking local custom. 84 
Even in the mid-sixties the President's Committee on Equal Employment 
Opportunity proposed this technique of unified action to persuade reluc-
tant southern employers to comply with the law. 85 It was not, for the most 
part, until after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, that company 
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executives occasionally felt brave enough to take the position of the cor-
porate personnel manager of Owens-Illinois who said, "We hope to chart 
an independent course of our own so that we will be ahead-a little bit 
ahead-of the law and the average company. We would like to be two or 
three years ahead of the times but not twenty. " 86 
Even when businessmen personally accepted the idea of fair employ-
ment and believed they could overcome objections that might arise within 
the plant, they frequently still refused to employ blacks out of fear of 
community opposition. Basically businessmen viewed themselves as chips 
floating on the stream of society. They sought to follow the strongest cur-
rents of customer response, public opinion, community mores, and col-
league reaction, rather than attempt to risk the danger of being swamped 
by moving against the tide. 
6 
The Rationale of Integration 
Between the end of World War II and the beginning of the Kennedy 
administration, increasing numbers of firms reluctantly and slowly began 
to employ Negroes and advance black workers to positions previously 
barred to them. While personal and external racism were sufficiently strong 
to prevent the majority of employers from hiring blacks, nevertheless the 
trend during the late 1940's and 1950's was toward larger numbers of 
blacks in better jobs. The improving Negro employment situation was 
based, to a large extent, on factors beyond the control of the business com-
munity. State FEPC laws, increasing federal pressure for equal employ-
ment, the manpower shortage of the Korean War, and a growing public 
demand for fair treatment of blacks all forced businessmen to reconsider 
their stands on black employment. 
Whether or not there were compelling practical or economic reasons 
to integrate, an important segment of the business community sought to 
develop a rationale for integration which would explain the changing pat-
tern of Negro employment in terms of morality, ethics, and the American 
Creed of fair treatment and equal opportunity for all citizens. Pioneering 
employers of the 1950's, more than any other group of businessmen, had 
to come to grips with the full implications of the American Creed. Even 
when the motivation for black employment was more practical than ideo-
logical, large numbers of pioneers seized the American Creed as the most 
satisfying justification for their change in policy. For the businessman with 
a strong personal commitment to human equality, the American Creed 
stood as legitimate in its own right. But for the employer who was under 
pressure from forces besides his conscience, the American Creed provided 
that wonderful little extra which transformed a mere business decision into 
an act of Christian virtue and an affirmation of the American dream. 
The single most important factor in the liberalization of hiring policies 
after World War II was the adoption of state fair employment practice 
laws. By and large, businessmen opposed the passage of these laws1 and 
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were less than enthusiastic in complying with them once they were passed. 
Yet, in those states that had strong enforcement procedures (usually also 
an indication of strong popular support for the FEPC laws) businesses did 
begin to grant equal employment to job applicants. In 1948 the American 
Friends Service Committee (AFSC) drew up a list of corporations which 
had good reputations for fair employment. Of the sixteen firms on the list, 
fourteen were located in New York State (nine of those in New York 
City), one was in New Jersey, and one was in Chicago. New York and 
New Jersey both had very strong antidiscrimination laws, and the Chicago 
firm, International Harvester, was a national leader in the movement for 
integrated employment.2 
New York led the way both legislatively and in terms of public attitudes 
which made it comparatively easy for New York businessmen to employ 
blacks. In other states, without strong FEPC laws and with more public 
antipathy toward integration, employers who allowed Negroes to pierce 
the job ceiling could not protect themselves from criticism under the 
aegis of legislation. In the period before the legal and popular pressure of 
the civil rights revolution, many pioneering businessmen justified their un-
orthodox employment practices on ideological grounds. 
The American Creed was the most important ideological argument 
businessmen used to defend their employment of Negroes. The discrepancy 
between the American Creed3 and the actual treatment of Negroes became 
particularly evident during World War II. When the wartime FEPC forced 
a New Haven firm to hire Negroes, management told the white workers, 
"millions of American boys of all races, colors and creeds are now fighting 
shoulder to shoulder to rid the world of a system which is based on racial 
intolerance and the crushing of personal liberty." The company explained 
that many of the same undemocratic tendencies existed in the United 
States, even in New Haven, but that industry could "do more than any 
other single agency to contribute to a solution by showing its willingness 
to employ those who are best qualified for employment opportunities."4 
Black men are dying in a war against racist totalitarianism; how can we 
then deny them equal job opportunity in the war effort at home?-this was 
a standard, and frequently telling, argument which employers used to con-
vince their employees to accept black coworkers.5 
While many businessmen used justifications based on democratic philos-
ophy when explaining why they employed Negroes during World War II, 
references to the American Creed were usually window dressing for the 
more cogent pressures of the wartime FEPC and the manpower shortage.6 
The three-step procedure developed by a West Coast aircraft company to 
try to calm white workers when they objected to new black employees 
demonstrated the reality of legal compulsion which lay beneath the ideo-
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logical facade of the American Creed. First, the company used the stock 
"black soldiers are dying" argument, to which it added that the company 
needed black manpower to help the home-front war effort. Second, the firm 
made a humanitarian appeal to the whites, explaining that "they have to 
have money to buy food and clothing just as we do." If these two some-
what abstract appeals were not sufficient grounds to accept the new black 
workers, the management pointed out that Executive Order 8802 forced 
the company to stop discriminating and declared that any employee who 
objected would be fired. 7 
The wartime rhetoric of patriotism and democracy may have been a 
convenient facade to cover up the actual compulsory sources of integration, 
but there was too much truth in the moral arguments for them to lapse 
along with Executive Order 8802 at the end of the war. William F. Rasche 
warned the Milwaukee Employers Association in 1946 not to slip back 
into prewar discriminatory employment habits. Among other reasons, 
Rasche explained "that in a world in which the combined populations of 
all the countries on the globe consist of colored and white people in the 
ratio of two to one, we will sacrifice our position of world leadership if 
we fail to practice our principles of American freedom and justice at 
home."8 
The antifascist patriotism of the war quickly became anticommunist 
patriotism in the postwar years. Those who opposed equal employment 
legislation sometimes branded its proponents communist.9 Occasionally 
those who advocated voluntary fair employment were also viewed as dan-
gerously left. The president of an insurance company told an AFSC field 
worker in 1952 that talk "about helping businessmen find pioneer place-
ments . . . was a fine way to introduce subversive people into a business" 
and that for all he knew the field worker might even be a communist.10 
However, it was also common to find businessmen espousing integration 
as a method of fighting communism. The American Creed of equal oppor-
tunity was in theory, if not in fact, the human corollary of the free market 
and was therefore theoretically anticommunist. However, like the argu-
ments which stressed patriotism during World War II, arguments empha-
sizing anticommunism during the Cold War appear to have been mostly 
the payment of lip service to the prevailing mood. It is unusual to find 
records of businessmen who advocated the anticommunist approach in 
private. When the national personnel director of a large mail order house 
did mention anticommunism in a private discussion in 1950, he did so not 
in terms of his own personal convictions but rather as a suggested method 
of most efficiently reaching other businessmen.11 
If there was a dearth of private comment favoring integration as a 
way to stem the red tide, there was a surfeit of it in published sources. 
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Supporters of FEPC in the state of Washington in 1949 tried to convince 
the legislature that communists wanted the bill defeated because it would 
deprive them of a valuable source of propaganda. 12 Throughout the Tru-
man and Eisenhower administrations supporters of economic equality for 
blacks, whether through legislation or through voluntary action, commonly 
exploited the fear of communism in advocating their cause. 13 As late as 
1960, Frank M. Folsom, president of RCA, said that "job discrimination 
against any of our people on the basis of race or creed weakens us in the 
face of adversaries who would destroy our democratic system."14 
Anticommunist arguments for fair employment picked up logically 
where antifascist arguments had left off. During both World War II and 
the Cold War patriotic arguments directed against the nation's enemies 
served to link the essentially conservative ideals of nationalism with the 
progressive values of employment integration. Moreover, by taking the 
offensive, fair employment proponents tried to stop short those who 
attacked their cause as disruptive and communistic. However, the concern 
with tying fair employment to the antired bandwagon was as much a 
public relations maneuver as an expression of business ideology. 
By the standards of the 1970's the actions of pioneering fair employers 
personally committed to the American Creed appear to have been half-
hearted tokenism. Their policy of hiring an extremely limited number of 
blacks, frequently overqualified, did not even attempt to meet the funda-
mental problem of mass unemployment and underemployment in the 
black community. But those business pioneers in the forties and fifties were 
far ahead of most of their colleagues, and their successful experiments with 
integration eliminated many of the racist arguments on which discrimination 
had rested for years. The favorable experience of businessmen with pioneer 
placements in the 1950's effectively cleared the ground for the civil rights 
onslaught of the 1960's, which was able to build on the pioneer experience 
by demanding more extensive integration than would have otherwise been 
possible. 
In the vast majority of cases in which a company voluntarily played 
a pioneering role in integrating its work force, a single "great man" who 
believed the American Creed was more important than the Capitalist Ethic 
was responsible for the policy .15 In the absence of obvious external pres-
sures the pioneering businessman frequently ascribed his decision to employ 
blacks to ideological motivations. Such an employer did not act on the 
basis of the Capitalist Ethic rationale traditionally accepted in the business 
community; instead he frequently claimed he was answering an inner call, 
variously referred to as ethics, morals, principle, conviction, or liberalism. 
These terms were the employer's name for the reason he chose to follow 
the American Creed even when it appeared to be in conflict with the 
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official staff may be . . doing the right thing on the race question is one 
thing, to operate a business successfully from both a financial and organiza-
tional viewpoint is something else entirely different from the first."49 One 
of his colleagues in the Chicago financial community also divided his per-
sonal ethics from his business activity when he observed, "bankers are very 
sympathetic, highly moral and concerned about the affairs of the commu-
nity. As such, on an individual [as opposed to a corporate] basis they are 
doing whatever they can to carry out their social concems."50 
Evangelism is a common corollary to commitment and a number of 
integrationist employers attempted to convert their colleagues and their 
employees with race relations education programs. Proponents of equal 
employment opportunity placed great stress on the efficacy of education as 
a method of persuading others to accept their ideology. They believed, as 
did Myrdal, that Americans "are all good people. They want to be rational 
and just."51 If one assumes that businessmen, and their employees, wanted 
to live according to the American Creed, but were not doing so, then one 
must conclude, as did Myrdal, "that the social e·ngineering required should 
have its basis in a deliberate and well-planned campaign of popular educa-
tion."52 Many of Mydral's ideas were picked up in the postwar period and 
provided the basis for several educational campaigns designed to encourage 
voluntary employment integration. 
The American Friends Service Committee started one of the first of 
these educational efforts with its Job Opportunities Program ( JOP) in 
Philadelphia in 1945. JOP and its successor, the Employment on Merit pro-
gram, eventually spread to a half-dozen cities over the next twenty years. 
JOP was predicated on the belief that an educational campaign could help 
businessmen adhere more closely to their expressed values of equality and 
brotherhood.53 AFSC used businessmen as field workers, but businessmen 
who were willing to give up several years of their time to work for the 
advancement of black employment were rare indeed.54 More often than 
not, even pioneering employers were reluctant to proselytize among other 
businessmen, so aside from AFSC, integrationist educational efforts in the 
business community were limited to the very practical, nonmoralistic efforts 
designed to head off compulsory FEPC legislation. 
More commonly employers attempted to transmit their values and 
beliefs to their own employees through some kind of in-plant educational 
program. Interest in education to further better race relations during the 
late forties and fifties may have been as indicative of the business commu-
nity's fear of employee opposition as it was of businessmen's beliefs in the 
educability and rationality of men. The businessman who had decided to 
hire Negroes still had to face his employees, and some employers used 
educational programs as a way to ease acceptance of the new black 
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workers. If first-line management could be persuaded to support integra-
tion, employers were usually able to impose the change on the rank and 
file . Thus foremen were almost always included in the educational programs 
while the workers on the line were sometimes excluded. For example, the 
Pollack Manufacturing Company of Arlington, New Jersey, regularly in-
doctrinated supervisors during the late forties, but "where it appeared that 
discussion of the Negro subject might invite troublesome free-for-all argu-
ments," newly employed blacks were simply assigned to their departments 
without anything having been said to their white coworkers.55 
While there were occasional firms which ran their own elaborate 
employee race-relations programs, it was not until 1949, when the National 
Conference of Christians and Jews (NCCJ) organized in-plant race educa-
tion programs, that the process of employee indoctrination received wide-
spread notice. Dwight R. G. Palmer, president of the General Cable Cor-
poration and an important leader in interreligious and interracial activities, 
sponsored the first NCCJ seminar in his Perth Amboy, New Jersey, plant. 
Palmer's commitment to equal employment went back at least to 
World War II. At that time the St. Louis plant of General Cable, which 
made vitally needed field telegraph wire, suffered a wildcat walkout when 
black women were introduced into sections of the plant where they had 
not been employed before. Black men had previously been integrated with 
no difficulty, but the white women reacted violently to having to work be-
side black women. An army officer attempted to set up a program to edu-
cate the women into seeing the error of their ways. The workers were not 
receptive and the officer quit in frustration. Other military personnel seemed 
willing to go along with the white workers and bar the blacks from the 
plant. The military men believed that the production of wire was more 
important to the war effort than strict adherence to the nondiscrimination 
clause in the contract. 
Initially Palmer went along with the military decision, but the idea of 
denying blacks equal opportunity did not rest well with his personal philos-
ophy. While sitting in church during an Easter Sunday service Palmer came 
to the conclusion that only his personal intervention could solve the prob-
lem. He walked out of church in the middle of the service and flew to 
St. Louis where, despite the pleas of military officers on the scene, he con-
fronted the angry women who had just shouted down the plant manager, 
calling him, among other things, a "bald-headed son-of-a-bitch." 
In a speech that rang all the changes in the integrationist repertoire, 
Palmer persuaded the women to accept black coworkers. He called upon 
the women to judge others by what they did, not by their color or religion. 
He explained that black soldiers and nurses were dying to save democracy. 
He pointed out to the women, many of whom were of Eastern European 
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background, "our ancestors left the countries overseas to come here and 
practice equality and live on merit, and live in democracy and in freedom 
and to get away from all of the crochety stuff that they have over there, 
social classes and everything else." He then asked them in the spirit of 
Americanism and in the spirit of Easter to accept "these nice colored girls." 
His plea worked. Black women were successfully placed on the work 
floor. 56 Moreover, General Cable continued to employ Negroes and actually 
increased its percentages of black workers after the end of the war. s1 
In the postwar period, Palmer served on the committee which organized 
the integration of the armed services and later was the chairman of the 
Government Contract Compliance Committee under President Truman. 
Despite his various official positions as an enforcer of executive decisions, 
Palmer maintained that he was effective not because he represented the 
power of the President but because he stood as an example of what could 
be done by a businessman willing to back up his convictions with action. 58 
Palmer was not oblivious to the fact that his position as head of a com-
mittee that could cancel contracts was at least partly responsible for his 
successes in persuading other large firms to begin hiring and upgrading 
Negroes, but as far as he was concerned it played a secondary role. 
Dwight R. G. Palmer was a man motivated by a strong personal philos-
ophy which linked Christianity, democracy, and capitalism. He believed 
that "democracy is an extension into the political field of the religious view 
which regards every person, whatever his ancestry or social station, as the 
possessor of an immortal soul destined for salvation."59 Palmer opposed 
discrimination because, as he said in an address to the Canadian Council 
of Christians and Jews, it sapped "the economic vitality of both our 
countries [Canada and the United States]. . . . It is undermining the 
political health of our democracies .... Most important of all, it is weaken-
ing the moral fibre of our nations by a kind of spiritual erosion."60 As a 
businessman Palmer understood that people expected him to defend his 
beliefs on the basis of good business, and in fact he did see a link between 
democracy and capitalism, but he also believed that human equality could 
stand by itself without economic buttressing. Thus, he expressed annoy-
ance and embarrassment with the idea that "democracy is good for busi-
ness; that tolerance pays cff in high production and profits; that civil rights 
are a good investment." He contended that those opposed to hatred and 
intolerance would act in a democratic manner "even if it were bad for 
business, which it is not." He concluded that "the undue emphasis put on 
the economic element in moral behavior is really one of the pernicious 
products of Marxist propaganda in our generation."61 
Palmer used NCCJ seminars to inculcate his workers with his sense of 
moral commitment in the same way he used his positions in the govern-
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ment to inculcate his colleagues with his beliefs. In both instances he was 
in a position of authority over those to be converted. While Palmer's posi-
tion of dominance might raise questions about the sincerity of the converts, 
his insistence that people be educated rather than forced to conform to 
his standards indicated his strong belief in the acceptability of the American 
Creed. 
NCCJ seminars became something of a fad for several years after the 
first experiment at General Cable in 1949. The program itself consisted of 
nine weekly two-hour seminars. The meetings were held on company time, 
which undoubtedly helped contribute to the remarkably good attendance. 
Each nine-week session was limited to twenty-five employees drawn from 
all levels of the firm, from blue collar to management. Guest lecturers and 
leaders at the seminars discussed such topics as the three major Western 
religions, the anthropology of race, cultural differences, and prejudice, 
with the emphasis placed on free discussion. As Palmer put it, "within the 
limits of common decency, no holds were barred in the attempt to isolate 
and identify the bacteria of mutual prejudice and interracial myths, and 
then to examine the pesky creatures under the microscope of frank 
discussion. "62 
When the program was first instituted, Palmer was not willing to mea-
sure the success or failure of the seminars in terms of dollars and cents, 
although he was willing to say that the discussions had reduced tensions 
and improved citizenship and the spirit of teamwork.63 However, by 1951 
Palmer was more willing to make specific economic claims for his program. 
He said, "We found among our personnel a new spirit of cooperation with 
other employees and with the management. Tensions seemed to ease up. 
Somehow production records took . on a new personalized interest, scrap 
figures improved, grievances did not come up so often.64 
Perhaps because employers discovered that the integration process was 
not as fraught with trouble as many had feared, interest in race-relations 
seminars flagged after the first few years. Once businessmen realized that 
the presence of blacks in nontraditional jobs would not bring the walls 
down about their heads, they took a more cynical attitude toward convert-
ing their workers, particularly if the businessmen were not of an evangeli-
cal bent in the first place. A couple of New York employers belittled the 
importance of education in the late fifties when they said "education is in-
effective. You'll never change my mind by talking to me. It can't be done. 
The thing to do is just do it. That's the best education," and "It's not so 
much what employees feel. They can be controlled."65 
During the forties and fifties the moral and ethical assumptions inherent 
in the American Creed played an important part in motivating the place-
ment of pioneer Negroes in nontraditional jobs. For some businessmen, 
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their religious and ethical beliefs were enough to prod them into hiring 
and upgrading Negroes. Such persons frequently assumed that other citi-
zens shared their basic values, and so they placed a high value on education 
as a way of promoting fair employment practice. For most businessmen, 
however, it took direct economic or legal pressure to germinate the seeds 
of guilt sown by their failure to apply the American Creed to their employ-
ment practices. 
7 
Economic Pressure and Attitude 
Changes in the Eisenhower Era 
Due to general economic expansion and the Korean War, the busi-
ness community experienced a manpower squeeze during the 1950's. Be-
cause there were highly qualified yet unemployed blacks available, busi-
nessmen could get superior black workers when they could not find any 
white workers at all. Therefore, employers had a sound economic reason 
for employing blacks. Moreover, the Eisenhower administration was en-
couraging businessmen to increase their rate of Negro white-collar 
employment, so any move for greater black hiring would not only rest on 
sound Capitalist Ethic grounds but would also have the support of a 
Republican administration which was trying to prove that equal employ-
ment could be achieved without federal legislation. 
Forced to choose between the pull of conscience and the iron law 
of the Capitalist Ethic, most employers were unwilling to scrap their eco-
nomic faith no matter what the demands of their religious beliefs. 1 How-
ever, if the businessman could demonstrate that equal employment oppor-
tunity stood the tests of both finance and faith, he could reconcile his 
religious and his economic convictions. "Most of us have a difficult time 
from the moral viewpoint accusing ourselves or to a lesser degree our 
predecessors of aggressive or even passive resistance to the realization of 
these rights of minorities," said a Rhode Island utility executive in 1965. 
He continued, "Let that be so. We wouldn't have so difficult a time of it 
when we perceive the situation from an economic viewpoint. After all, 
we are all businessmen; we're in business to make a dollar whether for 
ourselves or our stockholders. "2 
Ideally the businessman wanted the exigencies of the marketplace to 
compel him to employ Negroes. The Capitalist Ethic required the em-
ployer to maximize profits, which, among other things, demanded that he 
hire the best possible workers at the lowest possible price. By and large, 
however, the price of Negro labor, no matter what its actual cost in 
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dollars, was too high because of the reactions of a racist society. But if no 
white labor were available, then the employer would have to hire Negroes 
if he wanted to stay in business. The Capitalist Ethic would require com-
pliance with the American Creed, at least for those jobs for which no 
whites could be found. Thus economic arguments provided the business-
man with a completely consistent rationalization: a manpower shortage 
meant the best available workers were blacks, and therefore hiring blacks 
conformed to the Capitalist Ethic as well as to the American Creed. 
The racial employment policy of International Harvester illustrates 
the interplay between fair employment values and economic pressure in 
creating better job opportunities for blacks. Both International Har-
vester's motivation and the justification used by its management combined 
elements of the American Creed and the Capitalist Ethic. Harvester 
originally announced a policy of nondiscrimination in 1919. The 1919 
disclaimer of prejudice included the usual "race, sex, political or religious 
affiliation" wording, but these seemingly liberal sentiments were actually a 
facade for the final phrase, "or membership in any labor or other organ-
ization," which was the firm's declaration of an open shop.3 Although 
Harvester had good experiences with its black workers, the company did 
not develop a positive approach toward minority hiring until after the 
establishment of the wartime FEPC. Fowler McCormick, who became com-
pany president in 1941, the same year the FEPC executive order was issued, 
decided the firm should not be content with minimum compliance with the 
law but should become a leader in employing blacks. McCormick's new 
policy was administered by assistant personnel director Sara Southall, who 
went on to become a member of FEPC under President Roosevelt.4 
Even though McCormick pursued a policy of equal employment be-
cause it fit into his concept of the American Creed, publicly the company 
sought to play down the role of ideology in determining its employment 
policy. McCormick, who had a reputation as a liberal in the Chicago busi-
ness community,5 personally believed that his company should be "con-
cerned as much in the interest of employees and customers as in the 
interest of its stockholders" and that the corporation should perform "a 
useful economic and social service for the community."6 However, Mc-
Cormick's expression of social concern appears to have been unique in the 
public statements of Harvester management until the mid-sixties. Much 
more common were such comments as, "We do not wish to cru~ade. We're 
not undertaking to establish social equality, a matter of community ac-
ceptance;"7 "Harvester is not running a crusade;"8 and, "No high ethical 
or moral tone was taken. Nothing was said about 'loving thy neighbor as 
thyself.' "9 
During the late forties and fifties, Harvester spokesmen sought to 
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justify their employment of Negroes by using a combination of arguments 
which linked the equal opportunity aspect of the American Creed with 
the broader interpretation of economic self-interest. "The basic philosophy 
behind the policy," according to Southall, was "that a man has a right to 
earn a living."10 Ivan Willis, the head of personnel, said the same thing 
but added, "It is our belief that if this policy is not followed, our company 
and the nation are the losers. " 11 Willis developed the economic implica-
tions of his position when he observed in 1951 that blacks "represent a vast 
consumer market that will add to national prosperity as rapidly as Negroes 
can improve their purchasing power."12 And in its own internal training 
program the company stressed not only the "right of a man to earn a 
living," but also the "relationship of the nondiscrimination policy to a 
democratic society. "13 
There was almost a schizophrenic duality to Harvester's position. On 
the one hand, they did not want to be seen as social crusaders and liked to 
emphasize the strictly business aspects of their policy. On the other hand, 
the company wanted to place its policy within a broader ideological frame-
work of social commitment. While company spokesmen denied the firm 
had any interest in the problems of blacks outside of the factory,14 com-
pany policy claimed, "We believe we have social as well as business obliga-
tions. " 15 It was not until after the beginning of the civil rights revolution 
that International Harvester felt free to crusade openly, stressing that 
equal employment was good for the country and therefore good for the 
company. "This is a 'self-interest' motive, of course," said the head of 
Harvester's employee relations department in 1965, "and we are not em-
barrassed to say so, but it is also a valid and compelling reason, one in 
harmony with the democratic principles of our country, as well as in the 
best Judeo-Christian tradition. " 16 
Harvester's attempts to couch its policy in mostly self-interest terms 
until the mid-sixties reflected both the importance of the Capitalist Ethic 
in business thought and the ambiguity of equal employment opportunity 
as a source of moral concern. 
When a businessman was faced with clear, immediate, and direct 
economic retribution if he refused to practice fair employment he had 
little choice but to comply. Unless he had a very strong personal aversion 
to hiring or upgrading blacks, unless he would really "rather close first," a 
strongly enforced FEPC or a civil rights boycott provided sufficient eco-
nomic pressure to persuade most businessmen to employ blacks. Not as 
dramatic, but equally effective was the pressure of a severe manpower 
shortage. In either of these situations most employers would probably have 
agreed with the wife of one of the partners of a major Chicago stock 
brokerage who claimed that "contrary to beliefs held by many workers 
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among minority group people, businessmen are really not concerned about 
the race problem as such, they look at it primarily from the business 
angle."17 
Prior to 1960, most businessmen believed that hiring blacks was po-
tentially more disruptive than excluding them-except during periods of 
severe manpower shortage. Labor shortages also meant_ increased demand 
for white labor, and, for the most part, blacks were employed to replace 
whites who had moved up to better jobs. 18 This, of course, meant that 
while blacks got more and better jobs, they were still apt to get the most 
undesirable jobs in a given firm, or in the most undesirable firm in a given 
region. Moreover, when executives began to to hire blacks for a position, 
the job often lost status and became less desirable to whites. Thus man-
power shortages frequently had the effect not of integrating employment 
but of turning previously white departments into predominantly black 
departments. t9 
World War II created an extreme manpower shortage that led to 
widespread employment for Negroes. Although the wartime FEPC unques-
tionably had a significant impact on business, its greatest importance may 
have been the excuse it gave businessmen to hire blacks. FEPC provided 
the rationalizations and created the psychological atmosphere which eased 
the employment of blacks who were desperately needed and who might 
well have been hired even without the executive order.20 In some cases 
management perceived the employment of blacks during the war as an 
extraordinary device to meet an unusual situation and had no intention of 
keeping black employees after the emergency.21 Returning veterans who 
had accumulated seniority while in service displaced some Negro workers, 
and others lost their jobs when employers reverted to traditional employ-
ment patterns.22 . 
However blacks did not suffer major job losses after World War II. 
In the absence of a postwar depression and with the growth of "clean" 
jobs due to increasing mechanization, most blacks were able to maintain 
their positions in unskilled and semiskilled jobs as whites moved into new, 
higher status positions. Having discovered that the black population was 
a source of reliable labor many employers saw no reason to return to 
prewar patterns of discriminiation. 
In the postwar era, only obedience to the law ranked ahead of the 
labor shortage as a universally accepted excuse for integration of employ-
ment. Businessmen who could not understand why anyone should ask them 
to hire blacks when they could get all the white workers they needed fre-
quently explained that they would employ Negroes, but only when they 
could no longer find whites. In 1952, an official of a Texas aircraft com-
pany explained that only if the international situation worsened and the 
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labor market tightened would they resort to hiring blacks, and even then 
the Negroes would be employed on a segregated basis.23 The same attitude 
was neatly summed up in 1953 by the manager of a notoriously conserva-
tive Columbus, Ohio, firm who said he would not hire Negroes in any 
positions above the production level because he "did not have any diffi-
culty in finding enough white people, so why should he?"24 
Beginning as early as 1949, in some areas, and continuing through 
the end of the Korean War employers in many parts of the country ex-
perienced labor scarcity. As during the 1940's, they turned to the black 
community for the necessary manpower. In early 1952, one trade journal 
warned, "Plants that, for any reason, have not hired members of minority 
groups in the past are likely to have to change their policy. No great 
reserve of unemployed is left to draw on, as there was a decade ago. And 
in the absence of full-scale war, not enough women to meet needs are 
likely to be drawn back into the plants. "25 A Philadelphia utility confirmed 
this prediction in 1953 when it broke a long tradition of barring blacks 
from clerical and meter-reading jobs. The company was particularly con-
cerned about the latter because it required "high moral character, since 
the meter re~der has to go into a person's home," but because the per-
sonnel director was having great difficulty finding enough persons to fill 
the vacancies in this job, he was willing to begin considering Negroes.26 
The absence of any major recession in the 1960's meant a continued 
steady demand for labor, and employers continued to cite their manpower 
needs when discussing Negro employment,27 although the coming of the 
civil rights revolution displaced manpower needs as the primary reason 
for business interest in the black community. The southern textile indus-
try, which had traditionally used only white workers, finally integrated 
during the 1960's when higher paying industries drained its white labor 
pool. Southern businessmen, however, preferred to blame the government 
for their new integration policy rather than their low wages and the result-
ing loss of white workers. It was only under prodding from the federal 
government that southern mills began a widespread movement to employ 
more blacks in skilled, white-collar, and even some managerial positions. 
But the vice president of a large textile corporation played down the im-
portance of government pressure. "It was a choice of running the plant 
or not-we would have hired Negroes for these jobs with or without civil 
rights legislation," he said. A plant superintendent in Alabama explained, 
"We hired Negroes and trained them for production jobs, but LBJ got the 
blame."28 
Throughout the postwar pedod, businessmen who explained their use 
of black labor as a rational economic response to manpower needs fre-
quently assumed that a large untapped pool of skilled black labor existed. 
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The pool does not seem to have been as deep as some businessmen as-
sumed, and as soon as the first wave of pioneering employers had snapped 
up the graduate engineers who were working as janitors and the skilled 
typists who were working as maids, this argument ceased to have much 
validity. But while the surplus of skilled black labor existed the arguments 
in favor of using Negro workers could get extremely cold-blooded. One 
observer has reported that in 1951 the Chicago Urban League tried to find 
jobs for Negroes by urging employers to exploit the competitively weak 
position of black workers. Using "strictly business terms," the Urban 
League pointed out that employers who hired blacks not only expanded 
their labor market but got a better type of worker because "Negro appli-
cants are usually overqualified and also show greater job stability since 
limited job opportunities make them hesitant to quit." Furthermore, the 
League is reported to have told employers that by expanding the labor mar-
ket they would help drive down the price of labor.29 In 1952 an executive 
in an important media survey company who believed the company's owner 
would be impervious to moral arguments said he might be reached "on a 
cold turkey basis of better employees at the same or lower rates. " 30 
However, most individuals who advocated equal employment practices 
did not urge clear-cut exploitation of the Negro's weak economic position; 
rather they said they were concerned with the most efficient use of the 
available supply of labor. The officers of a plant which broke local dis-
criminatory hiring patterns in a border state immediately after the war 
explained, "We haven't time to do anything else. We are going into a 
line of business that is highly competitive, and we will have many prob-
lems in engineering, manufacturing and sales. We need the best people we 
can get, and we can't afford to go into the problem all over again every 
time we hire a Negro in a new department or upgrade one:"31 Businesses 
that claimed they were employing Negroes because they needed the best 
available workers were dealing with some combination of a severe man-
power shortage, a relaxation of antiblack social pressure, or readily avail-
able, highly skilled, low-cost black workers. All of these were factors which 
made complete sense in terms of the Capitalist Ethic and also conformed 
to the American Creed because they did not involve explicit exploitation. 
Widespread underutilization of trained Negro workers during the 
late forties and fifties created a situation in which a good economic argu-
ment could be made for hiring blacks as the most qualified people for the 
job, particularly for smaller firms which chronically lost out in the bidding 
for trained manpower to better paying large companies. 32 Highly trained 
blacks found no ready market for their skills and frequently took jobs far 
beneath their capacities. Thus, the firm which decided to begin hiring 
Negroes, for whatever reason, could justify its actions in Capitalist Ethic 
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terms. The first black employees were almost always extremely competent 
employees whose productivity was higher than that of the average white 
worker. 
But businessmen continued to allude to the efficient-utilization-of-
manpower argument even after the pool of readily available skilled black 
labor had dried up. At the heart of the efficient-use argument was the be-
lief that the employer should hire the best available man. This belief con-
formed to both the American Creed and to the Capitalist Ethic and thus 
continued to have currency well into the 1960's. In 1964, Thomas F. 
Hilbert, Jr., labor relations counsel for the General Electric Company, 
said his firm did not hire blacks merely to comply with the law. "We are 
mainly acting in our own and our shareholders' self-interest," he explained. 
"We want the best employees we can find, and we would only be penal-
izing ourselves if we excluded from consideration any group of potential 
applicants from which we can procure good employees."33 After having 
used almost these identical words in a speech in 1965, one businessman 
went on to observe, "I don't want to imply here that there is a super-
abundance of qualified Negro applicants for all the job vacancies we have 
in our community. If this were so, then our failure to take advantage of 
such a condition would be perfectly obvious to us all. " 34 
In its narrowest sense, the Capitalist Ethic requires a company to 
adopt policies which will maximize profit. But inherent in that definition 
is the modifier "long-run.'' Even if black applicants were not superior to 
whites businessmen could still argue that they derived long-run secondary 
or indirect benefits from employing Negroes because they were helping to 
alleviate conditions which led to social and economic disintegration. Long 
before the turmoil of the civil rights revolution, perceptive businessmen 
understood the necessary relationship between the elimination of racial 
discrimination and the existence of the kind of pacific domestic climate in 
which business operated most efficiently. As early as 1941, the borough 
president of Manhattan was able to persuade the vice president in charge 
of personnel of a New York City utility to begin hiring Negro women in 
nontraditional jobs by arguing that employing blacks would help society 
and the utility would thus benefit indirectly. The businessman explained to 
his workers that they as individual citizens and the company as a corporate 
citizen had a responsibility to solve the social problem of discrimination 
against blacks. As the borough president had explained it, the problem 
arose because widespread unemployment among Manhattan Negroes led 
to a high crime rate. "We have a labor shortage," the executive said. "We 
have an untapped pool of workers. These workers need better jobs. Society 
will benefit if they get them."35 
When speaking about the secondary benefits of nondiscrimination, 
110 Black Men and Businessmen 
businessmen usually claimed that fair employment would lead to the ex-
pansion of the domestic market and would reduce crime and welfare and 
their related costs. Public opinion analyst Elmo Roper, one of the most 
prominent early business supporters of fair employment, viewed increased 
Negro employment and spending not only as a source of new business but 
also as a cushion against recession. 36 New York businessman Frederick W. 
Richmond said, "It is very simple. My business won't grow unless America 
grows. The more Negroes that can buy cars, the more the auto companies 
have to expand and buy steel. I can sell equipment to the steel mills. "37 
Among others, the president of RCA, the president of Textron, and the 
president of the Aluminum Company of America were all early advocates 
of employing blacks to benefit society.38 
Just in case the lure of potential profits from an expanded black pur-
chasing public was not enough to convince businessmen to hire more 
Negroes, fair employment proponents regularly pointed out to employers 
that they were already losing money because of their discriminatory em-
ployment policies. "Jt is generally accepted as fact," said Elmo Roper in 
1949, "that the segregated sectors of our large urban centers are the most 
expensive to maintain. The social cost of crime, juvenile delinquency, the 
rate of sickness and accidents, is higher in our depressed areas than it is in 
other parts of our cities. This is a waste of tax money. " 39 Seventeen years 
later Baltimore's Voluntary Council on Equal Opportunity painted a simi-
lar if somewhat more apocalyptic picture. Commenting on the falling de-
mand for unskilled (mostly black) workers, the council warned, "Failure 
to prepare for it can mean a city with a large mass of unemployed among 
all ranks, but particularly Negro, and a consequent burden upon the rest 
of the community that will prove unattractive to new industry, drive the 
established industries out, and bring a state of depression and despair from 
the top of the business leadership right through the ranks. "40 
The major difficulty with the indirect-benefit argument was its in-
applicability to any given firm. If the management of a firm took a tradi-
tional narrow view of the Capitalist Ethic it could easily dismiss arguments 
which depended on generalized social benefit. While it might be true that 
all businesses would gain if Negro unemployment were reduced, each in-
dividual firm could never be sure all other companies would act in a 
socially constructive manner. If they did not, then the firm which did 
integrate would run the risk of suffering economic retribution for an 
action whose benefits would be shared equally by those competitors who 
did not share in its costs. Thus, a conservative Atlanta business executive 
could admit in 1962, "The economic status of minority people reflects 
itself in the social health of the community and in the economic stability 
of the country," while at the same time cautioning against moving too 
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fast. 41 Since the benefits were to be long-run, businessmen also looked 
for long-run solutions-until the riots of the mid-sixties demonstrated 
that the end of the long run had finally arrived. 
Before these Piots of 1965-1967, employers most frequently cited legal 
compulsion as their reason for employing blacks. Even more than a labor 
shortage, the law removed the burden of decision from management's 
shoulders. The law forced many businessmen to adhere to the American 
Creed, and permitted them to do what was economically sound, that is 
hire the best man for the job. Furthermore, obeying the law fit t-he busi-
nessman's image of himself. As one executive put it, "American com-
panies are basically law-abiding; they may seek favorable interpretations 
of the law, but essentially executives want their companies to be good 
citizens. "42 
In and of itself the existence of a legal requirement to practice equal 
opportunity employment was frequently enough to spur management to 
analyze its employment practices. Large, highly visible firms which were 
likely to become the target of complaints from the black community were 
particularly quick to comply with the law. Saying he was pleased with the 
way the Massachusetts FEPC had worked out, the vice president of one of 
Boston's largest insurance companies observed, "Perhaps you shouldn't 
need a law but the fact is we didn't do anything until there was one." He 
implied that the company might not even have acted then were it not for 
the law's punitive provision.43 This manager's reaction is fairly typical of 
the responses of employers in the industrial Northeast. Although the em-
ployers did not want fair employment legislation and were less than 
gracious in their compliance, they nevertheless recognized that the law 
reflected a change in public expectations and that the time had passed 
when personal racism or even fears of racism in others would be accepted 
as a legitimate excuse for discrimination. 
It usually did not take much pressure from a government body to 
persuade a company to begin hiring blacks in nontraditional jobs. For 
example, in 1953, the manager of a New York restaurant refused to hire 
Negro waitresses because he had an "exclusive clientele." A visit from the 
FEPC commissioners persuaded him to change his hiring policy and his 
customers accepted the change without objection.44 Even reluctant em-
ployers began to practice fairer (if not completely fair) employment after 
specific complaints lodged against them were found valid. In a follow-up 
study of 334 proven cases of discrimination, the New Yark FEPC found 
that in 85 percent of the cases there was "definite improvement in the em-
ployment pattern as compared with the conditions which existed at the 
time the original complaints were filed against these firms. "45 
Reports vary on the extent of the success of FEPC legislation in actu-
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ally procuring new positions for black workers. Most studies seem to indi-
cate that the laws did have some effect and, moreover, had a very power-
ful educational impact on the attitudes of management and the public.46 
If there was a positive correlation between popular opinion and the enact-
ment of controversial legislation such as FEPC, businessmen were hardly in 
a position to strongly and publicly oppose antidiscrimination legislation 
once it had been passed. Employers were sensitive to community pressures, 
and they opposed the legislative expression of the "people's will" only 
when it presented an obvious threat to their economic position. 
At the beginning of the Eisenhower administration only seven states 
had compulsory FEPC laws. They were New York, New Jersey, Connecti-
cut, Massachusetts, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Washing-
ton.47 Although FEPC legislation had been introduced into the legislatures 
of virtually every other state outside of the Deep South, there was no 
legally enforceable bar to racial discrimination in employment in forty-
one of the forty-eight states. In those states only firms which held contracts 
with the federal government had any legal obligation to practice equal em-
ployment. Roosevelt's second PEP Committee had folded in June, 1946. 
The Truman administration expended its efforts to extend employment 
opportunity on unsuccessful attempts to persuade Congress to pass a 
permanent federal FEPC. Until the outbreak of the Korean War, except 
for airport facilities constructed with federal funds, Truman made no 
attempts to use the power of the executive office to insure integration in 
other than government jobs. However, on December 3, 1951, Truman 
issued Executive Order 10308, which established the Committee on Gov-
ernment Contract Compliance to oversee the nondiscrimination clause 
which continued to be written into all government contracts. The eleven-
member committee existed for little more than half a year before it was 
forced to resign by the change in administrations. In its final report the 
Truman committee called for a stronger antidiscrimination clause in all 
government contracts and suggested that the chief executive create a 
committee with the specific power to cancel the contract of any employer 
who did not live up to the letter of the fair employment clause.48 
During the 1952 campaign Dwight D. Eisenhower promised that 
"without the impossible handicap of federal compulsion, we can and must 
provide equal job opportunities for our citizens, regardless of their color, 
creed or national origin. "49 This remarkable task was to be carried out by 
the President's Committee on Government Contracts which Eisenhower 
created in August, 1953, by Executive Order 10479. True to his word, 
the president gave this new committee absolutely no power. Vice President 
Richard M. Nixon served as chairman (thus, the Nixon Committee) of 
the thirteen men who hoped to work a major change in national employ-
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ment policy through the dynamic force of their personalities and positions. 
In fact, the Nixon Committee was nothing more than a clearinghouse for 
information on employer experience with integration and a propaganda 
agency which coordinated antidiscrimination activity among various gov-
ernmental agencies and sought to encourage nongovernmental educa-
tional programs "in order to eliminate or reduce the basic causes and costs 
of discrimdnation in employment. "50 
Business Week overgenerously referred to the committee's first two 
years as a "comparatively low-geared, behind-the-scenes, but increasingly 
effective campaign .. . . " 51 It certainly was low-gear and behind the scenes. 
Positive action by the committee consisted of rewriting the nondiscrimina-
tion clause to require contractors to treat employees equally in all aspects 
of employment, not merely in hiring. It also required employers doing busi-
ness with the government to post in conspicuous places notices attesting 
to the firm's nondiscriminatory policy.52 In only two other instances did the 
committee do anything that could be even remotely considered helpful to 
the cause of equal employment. It persuaded th~ District of Columbia's 
Board of Commissioners to include the standard nondiscrimination clause 
in all the District's contracts, and it convinced the Chesapeake and Po-
tomac Telephone Company, which served Washington, to end its Jim 
Crow hiring practices.53 The rest of the committee's activity was limited 
to printing pamphlets, establishing liaisons with private agencies in the 
field of intergroup relations, and generally keeping out of peoples' way.54 
In October, 1955, the committee exhibited an unprecedented burst of 
energy and called fifty-five leading business chief executives to a closed-
door White House conference. The conference was the first of a series of 
similar meetings that Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson would 
call. All three Presidents tried to get top business leaders to do some lead-
ing in the area of fair employment. The Eisenhower administration had 
held a few meetings with individual contractors and small groups prior to 
the October conference,55 but the October meeting was the first attempt 
to appeal collectively to the top corporate executives of the country's most 
important federal contractors. Shortly after the meeting ended Secretary 
of Commerce Sinclair Weeks commented, "It's hard to believe that it has 
taken nearly a hundred years for national leadership to call together the 
people who have the major responsibility for solving this problem, to dis-
cuss it with them in free 'give and take' and ask their cooperation."56 No 
significant action took place as a result of the meeting, which perhaps ex-
plains why future Presidents were willing to call such conferences again. 
Commentary on the meeting indicated that the business community 
fully recognized that its traditional discriminatory personnel policies were 
not seriously threatened by the Nixon Committee. On the one hand in an 
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article titled "How the President is Winning the War on Discrimination," 
the trade journal Factory Management and Maintenance concluded that 
the President's committee was determined to wipe out discrimination and 
was succeeding through voluntary means. The magazine attributed this 
success to the committee's "prestige in the business circles it deals with, 
and to its recognition of the fact that discrimination is a difficult problem 
that cannot be solved by edict or penalty. " 57 On the other hand, the failure 
of the business press to cite hard data, or even token examples of integra-
tion, clearly implied that the increased visibility of the President's com-
mittee was not to be confused with actual demands that firms live up to 
their contractual obligations. Business Week reassured its readers that "the 
federal team pointedly noted there would be no compulsory actions to 
force immediate compliance with the nondiscrimination clause in con-
tracts. " 58 "No federal agency has ever canceled a contract because dis-
crimination exists," one trade journal observed, "and there's no indication 
that the present Administration ever will. Instead, the idea is to persuade 
contractors to do voluntarily what is legally correct, and to show them 
how this will help company, employees, and community."59 It is little 
wonder that businessmen and "moderate" southerners thought highly of 
the Nixon Committee. David Sarnoff, chairman of RCA, said with uncon-
scious irony, that he was "impressed not only by the Committee's achieve-
ments but also by its practical approach," and he quoted Mississippi editor 
Hodding Carter to the effect that "there has been nothing sensational 
about the Eisenhower program-except its success."60 
Only a Mississippian or a conservative businessman could find "suc-
cess" in the committee's record. All accounts agree that the Nixon Com-
mittee did little to resolve complaints. During its seven-year tenure the 
committee received 1,042 complaints but was able to resolve only 372, or 
just a bit more than a third. Moreover, there is no way of knowing what 
sort of action the committee recommended to the agencies in the 372 
cases in which some final action was taken. 61 After reviewing a third of all 
the complaints filed with the Nixon Committee, Paul H. Norgren con-
cluded that not more than twenty people actually got jobs as a result of 
the committee's action. 62 This unimpressive record is ironically high-
lighted by an early comment of Vice President Nixon expressing his hope 
that the 1955 meeting would convince people that the government was 
willing to take action. He said, "Most people just don't like to make formal 
complaints ... and I am afraid even today there are many people who do 
not file complaints because they do not know whether it will accomplish 
anything. " 63 
While the President's Committee on Government Contracts may have 
been little more than an empty gesture in terms of enforcing the legal 
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obligations of government contractors, its actual impact on the business 
community went somewhat beyond its limited effectiveness in resolving 
complaints of discrimination. A large part of the committee's purpose was 
educational, and it could more legitimately claim success in that area than 
in complaint settlement (but perhaps only because it is more difficult to 
measure success in changing attitudes). In some cases the positive educa-
tional impact of the committee could readily be measured by the change 
in hiring practices of firms which were not actually accused of violating 
their contracts, but which for one reason or another came under the 
committee's purview. One of the country's largest soap manufacturers 
adopted an across-the-board (i.e., in the South as well as in the North) fair 
employment policy after Fred Lazarus, president of Federated Depart-
ment Stores and one of the nongovernment members of the Nixon Com-
mittee, applied pressure to the firm's chief executive officer.64 In its fifth 
and sixth annual reports the committee listed scores of cases in which it 
claimed to have been instrumental in bringing about better employment 
opportunities for black workers. Most of these cases, in which companies 
employed Negroes in white-collar and skilled jobs for the first time, did 
not arise from complaints but rather were the result of "direct consulta-
tion and negotiation with senior management of selected major govern-
ment contractors." Fourteen operators at the Chesapeake and Potomac 
Telephone Company, or one professional and one clerical worker at Litton 
Industries in San Carlos, California, were hardly the stuff of which real 
progress was made, but for the companies involved, many of which were 
in the South, even token employment meant that the door had been opened 
a crack.65 
The isolated breakthroughs in black placement instigated by the 
Nixon Committee proved that those who claimed the employment barrier 
was an unbreachable wall were wrong. After meeting with the Nixon 
Committee in 1955, government contractors in Dallas were reported to 
have "expressed great enthusiasm for the work of the committee and have 
shown the desire to really move toward employment on merit. " 66 While 
such feelings may not have been immediately translated into practice, 
they undoubtedly paved the way for the big push that came after 1960. 
Having briefly emerged into the public limelight with its "summit 
conference" for business leaders in 1955, the committee dropped back 
into the shadows for two more years. It again caused a brief stir of inter-
est in 1957, when it announced that government agencies granting con-
tracts would unilaterally begin to survey major defense industries to see if 
they were complying with the nondiscrimination clauses. There were no 
specific threats coupled with the new "compliance review program," 
although the administration did hint that it might be more difficult for 
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companies found wanting to get contracts in the future. The depth of the 
committee's devotion to enforcing the contract clauses was well reflected 
in the observation of one committee official that "most companies co-
operate easily enough. But occasionally you have to threaten them with 
loss of business-not so much an actual threat as a certain raising of the 
eyebrows or a shaking of the head. " 67 There must have been a lot of head 
shaking and eyebrow raising during the next three years because there 
certainly were not any contract suspensions, nor was a single company's 
name ever placed on an "ineligible list" for additional contracts. 68 
The 1957 "tough line" quickly followed the 1955 summit conference 
into oblivion. Even though the committee experienced its only pronounced 
and concentrated successes in the period between 1955 and 1957, it 
simply did not have enough impetus to keep the hard line alive. In 1955 
NAACP filed a series of suits against southern oil refiners with the Nixon 
Committee. As a result the committee forced at least nine southern oil 
refineries to abolish separate seniority lists for blacks, although substi-
tution of departmental seniority in cases where Negroes were in segregated 
departments frequently wiped out much of the effect. The Nixon Com-
mittee also made some attempt to see that companies administered fair 
tests which would permit blacks to move up the job ladder. Actual ad-
vancement of Negroes into better oil refinery jobs was minimal at best, 
but it was done only under strong government pressure and in the face 
of reluctant management and unions and of intransigent local custom.69 
The committee spent its final year and a half puttering around making 
movies, translating its publications into Spanish, and holding confer-
cnces. 70 
Statistically the President's Committee on Government Contracts 
was a failure. Subsequent studies have shown that there was no appreciable 
increase in nonwhite employment in contractor firms over the life of the 
Nixon Committee. Plants continued to follow local employment patterns 
even when the firm had officially adopted a national fair employment 
practice policy.71 Yet, despite the committee's gross shortcomings, it was 
instrumental in placing pioneer black workers in many new positions and 
in forcing many other firms at least to pay lip service to the philosophy 
of equal employment. The committee may not have wielded anything more 
lethal than a velvet fist in a velvet glove, but it did help prepare employers, 
especially in the South, for the new era. A 1960 survey of North Carolina 
firms holding federal contracts did not find a single company which gave 
the traditional excuses that customers and white employees would object 
to integration as the reasons for not giving black workers jobs. There 
were firms, of course, which continued to use those excuses, and em-
ployers who still believed them in the 1960's, but at least among govern-
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ment contractors in one southern state the fabric which had held the 
prodiscrimination arguments together had disintegrated. 72 
The strength of the Nixon Committee lay in its reinforcing, with 
the prestige of a business-oriented Republican administration, of the fair 
employment arguments that integrationist forces had been using since 
World War II. The committee joined other fair employment proponents 
in reciting the great catechism of equal employment: integration is good 
business; businessmen should be leaders in their communities; a fair 
employment policy attracts qualified applicants; black workers are not 
inferior to white workers; neither employees nor customers will object 
to black workers. 73 
The committee's weakness lay in its unwillingness to use its poten-
tial strength to demand, rather than suggest, that government contractors 
practice fair employment. Operating during a time when most of the 
attention in race relations was focused on the school integration crisis, 
the Nixon Committee recognized that widespread discrimination against 
blacks existed as much in the economic as in the educational sphere, but 
the committee was insufficiently motivated to take the action that 
might have mitigated some of the destructive force of the civil rights 
revolution that was to follow in the 1960's. 
The testimony of a business representative to the U.S. Civil Rights 
Commission during the first days of the Kennedy administration neatly 
summed up both the educational successes and the enforcement failures 
of federal fair employment activity during the Eisenhower years. Adrian 
J. Falk represented the California State Chamber of Commerce, the San 
Francisco Chamber of Commerce, the Oakland Chamber of Commerce, 
the Downtown Association, and the Federated Employers of San Francisco 
and its sixteen affiliated associations. Mr. Falk was despondent. It seems 
that the previous year the State of California had passed a fair employ-
ment practice law nullifying a San Francisco fair employment ordinance 
in which he had placed great faith. Falk approved of the San Francisco 
ordinance, which he termed a "compromise" program, because it "em-
phasized that the entire community shares responsibility for bringing about 
improvement in employment opportunities for minority group members 
and because it recognized that because discrimination is rooted in preju-
dice, it is eliminated by persuasion and education rather than by punitive 
measures." The new state law was unacceptable. First, Falk called the 
state law "the most restrictive and punitive of all state FEPC laws in 
the Nation today," and second, Falk complained that "nowhere in the act 
does the word 'education' occur." Based on his study of "other States 
and cities so far," Falk concluded that "no FEPC law will be successful 
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to any significant degree without years of education to change the 
prejudices which cause such discrimination." 
Summing up his position, Falk found "the word 'education' has a 
magic meaning to a great many people. A lot of people are a little bit 
dubious and afraid of something which says 'you must.' They much 
prefer the idea of the 'you ought to or let's do it together' kind of ap-
proach. " 74 Not the least of Falk's "many people" were those in the 
business community. 
The entire period between 1945 and 1960 was one of education, or 
perhaps consolidation is a better word. The state FEPC laws along with 
the manpower crunch of the Korean War created a situation in which 
pioneering became increasingly easy. The law provided protection from 
racist competitors and the war provided economic impetus. Successful 
integration in one area provided examples fo r other areas, and the business 
community as a whole began to recognize that the Capitalist Ethic and 
the American Creed were indeed compatible. By the end of the period the 
conflict between the two values had all but disappeared and the ideological 
system had reached a point of equilibrium. In the industrial North busi-
nessmen could employ blacks without fear of massive public opposition. 
The American Creed could be fulfilled without fear and the Capitalist 
Ethic could be adhered to by choosing exceptionally qualified blacks and 
ignoring the needs of the millions who could never be "Jackie Robinson." 
The crisis of World War II had been responsible for establishing the 
trend toward using blacks in nontraditional positions. The wartime FEPC 
not only set the pattern for subsequent state fair employment legislation, 
but it also demonstrated that legal requirements could successfully bring 
about racial integration, at least under extreme circumstances of national 
emergency and stringent labor shortage. More importantly, wartime in-
tegration demonstrated that blacks and whites could work together. Writ-
ing immediately after the war, two close observers of the labor relations 
scene concluded that personnel men had learned that four of the major 
anti-Negro employment arguments were untrue: 1) "Negroes have no 
mechanical aptitudes," 2) "Negroes and whites cannot work together, 
mix together," 3) "the Negro is more susceptible to disease, has more 
disease," and 4) "management cannot force Negroes on the blue collar 
ranks."75 
Southern congressional opposition blocked attempts to extend the 
federal FEPC into peacetime, but the Truman years were marked by a 
series of state antidiscrimination laws. While businessmen opposed the 
state laws, their opposition was seldom racist in tone. Voluntary attempts 
to promote economic integrat.ion did not always head off fair employment 
legislation, but they did reflect the basically positive attitudes toward 
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hiring blacks which many managers held. At the same time employers 
opposed FEPC, they actively sought recognition and approval for action 
they took in hiring and promoting black workers. 76 The personnel mana-
ger of a Dallas automobile plant claimed in 1952 that "if the civil rights 
talk in Washington does not set progress back . . . the problem will be 
solved in 1960." His company had begun to use blacks as maintenance 
men, and he believed that given time the Negroes would move up into 
higher positions.77 At about the same time, and with equally unfounded 
optimism, two fair employment field workers said they believed that "race 
relations in the United States . .. have passed the point of revolution and 
reached the stage of negotiation." 78 
The idea that somehow good faith, honest pleading, negotiation, and 
education would wipe out job discrimination dominated much of the 
thinking of those concerned with the plight of the black worker. For the 
most part progress toward fair employment during the 1950's was token. 
The concept of the pioneer prevailed. Firms pioneered by being the first 
to hire blacks at particular jobs, and the Negro workers themselves 
pioneered in the positions. Each token advance was taken with elaborate 
planning and much trepidation. Caution and moderation were the watch-
words. Lemuel R. Boulware, General Electric's vice president of person-
nel relations, and a man with a reputation as a tough and unyielding 
executive, summed up the attitude of many prominent businessmen of the 
1950's when he said, "What we try to do is develop a natural and 
unselfconscious association that comes along as fast as we can bring it 
about naturally. We are just going along as temperately and constructively 
as we know how with merit as our sole standard at every level of em-
ployment. " 79 
A 1956 New York Times observation that "community sentiment is 
generally much more hospitable to integration on the job than to integra-
tion in housing, schools or social activities"80 seems accurate as long as 
the word "sentiment" is emphasized. After surveying the racial attitudes 
of New York businessmen in 1956, Rosenberg and Chapin concluded that 
"the job situation is ripe for improvement. The psychological predisposi-
tion already exists in good measure; it needs to be more fully crystallized 
and institutionalized. " 81 Although businessmen did not necessarily im-
plement the increasingly favorable public attitudes toward job integra-
tion, examples of fair employment were becoming less exceptional, and 
profession of the ideal of equal employment was becoming the rule in the 
business community. The "crystallization" and "institutionalization" 
which would finally do away with the most blatant forms of job discrimi-
nation came after 1960, in the form of legal and social pressure. His-
torically, the civil rights revolution, as it applied to business, was not an 
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attempt to "force" morality, but rather a semisuccessful attempt to force 
an already "moral" segment of the society to live up to its convictions. 
Nothing more clearly illustrates this change in business concern and 
orientation than "how-to-do-it" articles on fair employment. Before the 
civil rights revolution, they recommended elaborate, cautious, and hyper-
sensitive techniques for pioneering, with an emphasis on blue-collar jobs. 
Although many of the arguments and methods remained basically un-
changed, after 1960 the articles tended to be crisper and more to the 
point. The success of the educational emphasis of the 1950's could be 
seen in what the articles no longer said, but were able to take for granted. 
For example, during World War II the National Industrial Con-
ference Board published ten principles which characterized successful 
industrial integration programs. Like virtually every other list, it started 
off with the observation that no program would work unless top manage-
ment was fully committed to the policy. A postwar article elaborated on 
this point, suggesting that the employer "put himself through something 
like a course of reading, conference, round-table discussion, and inspec-
tion trips" in order to prevent his integration program from being "half-
hearted, unsure, stupid, or trouble-instigating." Once he had convinced 
himself, the employer was urged to convince supervisory personnel, 
workers, and the union of the possibility of effective fair employment. 82 
Having thus prepared the way, articles appearing prior to 1960 
usually proceeded to devote an inordinate amount of attention to the 
selection of the pioneer black worker. During the war, NICB had sug-
gested that care be taken to pick "the right type of Negro as the first 
worker of his race in the plant." Experts on integration urged that the 
first blacks in a new position be highly qualified, and some writers even 
suggested that pioneers be overqualified, although others cautioned 
against this "Jackie Robinson syndrome" for fear it would breed resent-
ment among less qualified white workers and might make it even harder 
for normally qualified black workers to follow. There was, however, 
little disagreement on the suggestion that the black pioneers "have more 
than the usual amount of poise'" and that "the grooming of this group 
should be above average. " 83 In addition, many of the how-to-do-it plans 
included rather extensive suggestions for orienting the new workers, both 
to reassure the black employees of management's support and to caution 
them against "undue" sensitivity to the discrimination they would prob-
ably face for a while on the job. 84 
During the early 1960's how-to-do-it articles assumed less racism 
and wider acceptance of blacks in blue-collar jobs,85 but their gentle 
urgings of management to proceed carefully at the upper levels were 
reminiscent of the advice for the integration of all positions during the 
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fift ies. 86 After mid-decade, however, the pressure of the civil rights revo-
lution dominated fair employment practice activity. All the standard in-
tegration methods, all the caution, the careful selection and introduction 
of pioneers, the concern about customers and the community, almost 
faded out of the picture under the civil rights onslaught of the mid-sixties. 
The how-to-do-it articles suddenly became concerned with how business 
should respond to outside pressure, not from the white community pro-
testing integration, but from the black community demanding it. 87 
In 1963 the Public Relations Journal published a list of problems 
it believed businessmen should be prepared to meet. The tone and con-
tent of the list indicate how quickly the business community could change 
its attitudes when circumspection ceased to be a virtue. The article warned 
that employers should know: 1) how to enforce antidiscrimination hiring 
rules, 2) how to handle unqualified applicants so they would not feel 
discriminated against and how to build a case should antidiscrimination 
agencies come into the picture, 3) how to seek out the qualified black 
workers rather than waiting for them to come in, 4) how to improve 
promotion and training programs to maximize the opportunities for ad-
vancement available to minority workers, 5) "how to expose the sophis-
tries which might be used to cover up unfair practices," and, an old 
friend, 6) how to meet and overcome opposition to fair employment from 
employees. 88 
Many of the specific recommendations in the new period remained 
the same, but they had a notably bolder tone. Articles began to en-
courage companies to adopt employment policies that went beyond mere 
evenhandedness to consider some of the unique problems of the black 
job seeker. In addition to traditional suggestions such as the necessity of 
a strong commitment from top management and a full explanation of the 
policy down the line, the how-to-do-it articles of the later sixties suggested 
that companies review their testing procedures, their application blanks, 
their job requirements, their help-wanted advertising, and their contact 
with black community leaders.89 Businessmen were becoming more so-
phisticated about the nature of institutional racism. 
8 
Sophisticated Jobs and Sophisticated Racism 
During the war and the immediate postwar years most interest in 
employment integration centered on getting black workers into plants from 
which they had been wholly excluded or on obtaining promotions for those 
who were confined to unskilled positions. With the passing years attention 
shifted from production work to the more prestigious white-collar, techni-
cal, professional, and managerial positions. By the late 1950's and early 
1960's the business community had become largely concerned with pro-
moting and hiring Negroes into what were considered high-status jobs. 
This, of course, does not mean that blacks had obtained fair treatment at 
the blue-collar level, but enough firms in various parts of the country had 
made enough breakthroughs so that the focus of the equal employment 
movement could be redirected. 
As Negroes moved into higher jobs, increasing numbers of whites 
felt threatened. From what little work has been done in the area of white 
gains from Negro subordination, it appears that some groups of skilled, 
managerial, and clerical white workers may have in fact improved their 
economic condition by antiblack discrimination.1 Although there is consid-
erable difference of opinion among economists about the legitimacy of 
these findings, scholars generally agree that Negro employment did not 
pose a real economic threat to production workers.2 Thus, if employee 
objections to equal opportunity for black workers were at all based on an 
actual economic competition, opposition should have increased as Negro 
workers began moving up the occupational ladder. 
The objections to working with blacks voiced by white employees3 
were widely accepted by employers throughout the country in the late 
forties and early fifties. In the South the patterns of job discrimination 
were so strong that one observer elevated them to the status of "laws." 
With the usual exceptions to which all such laws were subject, sociologist 
Donald Dewey claimed in 1952 that in the South : "1) Negro workers 
seldom hold jobs which require them to give orders to white workers, 
123 
124 Black Meo and Businessmen 
2) Negro and white workers do not ordinarily work side by side at the 
same jobs."4 In 1952 the laws were as applicable in the North as in the 
South. Although the laws decreased in importance in the North during the 
1950's, they still applied in many areas of the South as late as 1962.5 
As one might logically expect, because there was less status loss in 
being equal to rather than subservient to a black, the barriers against 
whites working alongside Negroes came down sooner than those which 
prohibited blacks from giving orders to whites. Southall noted an early 
break with the rule against blacks and whites working side by side in a 
Tennessee firm which employed Negroes to work alongside whites in the 
late forties . But she observed that "even here where so much progress has 
been made, the traditional pattern of white superiority triumphed; for 
whenever any kind of issue arose, the Negroes, afraid of offending their 
white associates, refused to stand up for their own rights."6 
In many instances, particularly in the South, promotion of blacks on 
a par with whites was barred through contractual agreements with white-
dominated unions. The Nixon Committee's campaign against separate 
seniority lists in southern oil refineries was directed at some of the most 
blatant examples of discriminatory collusion between management and 
white workers.7 Even where there was no formal dual seniority system, 
many southern plants had informal agreements that blacks would not bid 
up into white jobs. In 1960, when Negroes in a Texas manufacturing firm 
demanded their rights to promotion under the contract, the management 
agreed, but retaliated by halting all hiring of new black workers.8 The dual 
seniority system remained common until President Kennedy's Committee 
on Equal Employment Opportunity was able officially to end a large 
number of such arrangements.9 
The abolition of contractual bars to promotion, however, did not 
necessarily mean upgrading for the black worker. Because many firms did 
not want to promote Negroes, they made it a practice to hire nonpromot-
able blacks, that is, workers without high school educations or other skills. 
Although education was frequently not necessary for success on the job 
( and in fact was not demanded of white workers), the requirement of a 
high school diploma was a useful method of keeping black workers in 
menial jobs.10 Even when firms did not unfairly apply an educational 
criterion, just the existence of such a requirement discriminated against 
Negroes. The dual educational system of the South, with inferior schools 
for Negroes, virtually insured that a black man would be unable to com-
pete with a white even for jobs in which educational criteria were fairly 
applied.11 
The end of job segregation sometimes also meant the actual loss of 
black positions. There was some truth to the observation that "the ruts 
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into which the nonwhites have been pressed are sufficiently deep that the 
steam roller of white competition ... passes over them quite harmlessly."12 
The forces that had made black workers members of a depressed and ex-
ploited economic colony within many southern firms were also the forces 
which protected that colony from white competition. While blacks could 
not move into white jobs, neither would whites be hired for black jobs, and 
that situation insured a minimum number of black jobs in many plants. 
The elimination of racially based occupational enclaves meant that whites 
were in fact hired for jobs which formerly only blacks had held. 13 
The development of a highly formalized segregated employment pat-
tern in the South was an industrial extension of the general southern pat-
tern in which rigid custom, and often law, formalized the inferior status of 
the black. The northern employer, on the other hand, did not have any 
such contractual or quasi-contractual means for hiring blacks at a low 
level and for keeping them there. When promotable Negroes hired by 
northern firms demanded their rights to apply for higher jobs on an equal 
basis with whites, their employers faced, frequently for the first time, the 
necessity of creating a policy to deal with black promotion. 14 Northern 
companies which had a strong policy of promoting from within were apt 
to use the policy as an excuse not to hire any blacks at all. If all employees 
were potential supervisory or even managerial personnel, and if the 
management believed that blacks would be unacceptable in positions of 
high status, then of course management would not hire Negroes at any 
level. 15 A study in the late sixties of employment patterns among unskilled 
janitors and material handlers in the Chicago area disclosed systematic 
discrimination against blacks even in such menial occupations as material 
handling. The author concluded that Negroes received janitorial jobs but 
not material handling positions because blacks traditionally carried out 
custodial work, because janitors were usually isolated from the white work 
force and would be less apt to upset white employees, and because custo-
dial work was seen as a dead-end job while material handlers were in posi-
tion to advance to higher paying jobs. At least in firms which paid high 
wages, material handlers were better educated, younger, and more often 
white than janitors because these were the qualities necessary for pro-
motion.16 
For the most part, however, after the mid-fifties it became increasingly 
more difficult for northern employers completely to bar Negroes from 
employment. Once blacks were in the work force normal promotions began 
to occur. Northern employers found that their equal employment policies 
augumented the natural pressure for promotion exerted by seniority and 
forced them to upgrade minority workers into supervisory, technical, and 
sometimes even managerial positions. 
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When employers began promoting blacks to higher-level jobs they 
faced many problems analogous to those which had occurred when the 
first Negro blue-collar workers were hired . The most common fear was 
that white workers would object to black coworkers. Every time a Negro 
was introduced into a new occupation or into a new work group, the 
employer had to face the potential problem of his employees' position. 
White workers based much of their opposition on the historically inferior 
status of blacks. Since black workers had traditionally been limited to 
low-status jobs, any job into which a Negro was introduced ipso facto 
became low-status. Businessmen frequently shared their employees' evalu-
ation. A San Francisco employer complained that "Negroes are degrading 
to the profession of selling,"17 and another said his employees would object 
to black coworkers "because our employees have acquired 'social 
caste.' " 18 
The problem of social caste or status became more acute when a 
Negro was placed in a position where he had power over whites or contact 
with noncompany personnel. Thus, a Chicago personnel man said in 1955 
that while he would hire any qualified engineer who came along, he would 
not place a black in any position, notably sales and personnel, where he 
would come in contact with other people. 19 Although this Chicago person-
nel manager's reasoning was quite typical, his refusal to place blacks in 
the personnel department deviated somewhat from the usual pattern. 
Employers placed most pioneering black technical and professional em-
ployees in internal staff rather than in line departments. Businessmen 
probably found blacks more acceptable in staff positions for two reasons. 
First, staff departments had no actual control over any aspect of produc-
tion, and thus no member of such a department was in a position to give 
orders to anyone outside of his immediate department. Second, by defini-
tion, staff employees exist to provide a service to management, and it may 
be that whites felt better about blacks working in a department which 
existed to serve, not to create.20 According to an Urban League official, 
Cleveland employers liked to use Negroes to head the mail room. In this 
way the company could have a black supervisor, but in a relatively invisi-
ble low-status department which had a purely service function and which 
was frequently staffed by young workers, blacks, or other marginal 
employees.21 
The personnel department was another popular spot for employing 
the first Negro on the managerial level. To some extent personnel men 
hired blacks for their own departments because they did not want to be in 
the position of telling other departments to do something they had not 
done themselves. In addition, however, personnel was essentially a staff 
department which had little if any control over actual plant production 
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and thus was a "safe department" for a potentially disruptive pioneer 
placement. 22 
Well into the sixties many employers believed that while there might 
be industrial "poor whites" who had to work alongside blacks, no white 
was so low that he had to take orders from a black. The placement policies 
of the electronics industry make it particularly evident that position and 
power are not synonymous, and that blacks were seldom given the latter 
to wield. Government pressure, particularly after the passage of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, persuaded many electronics firms to begin hiring 
blacks. Because of the electronics industry's high percentage of professional 
and skilled jobs many of the placements were necessarily in positions which 
blacks had not previously filled. A black engineer in Detroit observed in 
1964 that "you may find a Negro with a fancy title and a high salary, but 
these things are usually meaningless because he won't have responsibility 
over people. " 23 When a manufacturer of electronics said, "You can't put a 
Negro in a position where he will give orders to a white engineer because 
it will cause too much friction,"24 he was only parroting one of the stan-
dard cliches of industrial race relations. Employers who were willing to 
break the first "rule" that Negroes and whites could Iiot work together on 
the same job were still not willing to break the second rule, "Negroes 
cannot work over whites in the chain of command."25 While there are 
indications that even some blacks objected to Negro supervisors, during 
the forties and fifties businessmen permitted black supervisors only in 
those positions where they controlled other blacks, or a mixed crew work-
ing in a traditionally black area, such as the foundry. 26 
The "law" which forbade blacks from supervising whites applied 
equally to the North and South through the forties and fifties. By the mid-
sixties, however, the rule had lost much of its force in the North, but 
continued unabated in the South. More than half of the managers ques-
tioned in a 194 7 survey of two northern cities said they would have objec-
tions to placing a Negro supervisor, administrator, or professional over a 
group including wpites.27 A similar question asked of a sample of northern 
managers in 1966 indicated a major change of employer attitudes. Eighty-
two percent of those questioned agreed with the statement, "A Negro 
supervisor would be accepted by white subordinates in my company after 
he had successfully proven himself a good manager." More than half of 
these managers expressed the view that black workers would be able to 
rise above the level of foreman. However, only a third of the southern 
managers que;stioned believed that whites would ever accept a Negro 
supervisor, and approximately the same number thought that a black could 
rise above the level of foreman.28 
Once large numbers of blacks began to work in white-collar jobs 
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(large numbers being a relative term), the barrier against black supervisors 
fell quickly. The widespread fear that whites would not obey when blacks 
gave the orders, and the objections which whites raised to working under 
blacks, evaporated as society began to accept blacks as legitimate workers 
in higher status jobs. Once society accepted, and even encouraged, the 
use of blacks in desirable jobs, whites no longer had to fear the psycho-
logical cost of taking orders from blacks. Even token promotions beyond 
the white-collar level removed the terrible stigma of being dominated by 
a member of the "mudsill." The status gain for blacks meant less of a 
status threat for whites. So great was the change that in 1967 sixty white 
sales people in Miami, Florida, submitted without protest to the complete 
supervision of a black man. 29 While opposition to black supervisors was 
still the dominant pattern in the South, the Miami case would not have 
been possible even as an isolated example a decade earlier. 
White acceptance of black supervisors was closely related to the 
increasing acceptance of blacks in white-collar jobs. While most white-
collar workers below the managerial level were not in positions of power 
over their coworkers, blacks seeking white-collar employment nevertheless 
found barriers similar to those that existed for supervisory positions. Be-
cause the status of nonsupervisory white-collar jobs was almost wholly 
dependent upon socially accepted symbols of position, rather than on 
real power, blacks had as difficult a time breaking into sales, clerical, and 
technical positions as they had moving into supervisory jobs. Whereas 
whites objected to being supervised by blacks because it lowered their 
status directly, they resisted the encroachment of the blacks into white-
collar positions because the low social standing of blacks demeaned the 
status of the job-and job status was frequently all poorly paid white-collar 
workers had. 
Until the beginning of the I 960's, employers' fears of worker and 
customer opposition were usually strong enough to limit Negro white-collar 
workers to token positions in isolated locations. Breakthroughs in white-
collar employment for Negroes were of primarily symbolic importance and 
were pursued one at a time. Victories were counted in ones and twos. The 
Urban League placed a few workers here and the American Friends 
Service Committee placed a few workers there.30 The I 958 report of 
Eisenhower's Committee on Government Contracts, optimistically entitled 
Five Years of Progress, clearly illustrated the token nature of black ad-
vancement in industry. The report listed more than fifty firms with 
government contracts which opened up new positions to blacks. Though 
all of the firms employed more than a thousand people, and many em-
ployed more than ten thousand, the companies averaged fewer than 
fifteen black professional, technical, or clerical workers each. Even this 
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low average is misleadingly high since three firms had disproportionately 
large numbers of Negro white-collar workers, and the vast majority em-
ployed fewer than ten blacks.31 
The classic arguments against hiring Negro workers in white-collar 
positions fell into disuse in the North after 1960 as employers began hiring 
more blacks for such jobs. 32 While the actual number of blacks involved 
was pitifully small, and Negro white-collar workers remained severely 
underrepresented by any statistical measurement, nevertheless, at least in 
large border and northern cities, the hiring of Negro white-collar workers 
had begun to move beyond the tokenism of a company Negro toward a 
somewhat wider use of Negroes in higher status positions.33 
The increasing employment of blacks in white-collar jobs, which might 
be called "stage two" tokenism, even began to appear in some areas of 
the South among government contractors during the early 1960's and 
among nongovernment contractors in the border states. The U.S. Com-
mission on Civil Rights found widespread discrimination against blacks in 
Washington, D.C., in 1962, yet it concluded that "in clerical and sales 
work, where customer relations are of prime importance there is evidence 
that Washington's Negro majority is slowly but steadily influencing changes 
in employment."34 Similar studies of Houston, Texas, and Dade County 
(Miami), Florida, in the early 1960's disclosed the same kind of reluctant 
but discernible change in employment policies. In both cities tokenism con-
tinued to be the order of the day, and blacks were still unable to get white-
collar jobs for which they were qualified, but there was "occasional ac-
ceptance of Negroes in better than traditional jobs, a change slowly impelled 
by rapidly growing industry and fast increasing population."35 
By the beginning of the 1970's the process of token integration in the 
North had finally worked its way up to the level of management. It is 
almost impossible to ascertain employers' attitudes toward this final step in 
the process of economic integration. The Civil Rights Act, the urban crisis, 
the ghetto riots, and the change of mood in the black community from 
passive resistance to militancy-all contributed to businessmen's acute 
awareness of the need for equal employment at all levels. By the late sixties 
few if any employers were willing to engage in the kind of public rational-
ization and justification for discriminatory hiring that had marked the 
black man's steps up the previous rungs on the employment ladder. Despite 
executives' use of liberal rhetoric there is some indication that the questions 
and doubts which accompanied acceptance of blacks in white-collar and 
supervisory jobs continued to exist as Negroes moved into managerial posi-
tions, which were both white-collar and supervisory-or at least nominally 
supervisory. 
The first blacks hired into managerial positions frequently found that 
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they were not even tokens but mere window dressing. At least the first 
Negroes employed in blue-collar and lower level white-collar jobs were 
expected to do the work for which they were hired. But too often black 
"managers" were not even expected, or allowed, to perform any managerial 
work. Public opinion had come to demand a "house nigger," and no mat-
ter what their actual training and competence, many of the new black ex-
ecutives were just expected to be the company's liaison with those segments 
of the community that wanted to see Negro employees in executive posi-
tions. A black lawyer in an electronics firm was expected to handle but not 
to process most of his company's legal papers. His job brought him into 
contact with the firm's top executives so he could serve as a constant re-
minder of their liberal policies. 36 In a similar vein a young black profes-
sional complained, "I don't want to be hired as an engineer and then find 
myself assigned as the company's representative to Plans for Progress or 
some other government-sponsored program in the equal opportunity bag. 
Above all, deliver me from presiding over the company table at the annual 
Urban League benefit dinner."37 
Employers sought and frequently found overqualified black applicants 
for managerial positions. Although this approach was scored by some 
observers as an attempt to avoid the problem by choosing employees who 
had learned to be as "unNegro as the recruiters,"38 reports indicate that 
despite their superior qualifications the black executives were not pro-
moted. 39 Hired for decorative rather than functional purposes, the token 
black managers could serve their purposes just as well in powerless junior 
positions as in senior positions where they might have real control over 
the company. 
Employers' demands for black employees and the increasing willingness 
of Negroes to apply for nontraditional jobs did not necessarily mean that 
large numbers of new black workers would begin appearing in the nation's 
offices. Employers may have accepted the American Creed sufficiently to 
hire Negro white-collar workers but they still insisted that the new workers 
be qualified. Until the early 1960's the term "qualified" frequently meant 
white, and technical ability was simply unimportant. Thus companies 
which were the first in their areas to hire blacks sought, and could usually 
obtain, overqualified candidates. When no Negroes could get any job 
which required training or skill the numbers of qualified blacks from 
which the first pioneer firms could choose was relatively large. However 
by the late fifties even though firms were still seeking black workers with 
qualifications superior to those of white workers, they were beginning to 
encounter difficulty in finding them. What had appeared to be a large pool 
of Jackie Robinsons was quickly drained dry by the early comers.40 
Chronically inferior educational opportunities, coupled with the knowledge 
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that they could not expect to get jobs which required education, meant that 
few blacks were either able or motivated to gain the necessary training for 
white-collar jobs. Once hired there was no institutionalized means of re-
plenishing those few highly motivated individuals who had prepared them-
selves for acceptance in the white business world despite the fact that they 
had no valid reason to expect that their preparation would actually result 
in a job. 
There is little question that beginning in the early 1960's a shortage of 
qualified Negro employees began to develop. While employers may have 
wanted blacks at the managerial level more for their publicity value than 
for their business acumen, they nevertheless desired, but could not find, 
Negroes with education in technical and managerial skills. The validity of 
the qualification crisis was reflected in the response of the organizations 
working for improved Negro employment opportunity. Formed to deal 
with economically irrelevant forms of discrimination, i.e., those based on 
racial grounds, the fair employment organizations suddenly found them-
selves confronted with economically relevant discrimination, i.e., that based 
on real inability to perform the job.41 
Until the early sixties, service organizations such as the Urban 
League and the American Friends Service Committee could usually meet 
the lack-of-qualified-applicants dodge by offering the reluctant employer a 
living, breathing, fully qualified black candidate the next morning. But in 
1961 the personnel director of Standard Oil of California, Fred Russell, 
claimed that "the real problem for the Negro in this area is job qualifica-
tion. In southern California, at least, I think people are ready to employ 
Negroes." Russell was a member of the Urban League and was presumably 
aware of whether or not qualified Negroes were available in his locality.42 
American Friends Service Committee field workers in Atlanta found that 
by 1962 they were having difficulty coming up with fully qualified candi-
dates to meet employers' arguments that no suitable Negroes ever applied. 
One field worker observed, "I am beginning to think that perhaps the 
employer has strong ground on which to stand by using this excuse rather 
than the fear of what may be the reactions of his white employees . . . 
because while it is true that a proportion of the staff does resent the de-
segregating process it recognizes that change is taking place."43 
In early 1964, the AFSC employment program in Atlanta reported that 
it was "shifting from major emphasis on confrontation to recruitment and 
encouragement in the Negro community to prepare for job openings as 
they are occurring in the post-pioneering stage .. .. Unfortunately," the 
report continued, "when the nontraditional job occurs we are frequently 
frustrated in our attempts to recruit qualified applicants."44 In 1962, 
Guichard Parris, public relations director of the National Urban League, 
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announced that "state and federal laws have reduced the needs and pres-
sures for getting more and better jobs." Parris predicted that within a 
decade "most of the [discriminatory] laws and other restrictions shall have 
disappeared and the Negro will be able to compete in the open market 
place." In order to enable blacks to compete more successfully the League 
said it would increase its emphasis on motivating youths to seek training 
for better jobs, rather than serving only as a placement agency.45 
Two years later, in 1964, the Urban League established its National 
Skills Bank, a clearing and coordinating center for placement of skilled 
black workers. After six months of operation the Skills Bank boasted of 
placing more than a thousand Negroes, and according to Mahlon T. Pur-
year, director of the program, "In many cases the jobs were obtained by 
a major breakthrough in the 'whites only' barrier in the upper echelons of 
business and industry."46 But the record of success was somewhat less 
dramatic than Puryear made it seem. Although the Skills Bank screened 
more than two hundred thousand individuals during its first year it was 
able to place only five thousand. The problem did not lie with reluctant 
employers. Puryear reported that "60 to 70 percent of the largest corpora-
tions have placed job orders with the skills bank for talented Negroes. Some 
of them have open orders with us, more jobs than we can fill some places." 
Rather, the difficulty lay with the reluctance of many black workers to 
move to areas where jobs were available and with the lack of professional, 
executive, and clerical skills among Negro job seekers.47 The problem of 
finding qualified workers had become so prevalent by 1967 that 64 per-
cent of more than four hundred employers questioned agreed with the 
statement "Negroes are apt to be less well trained than whites, so hiring 
many Negroes will either decrease production or increase training costs."48 
Despite a great tradition of paternalistic white capitalists urging and 
assisting education for Negroes, the American business community as a 
whole did not seem particularly concerned with the lack of trained workers 
until the advent of the civil rights revolution. The absence of an over-
whelming manpower shortage meant that business used blacks in menial 
capacities, and the rudimentary education which the public schools pro-
vided blacks was sufficient to fill the limited intellectual demands of un-
skilled work. There were some complaints from employers in the immedi-
ate postwar years, as there would be again in the sixties, that Negroes 
needed to be instructed in the responsibility of employment, but the de-
mand for this kind of education was quite different from the demand that 
blacks receive instruction in a salable skill. Many of the white demands for 
Negro education in the early period after the war were not for education 
at all but rather for indoctrination in the attitudes which made successful 
employees-from the employer's point of · view. The business community 
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wanted black workers who were honest and who had a desire to please the 
boss.49 On the whole, however, businessmen merely ignored the question 
of Negro education. Blacks were well enough trained for the jobs available 
to them and an occasional corporate gift to the United Negro College Fund 
appeased the spirits of General 0. 0. Howard and Booker T. Washington.so 
As legal and social pressure forced employers to increase their hiring 
of Negro workers for upper level positions, businessmen began to pay more 
attention to the state of Negro education. The renewed interest in education 
allowed the business community to let itself off the hook by attributing the 
scarcity of black employees to the failure of Negroes to "educate them-
selves" ( as the businessmen frequently put it). By blaming either individual 
Negroes or the educational system for the economic problems of black 
men, businessmen shifted the burden of responsibility for Negro under-
employment to institutions beyond their immediate control. Implicit in their 
faulting of education was a generalized acceptance of the complementary 
values of the American Creed and the Capitalist Ethic. Employers were 
willing to hire blacks equally with whites ( or so they stated) if the blacks 
were equally prepared. At the same time since most blacks were not equally 
prepared, the businessman could maintain his all-white professional, techni-
cal, and managerial staff. 
To some extent businessmen recognized that problems inherent in the 
country's dual educational system caused Negroes' educational shortcom-
ings. Commenting on the failure of blacks to enter management positions 
in the textile industry, the associate editor of a textile trade journal noted 
that no Negroes were enrolled in any programs which southern universities 
offered in the field of textiles. While all the colleges were legally integrated, 
the magazine observed "that Negro high school students graduating from 
an educational system that is substandard are going to have an exceedingly 
difficult time in completing today's university textile curriculum."51 Yet 
even when businessmen recognized the source of the lack of training, some 
drew curious conclusions. The manager of an employment agency in San 
Francisco observed in 1963, "We have found that the majority of Negro 
applicants-even those with high school diplomas-coudn't pass the sim-
plest clerical tests," from which he concluded not that the schools were 
wanting but rather that Negroes "are not equipping themselves." 52 
As increasing numbers of blacks moved into upper level jobs, business-
men who continued to employ few Negroes needed a new and more sophis-
ticated set of rationalizations to explain their failure to hire blacks. The 
arguments that employees and customers would object, although sanctified 
by tradition, were becoming embarrassingly transparent. Not only did the 
success of pioneer placements belie the traditional excuses, but the public 
and the government were becoming more knowledgeable. New times de-
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manded new rhetoric, if not new action. During the 1960's businessmen 
began to show an increasing awareness of the underlying sociological rea-
sons for the lack of qualified black workers-or at least they demonstrated 
an increased sensitivity to sociological jargon. 
By focusing on environmental rather than personal obstacles to Negro 
advancement, businessmen seemed to imply that society could alter the 
offending institutions, such as the educational system, and eliminate the 
problem of economic discrimination . In fact, discrimination ceased to be 
a subject of discussion. Business began to act as though discrimination hac! 
disappeared and the only problem that remained was motivating and train-
ing blacks to take advantage of the myriad of opportunities that were now 
open to them. So far as businessmen were concerned, the American Creed 
was a reality and all they needed to do was to convince blacks that jobs 
existed if only they would prepare themselves. Sponsors of an upgrading 
seminar for employers held in Milwaukee in 1968, urged their colleagues 
to prove that fair employment was a reality by promoting blacks. Seminar 
leaders believed that such examples would motivate "other minority group 
persons to seek employment, to stay employed, to aspire to better jobs, 
and to take steps necessary to prepare themselves for better jobs."53 
Increasing business emphasis on sociological explanations was an 
attempt to shift the cause of unequal employment for blacks to the society 
at large or even, by implication, to the blacks themselves. In 1966, Howard 
C. Lockwood of Lockheed Aircraft noted, "Three or four years ago the 
problems looming largest would have been how to eliminate discrimination 
in employment and the acceptance of minority personnel in occupations 
which formerly had been closed to them." Although Lockwood admitted 
that "there is still much to be done," he felt that a more serious sociologi-
cal problem had arisen. "Because of many years of discrimination and re-
jection," Lockwood said, "many minority individuals are very poorly pre-
pared educationally and even psychologically to accept their new role."54 
Two officials at a Georgia aircraft company took a similar view when they 
told an interviewer that Negroes were not only unprepared for available 
jobs but could not even qualify for company training programs. They be-
lieved that more emphasis should be placed upon motivation in the home, 
urging parents to discipline their children to further study, [and] radical 
changes in the school curriculum. "55 
Even hard-line southerners began to use sociological reasoning as a 
facade to cover more traditionally racist viewpoints. Explaining his opposi-
tion to civil rights legislation in 1962, an officer of an Atlanta bank said 
he felt it was economically and morally wrong to expect industry and provi-
dent people to care for the "shiftless and the chiselers." In itself, his was 
the classic position of conservative businessmen, but he capped his argu-
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ment with a more sophisticated sociological explanation when he admitted 
that "taken as a whole and disregarding the individual, the Negro is not a 
second-class citizen but a third-class citizen," whose inferior socioeco-
nomic position was due not to any racial traits but rather to "lack of cul-
tural advantages, etc." He believed, however, that these shortcomings 
could not be overcome with civil rights legislation. 56 Charles B. Potter, 
personnel vice president to Burdine's one of the largest department stores 
in Miami, Florida, insisted that the race problem could not be attributed 
to businessmen. Potter deary believed that the American Creed would be 
fulfilled by adherence to the Capitalist Ethic. Public antipathy toward 
black employees had vanished, and cnly blacks' lack of ambition and 
skills stood between them and good jobs. "The profit motive overlooks 
color; the dollar has no color," he explained. "The businessman isn't the 
obstacle. Our whole society has been the obstacle. The conditions society 
has imposed on the Negro's life have produced thousands of would-be 
workers without the skills or attitudes sought by employers." Potter called 
for remedial training to bring the black job seekers up to employers' stand-
ards. He warned however that "a simple expenditure for training is not 
going to do the job unless it includes the motivational, psychological factor. 
If the Negro is going to follow, as too many still do, the historical pattern 
-get paid on Friday and get drunk on Saturday-what is the training 
going to accomplish?"S7 
Although it is perhaps a bit clearer in Potter's comments than in those 
of other businessmen, a persistent trend developed during the sixties which 
used social science terminology not only to justify continued discrimina-
tion, but also to perpetuate racial stereotyping. The National Industrial 
Conference Board quoted an executive as saying large numbers of Negroes 
would never qualify for industrial employment because "they are illiterate 
or semi-illiterate, irresponsible, overly submissive or hostile, suspicious, 
resentful of white supervisors, and in other ways badly formed by their 
life experience."58 It is a matter of some question whether the modifying 
phrase "formed by their life experience" is an honest attempt to express 
the problems of the black subculture as seen from the businessman's 
perspective or is merely a modem tag line on a time-honored string of 
racist generalities. 
Employers became particularly fond of explaining the lack of qualified 
black applicants by alluding to the shortcomings of Negro family life. 
Some businessmen's discussions of black family patterns had obvious racist 
overtones. A Houston oil company executive whose company refused to 
take any community-level action to improve the conditions of the Negro, 
relieved himself, his children, and probably his grandchildren of any 
responsibility when he explained that "it will take several generations of 
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greatly improved education for Negro youth before any long strides can 
be made; as the 'home atmosphere' of Negro children is not conducive to 
intellectual attainment and advanced education, at least one generation of 
educated parents is needed to lay the proper groundwork."59 His words 
were echoed by a New York employer who said, "Home life, as far as 
parents are concerned, is probably not the best for colored people. The 
momentum of parents is probably carried over into children. There must 
be several generations yet before there will be any real change."60 
Like the efficient-use-of-labor argument, the sociological argument was 
a double-edged sword. Early proponents of fair employment had urged 
employers to use blacks because Negroes were a readily available source 
of trained manpower, only to have their argument turned against them 
when the supply of trained blacks was exhausted. Conversely, the socio-
logical objection to Negro employment was used mostly by opponents of 
black employment, but could be used by problack forces as an argument 
in favor of extra help for Negroes. Because the environment was subject 
to change, the emphasis on the nonmiddle-class nature of many black 
families Jed some employers to urge their colleagues to make a special 
effort to bring blacks up to white par. Harold Mayfield, director of per-
sonnel relations for Owens-Illinois, called upon employers to "make allow-
ances ... to see that a man may be qualifiable although not yet qualified ; 
we must make our selection of men on the basis of their teachability rather 
than their present knowledge." This, Mayfield said, was because Negroes 
"may not even have heard of these [technical] jobs nor of the tools we use 
in them. They did not have chemistry sets as children; their parents and 
friends did not talk about these matters; they are unprepared for this work 
in a profound sense most of us cannot grasp because it is a subtle matter 
of attitude more than simply a matter of facts."61 
The "subtle matter of attitude" was the frequent target of employer 
comments when they spoke of the environmentally caused shortcomings of 
Negro workers. In another article Mayfield noted that people from "the 
city slums, the rural backwoods, or an Indian tribe . . . are truly handi-
capped in performing business jobs and not all of them can or will make 
the transition." Among the important qualities Mayfield believed these un-
fortunates lacked were an "acceptance of personal competition, respect for 
authority, concern for the distant future, admiration of thrift, industrious-
ness, subordination of the personal good to the group welfare under cer-
tain circumstance, willingness to settle most personal disagreements peace-
ably, a complex code of ethics governing relations of one person to another, 
and so on. "62 
The preoccupation of some businessmen with motivating Negroes 
rather than with providing educational facilities could almost be viewed as 
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a sociological reincarnation of the stereotype of the lazy black. During the 
1960's a large segment of the business community participated in a number 
of programs designed to counteract what the businessmen believed was the 
lack of motivation among black youth to seek the education and training 
necessary for successful employment. The youth-oriented motivation pro-
grams which sprang up in the wake of the riots of the mid-sixties could 
have very conservative sociopolitical overtones. For example, several busi-
nessmen in Racine, Wisconsin, arranged for ex-boxer Archie Moore to 
bring his ABC Club presentation to the high school students of that city. 
Although the businessmen wished to help motivate Racine's black youth, 
they did so by sponsoring an organization which actively campaigned 
against the activist thought prevalent in the black community at that time. 
Moore's club stressed self-discipline, education, and "a program that will 
inspire young people to walk away from trouble with courage and dignity 
and without cowardice." Moore was an outspoken opponent of urban vio-
lence and of the black power demonstration of John Carlos and Tommie 
Smith at the 1968 Olympic Games. Moore provided businessmen with a 
perfect opportunity to demonstrate their new-found sympathy with the 
American Creed without having to deviate a step from a fundamentalist 
interpretation of the Capitalist Ethic.63 
The Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce established a more elaborate, 
but equally conservative, motivation project when it created the Committee 
for Employment Opportunity in 1965. From a number of sources, includ-
ing business and industry, the committee recruited volunteers to counsel 
unemployed job seekers. While the Indianapolis project was not unique in 
its method of one-to-one individual counseling, committee supporters justi-
fied their activity in a way that clearly illustrated the conservative business 
interpretation of black sociological problems. Committee literature said 
that "on-the-spot research showed that the unskilled job seeker's frustra-
tion and lack of motivation to find work is caused primarily by poor job 
focus, personal problems, a history of poor interviews, and a resulting lack 
of self-confidence." The committee carefully explained that the root of the 
problem lay with the individual, not with the business community. The 
committee claimed that the unemployed worker's "lack of good work atti-
tudes is caused by a poor understanding of his personal responsibilities to 
an employer, oversensitivity and defensiveness with supervisors, and a 
generalized hostility to business and industry whom he views incorrectly 
as the source of his troubles. " 64 
The most concerted business attempt to <;lea! with the problem of socio-
logical disabilities related to employment was the Plans for Progress series 
of Youth Motivation Programs. The programs began in Cleveland in 1965 
and consisted of sending minority employees into local schools to speak 
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to the students as "living witnesses" that properly trained blacks could get 
nontraditional jobs. Linked with a national advertising campaign organized 
by the Vice President's Task Force on Youth Motivation, local Plans for 
Progress councils in sixteen cities sponsored programs in fifty-nine 
schools during the 1967-68 school year. While the program was basically 
an antidrop-out campaign, it was specially directed at minority students. 
The Youth Motivation Program recognized that many black youths needed 
both models and proof that education would indeed lead to jobs. Thus 
the program was a tacit admission that the business community had failed 
in the past to provide jobs to qualified blacks and was now trying to rectify 
the imbalance it had created. In the introduction to a booklet which con-
tained hundreds of pictures of successful minority employees, Vice Presi-
dent Hubert H. Humphrey wrote, "There was a day when your choices 
might have been limited. But that day has now passed."65 
To a limited extent the Vice President's words were accurate. By 1966, 
breakthroughs had been made into white-collar, supervisory, technical, pro-
fessional, and even some managerial positions. Businessmen spoke out 
uniformly in favor of equal employment opportunity. While tokenism was 
undoubtedly still a problem, the lack of qualified black workers had sup-
planted the reluctance of business to hire Negroes as the chief difficulty 
facing the fair employment movement. During the mid-sixties pressure 
from the federal government and pressure from the black community finally 
forced business to begin living up to the pious expressions of equal employ-
ment which had been the formal position of most large national companies 
since World War II. In many cases the original policies of nondiscrimina-
tion had been instituted as the result of state FEPC laws, federal contracts, 
and, in some cases, pressure from industrial unions. It took the civil rights 
revolution to persuade businessmen, even those with formal policies of 
nondiscrimination, to stop taking the line of least resistance and instead 
face up to the implications of institutionalized racism.66 
9 
The Turning Point: Federal Pressure 
and the Civil Rights Movement 
The combined forces of the federal government under the Kennedy 
and Johnson administrations and the direct action of the black com-
munity wrought a major change in the fundamentalist interpretation 
of the Capitalist Ethic and American Creed which had marked business 
attitudes towards blacks during the first fifteen years after the war. 
The state laws and tokenism of the forties and fifties had consolidated 
the position of blacks in semiskilled labor and had opened the possi-
bility for Negro employment in higher level jobs. Many southern and 
border state firms and some northern companies as well continued to 
discriminate against blacks in production line work, and the black pres-
ence in white-collar jobs was statistically insignificant. Nevertheless, as 
a whole, the business community had come to accept black operatives, 
and to at least consider the possibility of Negro white-collar personnel. 
Up through the beginning of the Kennedy administration business 
acceptance of black employees was predicated upon an extremely ortho-
dox interpretation of the Capitalist Ethic. Blacks would be hired when 
there was no risk of excessive employee or public opposition and then 
only if the blacks could meet or exceed regular qualifications. The 
American Creed of equal opportunity was a reality only as long as there 
was no additional cost to the firm. It was this narrow economic inter-
pretation of the American Creed which would fall by the boards under 
the onslaught of governmental and black demands during the 1960's. 
Barely a month after he took office, President John F. Kennedy 
issued Executive Order 10925. From March 6, 1961, until it was super-
seded on October 24, 1965, by President Lyndon B. Johnson's Execu-
tive Order 11246, 10925 dominated the industrial race relations of the 
country's federal contractors. It established the President's Committee 
on Equal Employment Opportunity (PCEEO), which, unlike its prede-
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cessor, the Nixon Committee, had the power to initiate reviews of busi-
nessmen's compliance with their contracts and the authority to rectify 
any injustices it found. The Kennedy administration transformed an 
impotent coordinating and educational organization into a body with 
the power (if not the will) to search out discrimination in employment 
among federal contractors and to compel equal employment opportunity. 
The new committee differed from the old in four significant re-
spects. First, PCEEO created a definite timetable for dealing with com-
plaints. The timetable applied both to the committee itself and to the 
contracting federal agency. While complaints could be filed and pro-
cessed by either the agency or the committee, the committee had the 
power to review all cases and order compliance no matter what the 
findings of the contracting agency's compliance officer. This precluded 
possible deals between the agency and contractors at the expense of the 
complainant. 
Second, PCEEO enlarged upon the review procedure begun by the 
Nixon Committee in its last several years. Unlike the Nixon Committee, 
which had to rely upon the contracting federal agencies to carry out 
reviews of compliance, PCEEO had the authority to conduct such investi-
gations itself. These investigations were designed to dig deeply into 
potential problem areas revealed by the compliance reports which each 
employer was obliged to submit to the committee-also an innovation. 1 
Third, PCEEO rewrote the mandatory nondiscrimination clause which 
was a part of every government contract. Not only did the new clause 
contain the standard admonition, "The contractor will not discriminate 
against any employee or applicant for employment because of race, 
creed, color, or national origin," but it went on to require the contractor 
to "take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and 
that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their 
race, creed, color or national origin. "2 
Finally, the Kennedy committee had the authority to impose a 
variety of sanctions on noncooperating employers. Although the execu-
tive order urged that the committee act through informal means, such 
as "conference, conciliation, mediation, or persuasion," whenever pos-
sible, it did permit the committee to: 1) publicize the names of discrimin-
atory contractors, 2) recommend injunctive or criminal action by the 
Department of Justice, 3) terminate contracts, and 4) prohibit further 
contracts until the contractor complied with the nondiscriminatory re-
quirement.3 
Compared to the Nixon Committee , PCEEO was a whirlwind of 
activity. It adjusted more complaints during its first year than the 
Nixon Committee had in seven years.4 More importantly, it engaged 
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in a series of highly publicized confrontations with contractors which 
gave it a reputation in the business community for toughness which in 
turn influenced many employers actively to recruit black workers in 
order to stave off similar difficulties. 
During its first two years the committee forced the Lockheed 
Corporation to adopt the Plans for Progress which opened up a new era 
in affirmative racial personnel practices. PCEEO also placed five firms on 
the list of those prohibited from receiving further government contracts 
until they submitted acceptable compliance reports. 5 The committee's 
two most important moves were against Comet Rice Mills of Houston 
and Beaumont, Texas, and against the Danly Machine Company of 
Chicago. Danly, although it was located in an area with a large Negro 
population, did not have a single black worker among its more than 1,300 
employees. Comet exhibited the typical pattern of segregation and dis-
crimina tion thait existed in many parts of the South. Its noncompliance 
included "racial separation of employees by department, racially discrim-
inatory rates of pay, racially separate application forms, and separation 
of sanitary facilities by the designations, 'White,' 'Negro,' and 'Latin 
American.' " 6 
Early in 1962 PCEEO declared both companies ineligible to receive 
government contracts until they submitted plans for compliance with the 
nondiscriminatory clause. Within a month each company had submitted 
an acceptable plan to the committee. The plans were important not only 
because the companies agreed to eliminate the objectionable conditions, 
but because plans also specified the "affirmative action" steps each firm 
would pursue to insure equality of employment. Danly agreed to "estab-
lish contact with sources of minority group recruiting for referral of 
qualified minority group applicants,'' issue a policy statement, and set up 
methods to evaluate the success of its program. The company also "noti-
fied in writing all sources of recruitment that it expected referral without 
regard to race, creed, color, or national origin,'' and "it broadened the 
base of its advertising and recruitment activities to include periodicals 
reaching the minority group community and colleges with substantial 
minority enrollment."7 Comet's affirmative actions were of a similar 
nature. In addition, Comet agreed to survey its minority employees to 
see if they had any skills which might qualify them for promotion. Before 
the committee's action Comet had not even provided space on its appli-
cation blanks for blacks to indicate their educational experience. 8 
While the action against the five companies showed that the com-
mittee could get results when it was willing to use its muscle, PCEEO 
nevertheless operated very cautiously. One observer ·believed that the 
committee's caution sprang from its fear of being declared unconsti-
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tutional, at least until the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.9 Even 
though the publicity from the prosecution of offending firms gave the 
committee an important no-nonsense reputation in the business com-
munity, it was reluctant to engage in widespread public prosecution. 
According to vice chairman Jerry R. Holleman, the committee did most 
of its work in secret because, "we are seeking to avoid publicity. We're 
working through cooperation, not through compulsion or threats. We 
don't want to blacken [sic] anyone's name."10 
While conciliation and informal pressure appear to have had some 
positive effect, particularly in the wake of the Danly and Comet cases, 
which lent an implicit threat to committee requests, 11 PCEEO clearly took 
a soft line. It was not trying to maximize the number of black job 
holders. 12 Despite its power to supersede government agencies, PCEEO, 
like its predecessor, continued to leave most of the enforcement up to 
the contracting agencies even though they were less than adamant in 
their demands for compliance. Although the committee had demanded and 
received affirmative action in recruitment from firms it threatened to 
prosecute, the head of compliance for the General Services Administra-
tion (along with the Defense Department, it was the largest purchaser 
in the federal government) said, "We don't tell companies that they have 
to go out on the street and hire Negroes, we just ask them to take appli-
cations and put everyone on an equal basis." 13 According to one trade 
magazine, PCEEO wished to achieve "more or less voluntary compliance. 
The theory is that the 'converted' are more likely to increase job oppor-
tunities for Negroes beyond a mere minimum than companies that are 
pushed hard and penalized. " 14 It is difficult to distinguish between this 
concept of voluntary compliance and the supplicatory attitude of the 
Nixon Committee. The new committee was born with teeth. It tried 
them out a couple of times and apparently decided that it did not like 
the taste of red meat so it reverted to the gum beating that had charac-
terized the previous Republican administration. 15 
Business generally reacted favorably to Executive Order 10925, per-
haps because even such staunch conservatives as Barry Goldwater sup-
ported the government's right to demand nondiscrimination in its con-
tracts.16 Businessmen were concerned with the government's require-
ment for "affirmative action," but in comparison to some of the demands 
that were forthcoming from black protest organizations, the govern-
ment's demands appeared reasonable, and businessmen sought to meet 
the new government standards. For example, several firms in Atlanta 
which held contracts with government agencies indicated they felt more 
pressure to act under Executive Order 10925 than they had under 
previous executive orders even though their contracts had obligated 
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them to fair employment for as long as they had held them. In 1963, the 
Atlanta district manager of an office machines company said that the 
executive order had prompted him to "casually mention" the possibility 
of hiring Negroes and "to his satisfaction and some surprise lounge talk 
evidenced no unfavorable comment." He said, "It was almost as though 
thoughts of desegregation of the work force were in the air."17 
The committee's power to deprive· a company of its contracts, 
present and future, plus its threats to do so on a small number of occa-
sions, created an atmosphere more conducive to employing blacks. 
Coupled with a rising tide of black antibusiness militancy, many con-
tractors felt it prudent, if not imperative, to begin hiring more blacks in 
nontraditional positions. 18 The apparent willingness of white employees 
and public to accept blacks reduced the potential cost of integrating 
while the threat of contract cancellation clearly increased the cost of 
continued segregation. Under such circumstances there was obviously no 
conflict between the Capitalist Ethic and the American Creed. 
The business community was singularly silent in opposition to civil 
rights legislation during the 1960's.19 Public acceptance of the civil 
rights movement indicated a generally sympathetic attitude toward the 
American Creed, not only in theory but also in practice. Civil rights 
legislation was opposed by decreasing numbers of congressmen, and by 
opposing such legislation businessmen ran the risk of placing themselves 
outside the mainstream of national attitudes. Moreover, by the early 
1960's most industrial states had FEPC laws and businessmen found they 
could live with them without incurring any additional costs. Of employ-
ers' organizations, only the Illinois Manufacturers' Association testified 
against proposed federal legislation, and even that occurred at the begin-
ning of the decade.20 The silence continued even after it became clear 
in 1964 that a civil rights bill of some sort was going to pass. With the 
single exception of the Wall Street l ournal, which feared the law would 
open "the gates to new floods of bureaucracy and litigation" and would 
compel employers to hire unqualified workers,21 open opposition to the 
civil rights bill came from nonbusiness conservatives, not from employ-
ers.22 
On the other hand, on several occasions President Johnson called 
directly on businessmen to lend active support to the pending civil rights 
legislation.23 But employers were no more willing to publicly support 
the legislation than to oppose it. Only a handful of employers spoke in 
favor of the bill.24 Halward L. Homan, personnel manager of Friden, 
summed up the business position on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when 
he wrote, "A few years ago I would have said there is only one way to 
handle the Fair Employment problem-voluntarily. I still feel that way, 
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but we have done very little about it." Homan continued, "I am not 
particularly fond of legal coercion. I think that voluntary conduct is far 
better than legal force. But- where the rights of the individuals are not 
protected voluntarily, the law must step in. " 25 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited employers from 
discriminating against employees in any facet of employment because of 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and it established the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to administer the law.26 
Congress passed the law as part of the memorial wave of legislation that 
followed President Kennedy's assassination. The period was also one of 
increasing antibusiness activity on the part of civil rights groups. Given 
this background, and the almost total absence of outspoken opposition 
to the law before it passed, it is hardly surprising that the business com-
munity accepted the new legislation calmly. The Mississippi Manufac-
turer's Association, for example, urged its members to accept the Civil 
Rights Act and pointed out that everyone in Mississippi would benefit 
"through gainful employment in a useful occupation in an expanding 
economy in which all citizens, all Mississippians have the equal oppor-
tunity to enjoy the fruits of their own individual labors. " 27 A generally 
calm reception was not indicative of the disappearance of discrimination 
in employment. The work of EEOC made that abundantly clear. Rather, 
lack of opposition by employers indicated that the business community 
either accepted the new ideal, or at least was unwilling to speak out 
against the law of the land. 
The apparent lack of animosity toward EEOC may have been due in 
part to the law's emphasis on conciliation. Upon investigation of a com-
plaint, if EEOC found "reasonable cause" to believe that there had been 
discrimination, a conciliator contacted the complainant to determine 
what kind of remedy he would accept. The conciliator then presented 
this proposed remedy to the employer along with whatever other changes 
in policy EEOC believed were necessary to insure continued nondiscrim-
inatory practice. The law did not bind the employer to sign the con-
ciliation agreement. However, if EEOC found that the employer had not 
stopped his illegal behavior, it could recommend to the Attorney General 
that criminal charges be brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act.28 
When the commission demonstrated a willingness to recommend 
legal action against uncooperative firms-and it initiated thirty-five such 
cases in fiscal 1967-it undoubtedly bolstered employer eagerness to sign 
conciliation agreements. EEOC officials reported that most businessmen 
they approached would comply both because they feared the legal and 
public relations impact of extended litigation and because direct ap-
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proaches from the government gave the businessman someone else to 
take the blame for integrating his work force. 29 
Conciliation agreements with EEOC were designed to have a broad 
impact on the employment practices of the firm in question. Not only 
did the agreements include policy changes in areas not directly relevant 
to the specific complaint which initiated EEOC investigation, but the 
agreements also required the employer to take affirmative action, a con-
tinuation of the policy first developed by PCEEo.30 Also like PCEEO, EEOC 
could initiate investigations into industries that appeared to widely 
underutilize minority workers. Unlike PCEEO, of course, EEOC was not 
limited to employers with government contracts. The policy of "confron-
tation and visitation" with firms in specified industries and geographic 
areas served the purpose of encouraging employers to hire more minority 
personnel both among those "confronted" and among those who wished 
to avoid awkward public hearings.31 
The willingness of even southern firms to accede to the demands of 
the law without great bitterness or recrimination was a result of the 
Capitalist Ethic, which required the employer to do whatever was neces-
sary to minimize disruption to normal business procedures, and it was 
obviously less disruptive to obey the law than to face the criminal con-
sequences of maintaining blatant discrimination. The president of Hunt 
Foods said that his company would abide by its nondiscriminatory policy 
even if there were no Civil Rights Act, but he added, "I think govern-
mental inspection of our plants and facilities is an asset. We all need 
some prodding. "32 
The state laws, the government contract compliance committees, 
and finally the Civil Rights Act of 1964, provided businessmen with a 
method of meeting the demands of black pressure groups and the liberal 
white community without having to deal with the protesters themselves. 
Given a choice, businessmen would undoubtedly have preferred no inter-
ference in their racial practices at all, but forced to decide between the 
demands of legislative bodies, with whom they had traditionally been 
friendly, and the demands of an aroused and angry black population, it 
is little wonder that they embraced the former. 
While many businessmen felt that compliance with the law should 
have made them immune from attack by civil rights groups, the black 
groups did not share this point of view. The refusal of civil rights groups 
to depend on EEOC was probably well founded. A 1966 survey of 180 
oompail!ies concluded, "Fair employment practices legislat-ion is a neces-
sary but not a sufficient cause in creating equality of opportunity." The 
report said that one or more of the folfowing factors had to exist before 
a firm was likely to institute a fair employment policy: "A contract with 
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government, a top company official imbued with the injustice of inequal-
ity, the organized awareness and resistance of the Negro community."33 
Agitation for equal employment had originated in the black com-
munity years before any state or federal agency had even considered out-
lawing economic discrimination. There is no comprehensive study of 
black fair employment activity, but direct action by blacks took place at 
least as early as the 1920's. After white store owners had denied Negro 
requests to employ black salespeople in their Harlem establishments, 
black pickets forced the owners to change their policies.34 A more con-
certed effort toward the same ends also took place in Harlem during the 
1930's. The "Don't buy where you can't work" movement organized a 
boycott against offending proprietors and met with some success,35 al-
though some of its efforts at picketing were blocked by court injunc-
tions. 36 And it was black activism in the form of the March on Washing-
ton Movement that forced President Roosevelt to issue Executive Order 
8802, which opened the way for the modern fair employment campaigns. 
To a limited extent during the 1940's and somewhat more widely 
during the 1950's, black action groups experimented with direct pressure 
techniques to open up more and better jobs for Negro workers. In 1943, 
a City-Wide Citizens' Committee on Harlem successfully continued the 
earlier pressure on uptown New York stores.37 In 1946, when the Silver-
cup baking company in Chicago refused to hire Mrs. Mary Blake as an 
office worker because she was black, the co-op market in her neighbor-
hood took Silvercup bread off its shelves. Silvercup claimed that a quar-
ter of its workers were black and tried to convince the store manager to 
restock its bread by having some of the company's Negro employees 
testify as to the firm's fair employment policy. All the black workers, 
however, were in menial positions, and the boycott was not lifted until 
the company hired Mrs. Blake and other Negroes in nontraditional 
positions.38 In 1952, NAACP picketing opened up job opportunities at a 
Philadelphia Philco plant, and in 1958, the combined efforts of NAACP 
and CORE convinced St. Louis retail store owners and a bread manufac-
turer that employing Negroes was less disruptive than picketing and 
boycotts. 39 While these local efforts clearly had an impact on the busi-
nessmen involved, the business community remained unconcerned about 
the possible effects of concerted black activity until the civil rights revo-
lution began. 
The civil rights revolution was manned and led by southern blacks, 
and quite naturally the first business reaction came from southern em-
ployers. The tragedy of Little Rock, Arkansas, became the number one 
exhibit in the moderate southern businessman's case for compromising 
with the civil rights movement. The tragedy, as far as the business com-
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munity was concerned, was not that the governor of the state had used 
armed troops to prevent implementation of a Supreme Court ruling. The 
tragedy was that armed troops had enforced court-ordered desegrega-
tion, which in turn sparked riot and disorder on the part of whites. The 
head of the state's industrial commission, Winthrop Rockefeller (later 
to be governor), stated the business community's position bluntly when 
he said, "The industrial prospect doesn't give a hoot whether your schools 
are segregated or not, but he wants no part of disorder and violence."40 
Although some businessmen who shared Rockefeller's observations 
reacted by urging caution and deferment of integration lest they "arouse 
resentment among white employees and violence 'on the nature of Little 
Rock,' "41 many southern businessmen, particularly those in larger firms, 
supported moderation and peaceful progress. The 1957 disturbances in 
Little Rock severely retarded the city's economic development. During 
the five years preceding the integration crisis at Little Rock High School 
an average of five new plants a year moved to the city, providing a mil-
lion dollars worth of investment and more than three hundred new jobs a 
year. 42 It was not until five years after the integration riots that any 
other important new industries moved into Little Rock.43 There are 
clear indications that this hiatus in the city's growth was a direct result 
of the tension and turmoil that resulted from Governor Faubus' hard-
line segregation policy.44 
When Virginia's Governor J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., supported the 
Byrd machine's plan for "massive resistance" in order to protect Vir-
ginia children from "the livid stench of sadism, sex, immorality and 
juvenile pregnancy infesting the mixed schools of the District of Colum-
bia and elsewhere," he met strong resistance from his state's business 
community.45 Almond's state-wide policy forced the closing of several 
city and county school districts which otherwise would have had to de-
segregate under court orders. Virginia businessmen publicly opposed 
the school closings. They said it was hard enough to attract skilled tech-
nical and professional employees to the South without the additional 
obstacle of having no public school system.46 
Business proponents of an industrial South placed growth ahead of 
segregation. Public pressure, including that from the business com-
munity, had a telling effect on Governor Almond, who changed his 
tune and began to warn against "those who would have Virginia aban-
don public education and thereby consign a generation of children to 
darkness and illiteracy, the pits of indolence and dependency and the 
dungeons of delinquency. "47 The legislature responded to the moderates' 
counterattack by repealing the massive resistance laws in a special session 
in 1959 and by instituting a local option plan in which each school dis-
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trict could make its own decision on whether or not to integrate.48 The 
siren song of economic growth was sweet enough to insure at least pro 
f orma compliance with court orders in all school districts except Prince 
Edward County. But even there, where the public schools remained closed 
for five years, local businessmen formed the backbone of the preschool 
forces .49 
Under pressure from the courts to desegregate the schools in 
Atlanta, Georgia, politicians considered following the Virginia pattern 
of massive resistance. Once again the business community proved to be 
the crucial force that prevented hard-line segregationists from perma-
nently destroying the public school system of the state. Businessmen 
were not in favor of integration, nor was their opposition to the hard-
liners a display of respect for the law; but if some businessmen cared 
little for law, they cared mightily for order. Mills B. Lane, Jr. , president 
of the Citizens and Southern Bank, insisted , "I am just as much in dis-
agreement with the Supreme Court decision as anyone, for I view it as 
an invasion of state's right 's."50 Y et he, along with twenty-si x other prom-
inent businessmen, petitioned the state legislature in 1960 not to close 
the schools. 51 In order to insure Georgia's attractiveness to new industry, 
business maintained pressure to keep the schools open. The businessmen 
were successful in convincing the legislature not to close the school sys-
tem to escape court demands for what was, after all, only token inte-
gration. 
It remained, however, for Dallas to provide the ultimate demonstra-
tion of the effect a highly organized business community could have in 
bringing about peaceful racial integration , not only in the schools but in 
other facets of civic life. While most businessmen were aware of the 
power they wielded in their communities, few organized that power as 
effectively as the business leadership of Dallas. The Dallas Citizens 
Council (DCC) was an organization of 250 of the city's most powerful 
business executives which was able to exert influence, if not absolute 
control, over every aspect of city life with which it was concerned.52 In 
1960, DCC established a Committee for Desegregation. The committee, 
in concert with a number of other civic groups, launched an extensive 
year-long propaganda campaign to convince D allasites that peaceful de-
segregation was in their best interests. Fear of the economic consequences 
of racial violence apparently motivated the DCC, but the council tied its 
public education program to civic pride, of which Dallas had an ample 
amount, and to obedience to the law. 53 
The Dallas program was notable not only because it successfully 
averted the violence which was endemic in desegregating southern cities 
during the early 1960's, but also because it extended desegregation be-
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yond the schoolroom. Under the leadership of ncc, with some prodding 
from the American Friends Service Committee, a number of firms pro-
moted Negroes to previously all-white jobs. Negro policemen were put 
in uniform for the first time. The state fair was desegregated, and down-
town eating places and hotels agreed to accept Negro patronage.54 
Until 1963, the main thrust of the civil rights movement was for 
equal service rather than for equal employment. Since most northern, 
many border, and even some southern businesses had extended equal 
patronage privileges to blacks before 1960, the movement remained 
mostly southern and oriented toward retail establishments. Because the 
most important northern spokesmen for the business community were 
outside of the civil rights area of activity, most businesses attacked for 
not granting blacks equal service were left to work out their problems 
without the support of the national business community. 
Once southern blacks discovered they could successfu11y demand 
equal service, they logica11y extended their demands to include equal 
employment. 55 As early as 1961 observers in Houston reported that after 
the city's schools and lunch counters were desegregated without overt 
trouble "employers began to shown awareness of the problem of discrim-
ination in employment," and when blacks boycotted a Houston super-
market it began to employ black checkers.56 In January, 1963, close ob-
servers of the equal employment scene in Atlanta said they had found 
"a significant change during the past year in objections raised in expressed 
reluctance to embark upon a policy of employment on merit." Formerly 
employers had said, "Atlanta is not ready yet," or "Personally I have no 
objections, but I must think of my customers, my staff," etc. By 1963, 
the observers reported, "We now more frequently hear, 'The Negroes 
don't apply,' or 'where are qualified Negroes.' This to us at least, im-
plies a change in attitude that is difficult to describe but nevertheless 
apparent. " 57 
Although most civil rights activists did not turn their attention to 
employment in northern firms until 1963, an important vanguard of the 
black equal employment movement emerged in the North during the 
early 1960's at the same time most attention was focused on the South. 
Early in 1961 a group of four hundred black ministers in Philadelphia 
organized a boycott of the Sun Oil Company.58 Operating under the 
slogan "No more Sunoco till your preacher says so!" they drastically 
cut back consumption of the company's gasoline in Negro areas. The 
company had agreed to the Negro ministers' demand to hire thirty 
thirty-day deadline which the ministers had imposed. The boycott ended 
blacks in specific jobs but had been unable, or unwilling, to meet the 
150 Black Meo and Businessmen 
only after the company hired the requisite number of blacks in the de-
signated jobs. s9 
The Philadelphia boycott movement, or selective patronage pro-
gram, was more or less led by the Rev. Leon Sullivan, who often acted 
as its spokesman. The description "more or less" is appropriate because 
participants feared legal retribution for taking part in a secondary boy-
cott and, for safety, attempted to keep the leadership diffuse.60 The boy-
cott movement was astonishingly successful during the three years it 
operated. The selective patronage program took formal action against 
only two dozen firms, but it is difficult to estimate how many other 
companies opened additional jobs when they heard they were already on 
the ministers' list, or in an attempt to forego that dubious honor. The 
ministers claimed, and businessmen agreed, that more than four thou-
sand jobs which whites had traditionally held were opened to Negroes 
as a direct result of the boycotts.61 
The Philadelphia boycott movement erased the requirement of the 
American Creed that all applicants, white and black, receive absolutely 
impartial consideration, but the movement did not disturb the demand of 
the Capitalist Ethic that the employer need hire only men who met his 
standards. Although the ministers' demands for a specific number of 
new black workers in given jobs by a certain date were less flexible than 
the demands of any previous equal employment group, the ministerial 
alliance continued to accept one basic personnel concept-a company 
should be required to hire only qualified men. By demanding that com-
panies hire black men the Philadelphia movement forced employers to 
give preference to qualified black men, but because the ministerial alli-
ance accepted the premise that it could force employers to hire only 
qualified men, the movement quickly foundered on the rocks which 
emerged as business drained the shallow pool of qualified blacks. 
By 1963 Sullivan had discovered that he could continu~ to force 
firms into opening up jobs to black candidates, but he could not find po-
tential black workers who qualified for the proffered jobs. Rather than 
_demanding that business undertake the responsibility for training the 
unemployables, simplify its jobs so less qualified people could work, or 
reevaluate job requirements, as later protest leaders did, Sullivan took 
upon himself the burden of supplying industry with appropriately trained 
and motivated personnel, With money from foundations and equipment 
donated by Philadelphia firms, including those which had been objects 
of "selective patronage," Sullivan opened the Opportunities Industriali-
zation Center (Ole) in late 1963. Essentially a private vocational school, 
01c received enthusiastic support from the business community and from 
government officials. 
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Whatever its other merits, and they appear to have been consider-
able, 01c provided the Philadelphia business community with a perfect 
"out. " 62 Since Philadelphia employers did not object to hiring qualified 
blacks, and since the leader of the protest movement agreed that there 
was a shortage of skilled Negro workers, the business community re-
mained immune from attacks by the black community as long as em-
ployers supported me and hired its trained graduates. Not only did the 
creation of me mark the end of the boycott movement, but Sullivan 
proved to be a man of essentially conservative values who helped rein-
force the businessmen's own traditional beliefs. He worked against big 
government by operating independently of Washington, and to some ex-
tent in competition with established federal training programs. Nothing 
could be more satisfying to ideologically conservative businessmen than 
to help a "militant" leader who believed "that a man is like a balloon, 
that it's not a man's color that determines how high he can rise, but what 
he has inside of him. "63 
As the selective patronage campaign was being phased out in favor 
of 01c in Philadelphia, militant antibusiness activity began to appear in 
other cities throughout the nation. 64 At first equal employment activism 
followed the pattern set by the Philadelphia movement. The boycott 
was the primary weapon which the pressure groups used, and their tar-
gets were those firms most susceptible to consumer buying habits. The 
local nature of most of the boycotting organizations and their targets, 
and the minimum of public commotion which attended them (to say 
nothing of the reluctance of the press to publicize a boycott of their ad-
vertisers), make it impossible to know how many companies faced or-
ganized black consumer resistance. Although some poorly organized boy-
cotts must have failed, businessmen appear to have met Negro demands 
for more jobs in the overwhelming majority of cases. 65 
In the South, from its inception in 1960, the civil rights movement 
had emphasized personal commitment and direct action. In the North, 
on the other hand, consumer boycotts had required a minimum of per-
sonal involvement and a maximum of organization. In the spring of 
1963 the movement combined the passive boycott with the active street 
demonstration to demand more jobs for blacks and bring the Birming-
ham-style fair employment demon~ration to the North. The Detroit 
Council for Human Relations held a "walk" in which more than a 
hundred thousand people marched for better jobs. The council, an all-
black organization which rejected whites as members because they 
tended to be "gradualists," announced that it was going to conduct a 
series of boycotts starting with the A&P supermarkets and working up 
from there until they reached Detroit's pinnacle, General Motors. The 
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leader of the council, the Rev. Albert B. Cleage, Jr., predicted that his 
boycott movement would spread, and when sufficient regional groups 
had been formed, he would institute nationwide boycotts. 66 Because of 
its size, GM was a natural target for the new activist mood. GM responded 
to the boycott threat by hiring additional blacks in all positions, but 
with an emphasis on technical and professional jobs since black workers 
already constituted between a quarter and a half of all GM production 
workers.67 The automobile giant never suffered a formal boycott. NAACP 
led a day of nationwide demonstrations against the company in the 
spring of 1964, but the attacks and counterattacks in the GM battle re-
mained a war of words. 68 
To a limited extent blacks continued the boycott movement after 
1965, with a number of attempts to bring consumer pressure against 
companies on both the local and national levels.69 However, the drama 
of direct confrontation increasingly overshadowed the boycott move-
ment during the late 1960's. In its mildest form the confrontation con-
sisted merely of picketing the offending establishment. Washington, 
D.C., ministerial groups had tried this technique against banks with 
mixed success as early as the spring of 1961.70 The incidence of con-
frontation increased sharply as the civil rights movement concentrated 
more and more attention on the business community during the summer 
of 1963.71 While picketing had always been an effective weapon against 
consumer-oriented firms, blacks discovered that even big industrial firms 
did not like to have people marching around in front of their doors and 
accusing them of discrimination. No matter what the public climate, 
when a consumer-oriented firm suffered from a boycott it had at least 
to weigh the costs of the boycott against possible public opposition. But 
during the 1960's, when people expected the business community to 
practice fair employment, picketing, even in the absence of a boycott, 
could have a negative impact on a firm's image and ultimately on its 
ability to do business. Even utility companies, which have both a monop-
oly and an inelastic product demand, nevertheless consulted with black 
groups in a number of cities after NAACP picketing. Because their monop-
oly positions subjected them to regulation by public bodies and made 
them particularly vulnerable to criticism, electrical, water, and gas com-
panies throughout the nation agreed to review their hiring practices 
and to make a concerted effort to employ more Negroes in nontradi-
tional positions in return for clear front sidewalks.72 
Direct action against employers by black action groups reached a 
kind of climax in San Francisco during the winter and spring of 1964. Boy-
cotts, and boycotts with picketing, may have been effective in the hands 
of large, widely respected groups such as NAACP or an ad hoc ministerial 
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alliance, but the Congress of Racial Equality discovered that a small 
group of dedicated activists could be just as effective as a large group. 
Success demanded a new technique. Early in 1964, CORE decided to put 
pressure on San Francisco stores and banks in order to get them to hire 
more blacks.73 In an alliance with the Baptist Union, an organization of 
Negro ministers, the demonstrators entered Bay Area Lucky super-
markets, filled shopping carts, and then abandoned them at the checkout 
counters. This form of harassment continued daily for more than two 
weeks until bad publicity and disapproval from the Baptist ministers put 
a stop to the "shop-ins."74 Mayor John F. Shelley mediated peace talks 
between CORE and Lucky which ended in an agreement to hire 45 to 75 
additional black workers over a three-month period. 75 
A second wave of direct action occurred in San Francisco in March 
when the Ad-Hoc Committee to End Discrimination, a biracial group 
with some left-wing leadership, sat down in the lobby of the Sheraton-
Palace Hotel. The group had been negotiating with the hotel for more 
jobs for blacks since December and had held a number of minor demon-
strations for which the hotel had filed a $50,000 damage suit. 76 The 
hotel demonstrations reached their peak on March 6, when more than a 
thousand protesters jammed into the hotel lobby and sat down.77 The 
San Francisco Hotel Association, representing the Sheraton-Palace and 
thirty-four other city hotels, met with the Ad-Hoc Committee in the 
mayor's office and through his mediation worked out a two-year pact. 
The hotels agreed that 15 to 20 percent of their new employees would 
be from minority groups, that they would make monthly reports to the 
civil rights group on their progress, and that they would not press 
charges against sit-in participants (although prosecutions took place 
nevertheless). 78 
As the Ad-Hoc Committee signed the agreement with the hotel 
association, NAACP began a new series of demonstrations in the city. On 
March 9, it threw a picket line around the General Motors Cadillac 
showroom on Van Ness Avenue to demand more jobs for blacks.79 
Five days later one hundred and ten protesters were arrested at a sit-in 
there. 80 Although GM took a tough public stand, saying that "no good 
purpose could be served by private discussion of allegations and un-
founded charges made by unlawful demonstrators,"81 it apparently ini-
tiated secret talks with NAACP. 82 The talks dragged on for a month until 
the protesters struck once again. On April 11, the police arrested more 
than 200 people who disrupted normal activity at four major auto firms 
oq Van Ness Avenue.83 The dealers balked at NAACP demands that they 
follow the lead of the hotel association and make periodic reports to the 
civil rights group on their progress in hiring blacks. 
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However, on April 17, one of the picketed dealers, not a member of 
the Motor Car Dealers Association, signed an agreement with N AACP 
which included a promise of a dealer-sponsored training program. 84 The 
next day the dealers' association announced it too had come to terms 
with NAACP. The new agreement did not go as far as the pact with the 
hotel association. The auto dealers acknowledged "the necessity for the 
acceleration of employment opportunities of minority group persons," 
but made no numerical or percentage commitments for actual hiring. 
Although the association promised to pursue a policy of minority re-
cruitment and cooperation in training efforts, again the promises were 
general rather than specific. Finally, the agreement was worded in such 
a way that all commitments were made to the Mayor's Interim Com-
mittee on Human Rights, which was led by businessman and ex-Secretary 
of Commerce James Mitchell, rather than to NAACP. It was the Mayor's 
Committee which would receive " such data or information as may be 
reasonably required to measure the fulfillment of all aspects of the fore-
going pledge. " 85 
In one sense all the activity of the winter and spring was prepara-
tion for the assault on the final symbol of business power in California, 
the Bank of America. The nation's largest bank did not just sit and wait. 
Although none of the three organizations, CORE, NAACP, or the Ad-Hoc 
CommiHee, had approached the bank's executives, the bank ran a full-
page advertisement in California newspapers. Bank management felt 
confident that it had a good record of hiring minorities and hoped to beat 
the demonstrators to the punch by taking its case to the public. The 
March 16, 1964, advertisement released the contents of a letter the bank 
president had sent to the chairman of the California Fair Employment 
Practice Commission.86 Tough talk at the beginning and the end of the 
letter bracketed a number of voluntary concessions of major importance. 
The letter stated that the bank would refuse "to sign agreements and 
provide reports to non-government agencies such as the Ad-Hoc Com-
mittee to End Discrimination . . . . " R . A. Peterson, the bank president, 
said that "as good Americans, we will not now or in the future capitulate 
to illegal pressures of the type prominent in San Francisco over the 
past weeks. . . . "87 However, the Bank of America's public relations 
director conceded that if the firm hoped to get public support it had to 
"stand up and be counted on the urgent social problems posed by the 
fermenting unrest in the Negro community .... " 88 While saying it 
would never accede to the demands of race pressure groups, the bank 
disclosed that it was voluntarily setting up a program that incorporated 
all the points of the auto dealers' agreement and most of those of the 
hotel association pact. The bank promised to actively seek out minority 
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applications for positions. The bank said that "because our experience 
has clearly shown that a large proportion of minority racial applicants 
have not completed high school and cannot pass simple clerical tests," it 
would not make any firm promises as to the numbers or percentage of 
minority people it would hire. However, it did pledge to periodically 
analyze the racial makeup of its employees and to report this information 
to the state FEPC. 89 
CORE responded to the bank's move by asking for a meeting with 
the bank management, to which it presented a list of demands. The 
bank had already implemented most of them in one form or another. 
The civil rights group did ask for more specifics in such areas as 
affirmative recruiting, but CORE's major substantive point of disagreement 
with the bank was the demand that CORE be designated the judge of the 
bank's minority hiring program. CORE asked the bank to turn over all 
statistics to it, that the bank clear all announcements with the civil rights 
group, and that the bank regularly meet with CORE to review employment 
progress. 90 
CORE broke off meetings with the Bank of America in May, accus-
ing the firm of refusing to negotiate in good faith because it would not 
discuss CORE's demands that the bank turn over full statistics on minority 
employment.91 CORE then began three months of picketing branches of 
the Bank of America all over California. CORE'S tactics included "nickle 
and dime-ins" during which demonstrators clogged the bank's lines by 
changing bills into coins and then returning the change for bills. CORE 
refused offers of the governor to conciliate, and the bank refused CORE'S 
offers to talk unless the civil rights group publicly announced it under-
stood that the bank would not provide CORE with the information it 
demanded. 92 
In the meantime, the bank had been putting sharp pressure on all 
its branches to increase minority hiring. During the three months of the 
crisis the bank hired more than three hundred new black employees.93 
With this increase in nonwhite hiring safely in its pocket, the bank then 
announced on June 1 that executives had signed a memorandum of 
understanding with the California FEPC implementing the points of its 
March 12 open letter.94 CORE continued to picket for the rest of the 
summer, but the bank held firm and eventually the demonstrations 
ceased. 
The business community responded slowly but positively to the 
employment demonstrations of 1963 and 1964. When a firm found itself 
the object of public attack it almost invariably denied wrong doing, de-
clared it would not be coerced, and then went ahead to meet the demands 
of the demonstrators, thus giving the lie to its original protestations of 
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innocence. The need for immediate action to remedy employment in-
justice was the message that came through, even to those not specifically 
affected by the boycotts and demonstrations. Commenting on the San 
Francisco demonstrations, Fortune magazine advised its readers, "To 
achieve the kind of results Negroes are demanding business will have 
to move swiftly and aggressively. " 95 
The militant action offended much of the white public. Among 
some employers there was enough fear of a white backlash to a strong 
equal employment position that they attempted to minimize publicity 
about any actions which they took to meet Negro demands.96 _While 
confrontation tactics may have offended much of the white public, con-
sumers did not necessarily rally to the cause of a besieged firm. In the 
. mid 1960's the public expected business to provide equal employment for 
blacks and it hurt a businessman's image to be branded discriminatory, 
which is why public relations firms were increasingly involved in busi-
ness racial policies.97 Moreover, businessmen recognized that the public 
had come to expect fair employment. A progressive hiring policy was 
good public relations, even if black pressure were the actual source of 
the move to employ Negroes. 
The upsurge of civil rights protests in 1963 and 1964 alerted busi-
nessmen to the black community's increasing concern with employment 
problems, a concern which was burned into the minds of employers by 
the three years of urban disorders which followed. Mass violence with 
racial overtones is historically endemic in American cities. Until 1965, 
however, most businessmen ignored urban violence because it did not 
directly affect them. Only when the disorder approached the proportions 
of a spontaneous revolution did businessmen take an active hand in trying 
to deal with America's racism. Businessmen recognized immediately that 
unequal employment patterns for blacks was one of the underlying 
causes of the riots.98 
The business community had not been totally blind to the possibly 
explosive consequences of unequal employment patterns.99 With very 
few exceptions before 1965, however, businessmen feared the adverse 
effects of unequal employment would be political. For example, in 1964 
William Miller, the president of Textron, warned, "Equal opportunity 
may be the most important issue that this nation faces for many decades 
.. . because the American system itself is being tested. Unless we assure 
equal rights and equal justice for all, our form of government will be in 
jeopardy."100 In 1959 James C. Worthy, of Sears Roebuck, had suggested 
that discrimination was sowing the seeds of revolutionary change in the 
country. Worthy warned that if the Negro is "denied the white man's 
opportunities he may seek to take some of the white man's power away 
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from him." But Worthy was worried about political not violent revolu-
tion. His fear was the radical potential of legitimate black electoral 
power tied "through heightened race consciousness, to demagogic ap-
peals and boss control. "101 
The riots were thus a more severe reaction than even the most 
pessimistic businessmen had predicted. It was not political extremists 
that the businessmen feared, but violent street revolution. "It is no 
longer solely a matter of justice and the principles of democracy," said 
Henry Ford II. "After the tragic events of the past few summers we 
must finally recognize-if we did not do so before-that our very na-
tional unity and the peace of our cities are at stake."102 W. P. Gullander, 
president of the National Association of Manufacturers, declared, "The 
problem of Watts is not a Negro problem, it is our problem as a nation," 
and he went on to point out that "the fundamental cause of the Watts 
riot was lack of jobs for Negroes." 103 Executive after executive echoed 
Gullander's contention that the riots were a national problem which 
business could help solve. Many admitted that they were spurred to 
increased efforts by the spreading violence, and not a few implicitly 
condoned the violence, like the California industrialist who commented, 
"Perhaps riots help more at some stages in the evolution of this 
thing than they hurt. How the devil do you get 200 million people to 
wake up?" 104 
Three years of rioting left many businessmen with the belief that 
the very foundations of society were under attack. It became mani-
festly clear, even to the most · conservative businessmen, that something 
had to be done to reestablish domestic peace. Rioting upset plans, and 
long-range planning is the heart of rational business management. Some 
employers continued to use many of the preriot economic justifications 
for actively hiring Negroes. They spoke of making the Negro a purchaser 
of goods rather than a consumer of taxes. 105 But they did so with the 
clear implication that an increase in purchasing power would also lead 
to a decrease in the propensity to riot. Stanley Marcus, head of Dallas' 
Neiman-Marcus department store, commented on his own feelings by 
observing that fellow retailer Joseph Hudson was head of a business 
action movement in Detroit. "Once a man sees his investment in a com-
munity going up in smoke," said Marcus, "he is going to act."106 
No man was more committed to the new cause than Henry Ford II. 
Speaking to the Buffalo Area Chamber of Commerce, Ford remembered 
that on a previous trip to Buffalo in 1950 "we were a complacent, self-
satisfied country . . .. Business executives and chamber officials in those 
days were beginning to talk about social responsibilities or corporate 
citizenship, but most of us had hardly begun to act." Ford sounded op-
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timistic, however, when he told his audience, "More and more business-
men are waking up to the fact that they must concern themselves in 
deeds as well as in words with the needs of their country and its cities." 107 
The riots climaxed six years of sharply increasing pressure on the 
business community. Beginning with President Kennedy's Executive 
Order 10925, businessmen had suffered a series of blows, the Civil Rights 
Act, the civil rights movement, and finally the uprisings in the nation's 
cities. There were businessmen who rebelled at the growing militancy in 
the black community and who refused to join in the breastbeating con-
test which followed the riots. A West Coast chamber of commerce official 
complained that despite "fundamental progress . .. in changing attitudes 
of businessmen in our city in the past five years," employers were be-
ginning to "conclude that there is little chance of overcoming the trend 
toward anarchy in our major cities" and that it was "futile to seek an 
integrated labor force. " 108 Most comment, however, was more along the 
lines of an American Telephone and Telegraph report which declared 
bluntly, "The question of whether or not a company participates in pro-
grams designed to provide job opportunities for Negroes is no longer 
appropriate. The question today is how it should participate. " 109 
10 
Beyond Equal Employment: The Revolution 
in Personnel Policy 
Increased federal pressure and the actions of the civil rights move-
ment produced a series of profound changes in the attitudes of American 
businessmen toward Negro employment. Personnel policies which had 
their roots deep in the American Creed and in the Capitalist Ethic were 
torn up, and strange new doctrines were planted in their place. The ideal 
of equal employment opportunity gave way to affirmative action and 
compensatory practices. The law and the riots motivated businessmen 
to institute radically new policies of recruitment, selection, and training 
which went beyond anything even the most liberal fair employment sup-
porter asked for in the 1950's. While the most extreme innovations were 
limited to the nation's largest corporations, their abandonment of the 
American Creed principle of color-blindness and of the Capitalist Ethic 
principle of hiring the best man for the job marked a fundamental new 
departure in employment attitudes. 
In 1963 several hundred thousand demonstrators had marched on 
Washington demanding "Jobs now!" but it was to take civil turmoil in 
the nation's largest cities to actually get jobs now. The Watts riot of 
1965 and the Chicago riot of 1966 gave rise to a handful of job pro-
grams, 1 but when more than two dozen cities experienced some sort of 
racial disorder during the summer of 1967, the nascent employment or-
ganizations -engendered by the earlier troubles abandoned plans for slow, 
careful development and sought instant maturity. Businessmen in Dade 
County, Florida, for example, had joined with the government and 
various social welfare agencies in 1967 to form the Dade County Equal 
Employment Opportunity Task Force, which was to "conduct an effec-
tive action program to develop greater employment of minority group 
members residing in Dade County." After its founding in May, 1967, it 
took the task force almost two months to establish working committees. 
But Miami's businessmen had second thoughts about their measured pace 
on July 26-during the height of the Detroit riot. At an emergency 
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meeting the organization's leaders decided they needed a crash program. 
It took them only two days to create a new emergency plan, and within 
the week they found two thousand jobs for minority group members.2 
The great crush to "do something" was on. By September the N ew York 
Times could comment that a list of the companies actively engaged in 
ghetto-oriented programs "would read much like a stock-market table and 
run just about as long.''3 
Demands made by civil rights organizations in the wake of the 
riots found an extraordinarily receptive audience in the business commu-
nity. Businessmen who were not dependent on consumer purchases could 
afford to dicker over employing blacks when sit-ins, picketing, and boy-
cotts were the ultimate weapons of the civil rights movement. But when 
the crackle of the flames and the sound of gunfire still echoed in the 
streets, civil rights groups could move businessmen, and move them fast , 
to hire immediately large numbers of Negroes who would have never 
even made it past the factory gate in more peaceful times. The way in 
which the black community in Rochester, New York, rioted and then 
used the threat of renewed violence to force that city's business commu-
nity to make concessions provides a case study of the business response to 
the new black militancy. 
The first postwar riot occurred in Harlem during the summer of 1964. 
Harlem is the capital of black America and traditionally has been the 
bellwether of the mood of black Americans. All the problems that beset 
Negroes converged in Harlem. Overcrowding, poor.living conditions, high 
prices, friction with the police, poor schools, and high unemployment 
made the trouble in Harlem and in its sister ghetto, Bedford-Stuyvesant, 
understandable. But when blacks rioted in Rochester in late July, 1964, 
they shattered a number of illusions about the status of Negroes outside 
of the nationally known urban concentrations. The demand for labor in 
Rochester was high, but so was the unemployment rate among blacks. 
Many Rochester firms had long traditions of equal employment, and most 
of them also held government contracts. Rochester's leading industries-
Kodak, Xerox, Bausch & Lomb, General Motors, and General Dynamics-
employed black technical and professional personnel. But the very nature 
of the work that made the employment of technically trained blacks pos-
sible meant that there were fewer jobs for the unskilled who made up the 
bulk of Rochester's Negro population.4 
Immediate business response to the riot was unimpressive,5 but 
Rochester's Council of Churches reacted to the riot by inviting Saul 
Alinsky's Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) to come to the city to 
organize the black community, and it was IAF that turned the riot into a 
weapon for better jobs. Funded by a hundred thousand dollars in church 
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money and directed by IAF, the black community organized under the 
name FIGHT (Freedom, Integration, God, Honor-Today) in the spring of 
1965. The Rev. Franklin Delano Roosevelt Florence (Minister Florence) 
led FIGHT in an attack on slum-lords, the United Fund, the antipoverty 
program, and local industry.6 
FIGHT was successful in persuading the Xerox Corporation to expand 
its training program.7 Then, in September, 1966, FIGHT turned its guns on 
Rochester's most imporitant employer, the Eastman Kodak Company. 
FIGHT asked Kodak to hire six hundred hard-core unemployed whom FIGHT 
would recruit. Minister Florence said FIGHT wanted Kodak to train "the 
down and out, the man crushed by this evil system, the man emasculated, 
who can't make it on his own."8 
Meetings between FIGHT and various representatives of Kodak con-
tinued for four months. FIGHT refused to back down on its figure of six 
hundred and the company refused to bind itself to a specific number be-
cause "jobs aren't something you turn out of a machine." Nevertheless, 
Kodak began to recruit blacks more actively and began to hire larger 
numbers of unskilled blacks by lowering its employment standards and 
undertaking a basic education program to equip new employees with 
educational fundamentals.9 
On December 1 Kodak's new negotiator, assistant vice president John 
Mulder, signed an agreement commiting Kodak to hire the six hundred 
men over a two-year period. The next day Kodak's top management met 
and issued a statement declaring that Mulder had exceeded his instruc-
tions and nullified the agreement. 10 Minister Florence called Kodak "in-
stitutionally racist" for going back on its word and warned, "I see troubled 
times, grave times for the total community because of the dishonesty of 
Eastman Kodak."11 FIGHT warned about a "long hot summer" and in-
vited Stokely Carmichael to Rochester, where the militant black leader of 
SNCC and founder of the "black power" movement promised, "We're going 
to bring [Kodak] to their knees if it's the last thing we do. " 12 
Fearing perhaps that their own creation had gotten away from them, 
the Council of Churches began preliminary action to set up a new com-
mittee to respond to the needs of black citizens. Meetings first expanded 
from Protestant church members to include other religious groups, then 
the business community, and finally organizations representing the poor. 
In April, 1967, these groups came together to form RocheS1ter Jobs, Inc. 
(Rn) .13 RJI said its purpose was to mobilize "the resources of the Rochester 
area in order to develop a community-wide program that will make pos-
sible the hiring by participating business and industry of the unemployed 
in the Rochester community and provide motivation, counseling and 
training that will assist individuals in securing employment and remaining 
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steadily on the job. " 14 The twenty-man board of directors had ten repre-
sentatives from business, commerce, and industry, seven from organiza-
tions directly involved with the poor, and three clergymen, one Protestant, 
one Catholic, and one Jew.ts 
Although RJI declared itself neutral in the FIGHT-Kodak dispute, it 
proposed a settlement that could give both sides a chance to settle their 
differences without losing face. RJI recommended that the business com-
munity establish centers to train the unemployed to fill the needs of local 
industry. RJI promised "to employ, educate and train fifteen hundred un-
employed and under,employed, with emphasis on the hard oore unem-
ployed over the next eighteen months," through the use of quotas for 
participating firms.16 Although Kodak had termed FIGHT's demands for 
hiring a specific number of Negroes "morally, legally and economically 
wrong," 17 the company's executives apparently felt that similar quotas 
established by Rn were proper. Both FIGHT and Kodak agreed to work to-
gether under the umbrella of the new organization, 18 and the business 
community agreed to raise more than three hundred thousand dollars to 
finance the projected three-to-four-year program. 19 
Under the leadership of executive director Edward S. Croft, RJI mem-
bers began hiring unemployed and recrui,ting in inner-city neighborhoods.20 
In the six months from the time it began operation, RJI filled thirty percent 
of its eighteen-month quota of fifteen hundred j·obs. 21 In addition to finding 
jobs, RJI held an "educational seminar" in which it familiarized eight 
hundred people, most of them first-line foremen, with "the emotions and 
attitudes of the hard-core unemployed applicant and his plight to find and 
retain suitable employment. " 22 RJI also helped finance two special pro-
grams: Teens on Patrol, a summer-time work program for unemployed 
minority youth, and Advancement Through Clerical Training, an on-the-
job clerical training program run by the Urban League.23 
Kodak not only supported the work of RJI but acted on its own to 
find and employ marginal black workers. Minister Florence succinctly 
summed up Kodak's motivation when he observed, "Kodak started its 
programs because they were kicked in the face. " 24 Once kicked by the 
forces of t1he black revolution, Kodak did two things done by virtua,Hy 
every big company which tried to deal with the problem of militant black 
unrest. First, the company joined with other businessmen in a voluntary 
equal employment organization, and, second, it altered some of its funda-
mental approaches to personnel selection. It went from a simple policy of 
granting equal employment opportunity to one of actively recruiting, 
training, and hiring the marginal worker. 
The civil rights movement created an atmosphere in which business-
men could act without serious fear of adverse public reaction. In fact, 
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businessmen came to fear public disapproval for not having enough black 
workers rather than for hiring too many. As pressure for more Negro 
employment increased, the neat balance between the American Creed and 
the Capitalist Ethic began to deteriorate. No longer was it enough to apply 
the same criteria to both blacks and whites. Business had to make a posi-
tive and successful effort to get Negroes into the firm. The ideal of color 
blindness was left behind after 1965, as numbers of leading businessmen 
voluntarily initiated and participated in numerous affirmative-action pro-
grams in which they sought out, trained, and placed black workers. 
The original impetus for affirmative action had come from the 
federal government. Under severe pressure in the spring of 1961 to meet 
the affirmative-action clause demanded by Executive Order 10925 in all 
federal contracts, the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation initiated a "volun-
tary" Plan for Progress in which it agreed to seek Negro workers for jobs 
at all levels and to promote employees without discrimination.25 Lock-
heed's affirmative-action plan had little impaot on companies without 
major government contraots until 1963, when Whitney M. Young, Jr., 
executive director of the National Urban League, called for a domestic 
Marshall Plan for Negroes. Young specifically denied that his plan was 
"preferential treatment, indemnification, special consideration, [or] com-
pensatory activity." Young wanted special effort,rnot special privilege. He 
called for a "a planned effort to place qualified Negroes in all categories 
of employment at all levels of responsibility. This would mean that em-
ployers would consciously seek to hire qualified Negro citizens and would 
intensify apprenticeship and training programs to prepare new Negro em-
ployees and upgrade those already employed. "26 While Young did not 
ask for preferential treatment on the job, nor did he ask employers to 
lower their job requirements, he admitted he was requesting preferential 
hiring by suggesting that companies give "a time preference by actively 
seeking Negro applicants a week before opening the doors to others."27 
Young's call for a special effort to hire Negroes was the formal 
presentation by a recognized national black leader of what civil rights 
groups had begun to demand through direct action.28 In a widely dis-
cussed article, Fortune editor Charles E. Silberman used the Philadelphia 
boycotts as an example of militant black organizations that were demand-
ing "business firms hire Negroes not because they were qualified but be-
cause they are Negroes." When Silberman quoted Young, the essential 
modifier "qualified" was nowhere to be seen. Silberman commended to 
his business audience Young's observation that "they must go further than 
fine impartiality. We must have, in fact, special consideration if we are to 
compensate for the scars left by three hundred years of deprivation .. . . " 29 
By ignoring the term "qualified," Silberman was in effect saying that the 
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employer had a special obligation to absorb the additional cost of em-
ploying a substandard worker. In one sense he was returning to the argu-
ments of the pioneering employers of the 1940's who had urged equal 
employment even at the cost of alienating some employees or customers. 
But whereas the earlier proponents of Negro employment had demanded 
equal treatment for blacks and whites, Silberman was asking for "special 
consideration." 
Although the federal government had been demanding that federal 
contractors actively recruit blacks since 1961, by 1963 the Labor Depart-
ment had begun to encourage all employers, not only government con-
tractors, to take affirmative action through personnel policy changes. 
Speaking to the Urban League in 1963, Secretary of Commerce Luther H. 
Hodges said that any company which wanted to make its equal employ-
ment opportunity program "truly effective" had to thoroughly reexamine 
its personnel policies. Hodges said, "A responsible management official 
personally commited to the program should supervise a review of seniority 
lists, recall lists, job descriptions and classifications, prerequisites for hir-
ing, application forms, employment tests, the sources of applicants, and 
all aspects of employee recruiting. " 30 
The Labor Department suggestions that nonfederal contractors con-
sider policies of affirmative action took on new significance in 1964, when 
the Civil Rights Act established the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) . EEOC had specific legislated power and could thus ex-
ert formal pressure for full fair employment on all employers. EEOC chair-
man, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Jr., said, "We are asking management 
for more than fair hiring practices, we are suggesting creative recruitment 
policies that actually seek out qualified employees among minority groups." 
Although EEoc's concept of affirmative action still emphasized "qualified" 
applicants, the commission recommended that affirmative-action programs 
include: the adoption and communication of a strong fair employment 
policy to all company personnel; a broadening of recruitment sources to 
include those specifically designed to reach minority audiences; an active 
solicitation of minority participation in training programs; an auditing of 
skills of existing employees and promotion of those meriting it; and parti-
cipation in community projects. 31 By 1967, state fair employment com-
missions and big city mayors had also begun to advocate affirmative action 
programs similar to that of the federal EEoc.32 
Even in its mildest form, affirmative action required a special effort 
to recruit qualified blacks. More frequently it also entailed either lowering 
standards or bninging substandard recruits up to par. In any case, affirma-
tive action required employers to undertake extra expenses in order to 
employ Negroes. Such costs could not be justified by the Capitalist Ethic, 
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and there is some question as to whether affirmative action did not also 
violate the canons of the American Creed. It is ironic, but understandable, 
that no sooner had the business community accepted the American Creed 
as a guide for employment policy thari external forces demanded that 
business move beyond equal employment into a program of compensatory 
action. 
Until the late sixties, hiring the best man for the job had been a funda-
mental maxim of the selection and placement procedure. During the 
forties and fifties, most businesses based their objections to hiring Negroes 
on the assumption that while blacks might be technically able to perform 
the job, they had certain social liabilities which made them less than the 
best qualified candidate. Once pioneer placements had demonstrated that 
blacks could perform successfully, businessmen usually accepted the 
American Creed philosophy of impartiality expressed by Ivan Willis, the 
vice president of industrial relations for International Harvester and one 
of the early leaders in the field of equal employment. In 1952 Willis told 
a congressional committee, "We say that our policy is non-discrimination. 
To us that means not only 'no discrimination against' but also means 'no 
discrimination for.' We do not refuse to hire a man just because he is a 
Negro. Neither will we hire him just because he is a Negro." 33 By 1958 
virtually all the employers interviewed in a study of Negro employment 
advocated a situation in which "Negro applicants are considered as a 
matter of course and Negro employees are given no additional attention or 
special consideration over other employees . .. . " 34 Thus by the late fifties 
and early sixties the business community had come to accept the ideal of 
equal employment. In thought at least, if not always in practice, the equal 
opportunity imperative of the American Creed had become a reality. 
The demands for affirmative action during the mid-sixties presented 
the business community with a crisis of conscience. For years the business 
community had gone to great lengths to justify its failure to live up to the 
American Creed. Having finally accepted the ideal of fair employment, 
employers were reluotant to abandon so widely held a value for the appar-
ently problack demands of affirmative action. Businessmen frequently 
voiced their resentment at what they considered governmental or civil 
rights pressure for " reverse discrimination. " 35 Some employers claimed 
"the forces of free enterprise won't allow these special costs" of prefer-
ential treatment,36 while others refused to engage in any compensatory 
effort because they "earnestly believed. in the principle and practice of 
equal opportunity. " 37 
While one segment of the business community was struggling to de-
fend its so recently acquired principles of equal employment opportunity, 
a number of particularly progressive employers moved to accept the idea 
166 Black Men and Businessmen 
of affirmative action and to justify its supposedly undemocratic implica-
tions. In 1964, a vice president of American Airlines approvingly quoted 
Anatole France's remark, "The law in its majestic equality forbids both 
the rich and the poor to sleep under bridges," and went on to warn against 
falling "under the illusion that people are treated equally when no recog-
nition is given to three hundred years of deprivation of opportunity. " 38 
This statement was remarkable not only for its candid support of com-
pensatory action, but because it came from an airline official. Airlines had 
been among the most conservative of the service industries in their re-
sistence to employing blacks in jobs in which they would have contact with 
the public. 
The evolution of the racial personnel policies of Pitney-Bowes, manu-
facturers of postage meters and other office machines, provides an ex-
cellent example of the way in which business thought responded to chang-
ing public expectations. At any given time in the postwar period the Negro 
employment policy of Pitney-Bowes was representative of the most pro-
gressive thinking in the business community. The management of the 
company had a long tradition of community involvement, but like so many 
other firms, it was not until World War II that the company became con-
cerned about discriminatory employment. As a regional director of the 
War Production Board, Walter H. Wheeler, Jr., Pitney-Bowes' chairman 
of the board, became acutely aware of the manpower shortage. Wheeler 
recognized that the black community represented an untapped labor 
source, and he ordered his personnel men to hire Negroes until blacks rep-
resented the same proportion of employees as they did in the company's 
home city of Stamford, Connecticut.39 Company success with Negro pro-
duction workers during the war encouraged the management to begin 
hiring black secretarial help in the postwar years.40 
The firm began its Negro employment policy by skimming the cream 
off the black manpower pool. Although Wheeler expressed an initial desire 
to see that his company employed a percentage quota of the minority 
people in the community, a more "realistic" course prevailed during the 
late forties. Because Pitney-Bowes was a pioneering company in the field 
of minority employment, it took advantage of its position by selecting the 
few best qualified Negroes rather than hiring blacks widely. Not only did 
the early Negro employees have to pass the company's standard battery of 
preemployment tests, but they also had to have "intelligence, tact and 
diplomacy of a high degree." It was not enough that the black worker be 
able to perform his task. The company had to be sure "that each new 
employee was very well qualified from all standpoints and would create 
the highest possible impression of the race itself. " 41 Once the pioneer 
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placements were completed in the late forties, however, the firm pursued 
a straight, evenhanded equal employment policy. 
Company spokesmen continued to be outspoken advocates of Negro 
employment through the 1950's,42 but it was not until the mid-sixties 
that Pitney-Bowes took the next step forward. Whereas it had previously 
been color-blind, after an initial period of hiring overqualified blacks, 
starting in 1964 the firm began to seek out qualifiable Negroes and 
train them for available jobs. Pitney-Bowes president, John 0. Nicklis, 
explained, "Equal opportunity is a fine principle, but it does not recognize 
the inability of many Negroes to compete equally, because of past 
discrimination in employment and education." The firm claimed that 
it trained blacks only for jobs for which there were no qualified white 
workers. "As long as we have to train someone, we'll train the Negro," 
said the director of employee and public relations, James Turrentine. 
Turrentine even implied that despite company statements, blacks were 
given actual preference over whites at lower job levels. He denied, how-
ever, that Negroes got any special consideration for management posi-
tions. "You cannot settle for a manager who is 20% less qualified for 
a task," Turrentine said, "but below the management level, we believe 
that we can justify the employment of persons who have a handicap-
color-and who lack experience because of that handicap. "43 
Pitney-Bowes attempted to reconcile its hiring program with the 
traditional concept of fair play by explaining that because no whites 
were available, no qualified white worker was being cheated out of a 
job. But even if qualified white workers were available, there were some 
businessmen who advocated training and employing hard-core unem-
ployed Negroes. Crown Zellerbach's senior vice president James P. Mit-
chell called upon businessmen to "hire what I would call 'qualifiable' 
Negroes and train them for jobs.' '44 However, hiring "qualifiable" blacks 
when already qualified whites were available presented the businessman 
with an awkward problem for ideological justification. 
During the forties and fifties employers with a strong personal 
commitment to solving the problems of Negroes placed their faith in 
the American Creed. They linked their own religious or ethical values 
to the American Creed and believed that evenhanded treatment of 
blacks and whites was the best solution to employment discrimination. 
It was clear by the late sixties, however, that color blindness had not 
significantly reduced black underemployment. It could be argued that 
the success of the American Creed could hardly be evaluated since the 
business community had accepted it for less than a decade, and then 
in an essentially token manner. But neither the government nor the 
black masses were willing to wait, and those employers whose commit-
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ment to the needs of the black people was preeminent had to begin to 
apply the concept of equal opportunity collectively rather than individ-
ually. Whereas traditionally concerned employers had applied the Ameri-
can Creed to individuals, by the late sixties they began to speak of 
equal opportunity for blacks as a group. Because historically whites had 
discriminated against blacks collectively, this new interpretation of equal 
opportunity discarded the American Creed and replaced it with an 
obligation to assist all blacks in achieving a better economic position. 
Since there could be no reason in the American Creed for dis-
criminating against the more qualified white, and since such a choice 
was clearly not in the immediate best economic interests of the firm, 
explanations for such action were usually based on personal values or 
long-run benefits. Employers who pointed to the black burden of three 
hundred years of discrimination to justify hiring blacks were in fact 
admitting they would shoulder the guilt and pay for the misdeeds of their 
fathers. On the other hand, businessmen who pointed to the riots were 
implying that the immediate costs of affirmative action were a form of 
insurance against the continued costs of social disorder- and that was an 
explanation which squared with the Capitalist Ethic. When the former 
president of the National Association of Manufacturers, H. C. McClellan, 
told the California Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots 
that he was opposed to lowering the employment standards because 
"that, in itself, would be discrimination,"45 he was taking a classical 
American Creed position. But when he said Negroes "should be given, 
perhaps, a bit of a priority in Watts because, in that area, unemploy-
ment presently is about four times that which prevails throughout the 
country,"46 he was alluding to both a special obligation for reducing 
Negro unemployment and to a desire to prevent future riots. 
The management of Owens-Illinois publicly and repeatedly took 
the final step in the philosophical justification for giving extra help to 
Negroes. The company's director of personnel, Harold S. Mayfield, told 
a meeting of insurance executives that while they might not have been 
able to cross the Delaware with George Washington , climb Mt. Everest, 
or go to the moon , "you are in the forefront of the fight to settle America's 
greatest internal problem of the Twentieth Century." Fairness was not 
enough, said Mayfield. Blacks were not starting off on a par with whites 
and could not be treated as though they were : "They need an extra boost 
because they have been injured." Mayfield admitted that he was calling 
for preferential treatment and for discrimination in reverse. For May-
field expectations of fairness could be met by not discriminating against 
whites already employed by the firm . He pointed out that none of the 
employer's current employees would be hurt by a policy of recruiting 
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and training unqualified Negroes, as long as they were fully trained. 
Implicit in Mayfield's argument was the understanding that a special 
training program for blacks might well be unfair to white job seekers, but 
that cost was necessary to compensate for generations of discrimination.47 
By the mid-sixties many firms in the North, but not in the South, 
had developed a series of rather elaborate philosophical justifications for 
their departure from the narrow path of strict equal employment. Al-
though not all firms that did so were willing to admit it, many companies 
had begun to give extra help to black applicants as pressure from the 
federal government and from the black community increased.48 Most 
employers, however, were reluctant to go beyond a policy of "equal 
treatment regardless of race," and southern firms interviewed in a 1966 
survey would not even profess simple nondiscrimination. Almost three-
quarters of the southern businessmen stated they would "employ only 
enough Negroes to satisfy the government and the civil rights groups. "49 
Whether an employer was motivated to take affirmative action out 
of personal conviction or merely wanted to avoid governmental sanctions, 
he had to come to grips with the implications for personnel policy raised 
by the demands for affirmative action. The social and legal push for more 
black employment forced employers to reevaluate three areas of per-
sonnel management: recruiting, selection, and training. 
Those firms which accepted the idea of affirmative action most 
commonly practiced it by giving extra attention to recruiting black 
workers. Until the beginnings of the civil rights revolution few if any 
firms included black-oriented sources, such as Negro colleges, in their 
regular recruiting activities. When an occasional employer conducted a 
special search for black workers in the forties and fifties he usually 
went to the Negro civil rights and welfare agencies, which, in the words 
of a personnel specialist of the late 1950's, "were of valuable assistance 
during the initial stages of Negro employment, for they generally referred 
the best qualified Negro applicants available."50 
The legal and social pressure of the civil rights movement caused 
firms to change their recruiting policies for both high- and low-level 
jobs. At the upper end, the black colleges were the most obvious sources 
for black technical and professional workers. Southern black schools 
suddenly became regular stops in the corporation recruiter's rounds.. 51 
For lower-level jobs businessmen at first attempted to find black workers 
through traditional sources. Companies contacted the Negro civil rights 
and welfare organizations, advertised in the Negro press, and informed 
public and private employment agencies that the firm wanted black 
employees. 52 Recruiting through established channels may not have 
turned up many candidates, but, equally important from a public relations 
Beyond Equal Employment: The Revolution in Personnel Policy 171 
Houston businessmen who planned a fair to get summer jobs for mi-
nority young people in 1967 discovered that two days before the opening 
they had 312 job openings for an estimated 7,000 young people who 
would attend the fair. Desperate last-minute pressure by civic and busi-
ness leaders managed to raise that figure to a thousand-an achievement 
widely applauded by the press and federal government. But the fact 
remains that more than 80 percent of those who came to the highly 
publicized fair went away as unemployed as they had arrived.58 
A number of job clearinghouses or placement centers supported 
by voluntary groups were both more permanent than the transitory job 
fairs and somewhat more successful in finding places for Negro job-
seekers.59 Job placement centers, which employers operated outside of 
regular private employment agencies or state employment services, 
existed in numerous cities including Boston, Omaha, St. Paul, Newark, 
and Columbus. 60 Some of them provided a place where businessmen 
could find qualified job applicants-in other words doing what the Urban 
League had been doing for many years. Others concentrated on finding 
work for the so-called hard-core unemployed, whom the traditional 
placement services would normally screen out. 
Until the riots in the years after 1965, job placement centers usually 
concentrated on finding and placing qualified blacks. However, the 
numerous job placement centers which employers created in the wake 
of the riots sought work for the unskilled hard-core unemployed who 
were assumed to be the major component among the rioters. Unlike 
most of the previous recruiting efforts, the employment drives in 1967-
68 were geared toward giving the maximum number of jobs to the 
maximum number of blacks, even if this meant lowering employment 
sta,ndards. The National Alliance of Businessmen (NAB) organized 
much of the postriot wave of recruiting which sought the hard-core 
unemployed. 61 The genuine depth of the initial business commitment to 
hire the hard-core unemployed expressed itself in the willingness of some 
big corporations to forego the safety of the herd and strike out into the 
ghettos on their own. Instead of joining collective efforts to find the 
hard-core unemployed, the companies sent their own recruiters into the 
inner city or, in some cases, set up employment offices in black neighbor-
hoods.62 Most major firms, however, were reluctant to recruit the 
hard-core unemployed. Only twenty-five of four hundred companies con-
tacted by the White House in 1968 agreed to participate in NAB's hard-
core recruitment program. 63 
The Ford Motor Company ran the most publicized and probably the 
most successful of the recruiting programs which aggressively sought out 
the hard-core unemployed. Chairman of the board Henry Ford II was 
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the head of NAB and a leader in the New Detroit Committee, two business 
organizations which business leaders had formed in response to the riots 
of 1967. Declaring that "management should be willing to go directly 
into the city, to seek out the unemployed, to make sure that hiring 
standards are not unnecessarily or unrealistically restrictive," Ford di-
rected his company to open inner-city recruiting offices which hired 
men who met minimum physical standards for employment regardless 
of police records and other normally disqualifying factors. 64 In one year 
Ford claimed to have hired five thousand hard-core unemployed.65 
The extent to which an employer would modify his recruitment 
policies depended on whether or not he believed affirmative action re-
quired him to lower employment standards. Those firms sticking closest 
to the traditional interpretation of the American Creed took affirmative 
action by merely seeking blacks without altering their standards. For 
example, a southern-oriented textile journal advocated recruitment of 
black workers, but cautioned employers against relaxing standards which 
"would damage the best interests of both the employer and the minority 
group." The journal even suggested raising standards in order to select 
Negroes with potential for advancement. 66 More unorthodox were mana-
gers like Alcoa's employment director, R. C. Becker, who recommended 
against lowering standards but who qualified his position by calling for 
a review of the standards with a conscious attempt to get away from 
"middle class bias. " 67 Most removed from the American Creed were 
those special programs designed to get jobs for the so-called hard-core 
unemployed which asked employers to "waive all normal standards" 
including high school diplomas, police records, and aptitude tests.68 
Even employers who agreed that standards should be lowered for 
black applicants disagreed on the actual method by which they would ease 
entry for the Negro worker. Employers could reevaluate job requirements 
to eliminate those not germane to actual job performance. They could 
lower standards and hire applicants with deficiencies which the worker 
would remedy in a training program. Or the employer could, and this was 
never advocated although it was occasionally practiced, lower his employ-
ment standards so that blacks who were not up to par with available 
white workers would be hired and retained. 
Traditionally companies had set standards higher for the black appli-
cant than for the white. In the late l 940's, a Negro personnel assistant said, 
"I am very careful in the selection of our girls. It is generally agreed that 
the Negro girls working here are of a higher type than the white girls. "69 
Superselectivity continued in varying degrees through the mid-1960's.70 It 
remained particularly prominent as a feature of pioneer placement, and as 
long as there were large numbers of firms which had not hired their first 
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black employees, overqualified applicants continued to be in demand. 
Demand for higher qualifications for blacks was particularly evident 
in the South. In 1964 the management of the Atlanta branch of a national 
mail order house with less than a glowing reputation as an equal opportun-
ity employer had to have its executives pull a number out of a hat to 
determine who would get the company's first Negro secretary. Even though 
this was a southern branch of a go-slow firm, all the executives wanted the 
new black secretary because they knew she would have to be superior to 
the average white girl. 71 But management's overcautious approach to 
pioneer placement and extreme, if not discriminatory, care in selecting 
subsequent Negro employees could not withstand the pressure for in-
creased black employment of the late 1960's. Clearly an employer could 
not maintain traditional standards and at the same time hire the hard-
core unemployed. 
The demands for aggressive recruitment had a profound impact on 
one of the personnel officer's most cherished selection devices, the test. 
Scientifically rational, and free from the prejudices of personality, equal 
employment proponents had long advocated objective testing procedures 
as a way of complying with the American Creed and of eliminating racial 
discrimination in employment.72 
The legitimacy of tests as a selection device remained unchallenged 
until the early 1960's. Even then many, probably most, employers con-
tinued to depend on tests to protect themselves from accusations of dis-
crimination. A 1967 survey of seventy-four Los Angeles firms found that 
85 percent of them used employment tests, and 78 percent of the using 
group observed the same cut-off scores for both Negro and white appli-
cants.73 If the Los Angeles employers counted on the tests to prove their 
fair employment practice, they were on solid legal ground. During the war 
and up through the 1950's, government agencies advocated testing as a 
means of insuring unbiased selection.74 As late as 1966, the vice chairman 
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission told southern busi-
nessmen, "The commission doesn't intend-or want-to lower employ-
ment standards .... Testing programs which help determine a qualified 
employee are permissible under the law. " 75 
The discriminatory nature of employment testing was not widely 
recognized until 1964, when an examiner of the Illinois Fair Employment 
Practices found the Motorola company guilty of an unfair practice for 
refusing to hire a Negro applicant who had "failed" a short general in-
telligence test. Late the same year, the examiner ordered Motorola to hire 
the applicant and to cease using the test. The examiner was partially over-
ruled by the full commission. While the commission did not demand the 
employment of the complainant or ban the further use of the employment 
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test, it confused the issue by ordering Motorola to pay the complainant a 
thousand dollars for the expense and embarrassment which the incident 
had caused him, and it ordered the company to cease unfair practices. A 
court subsequently threw out the award but sustained the ban on unfair 
practices. Because of legal technicalities dealing with the way charges 
were brought against the company, neither the courts nor the commission 
ruled directly on the propriety of preemployment testing, but they suc-
ceeded in opening up a wide-ranging debate that forced employers to ques-
tion both selection methods and selection criteria. 76 
Because the federal EEOC deferred to state commissions, businessmen 
had to worry about state FEPC interpretations of employment testing such 
as that in the Motorola case, but as far as the federal commission was con-
cerned business fears were unfounded. Section 703 (h) of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 specifically permitted the use of "any professionally developed 
ability test provided that such test, its administration or action upon the 
results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, 
color, religion, sex or national origin." As a matter of fact evidence indi-
cates that many firms interpreted this section of the act to mean that valid 
employment tests could be used as a defense against charges of discrimina-
tion and thus began using them for the first time.77 While the federal 
commission accepted the concept of testing, it cautioned employers to be 
sure that their tests did not inadvertently discriminate. In 1966, USEEOC 
issued a set of guidelines to help management develop acceptable test 
procedures. The commission suggested six steps, all of which boiled down 
to insuring that the tests were valid. If a firm could demonstrate that its 
objectively administered tests differentiated between applicants who would 
succeed on a given job and those who would fail, it was operating within 
the law.78 
Legally, no employer was obligated to give special treatment to Negro 
test takers; in fact, however, some did. In a number of firms the acceptable 
passing scores were lowered in order to include larger numbers of blacks in 
the work force,79 and in other companies the cut-off point for black appli-
cants was set below that for whites. 80 When the KLH corporation dis-
covered that no one without a high school education could pass the 
Wonderlic test (a standard, short general intelligence test), the company 
attempted to validate the test by administering it to some of the firm's 
best Negro supervisors. When they failed to pass, KLH eliminated the high 
school education requirement and the use of the test. 81 
Some highly progressive firms like KLH said, "The hell with the 
Wonderlic,"82 but by and large employers were reluctant to do away with 
employment tests that were a "product of at least a half century of ex-
ploring and disproving alternative approaches." 83 However, all employers 
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seemed willing to accept, at least in theory, the need for more rigorous at-
tention to the validity of testing. Large numbers of companies began to re-
evaluate both their job requirements and their tests. 84 Having determined 
the actual minimum skill necessary to perform a given task, business began 
to look for tests which measured only those skills and did "not depend 
upon the applicants having been born and raised in a particular cultural 
environment and having been exposed to a specified educational system."85 
The impact of the civil rights revolution affected each firm's selection 
procedure differently. Some companies introduced employment testing for 
the first time, others threw out testing for some jobs, and still others at-
tempted to find out what their tests were testing and whether it was rele-
vant to the job. Although the techniques adopted could be diametrically 
opposed, the purpose was actually the same: to increase the number of 
Negro employees until there were "enough," but how many was that? 
In the halcyon days before 1960, the equal employment opportunity 
movement never seriously considered the idea of quotas except as objec-
tionable devices contrary to the spirit of the American Creed used by em-
ployers to limit the number of minority workers in their firms. Arguing in 
favor of FEPC in 1945, Malcolm Ross called the idea that FEPC would re-
quire positive quotas "obvious nonsense. The whole idea of quotas indi-
cates discrimination." He continued, "FEPC has repeatedly condemned 
racial quotas, and insists merely that employers shall hire the best quali-
fied person for a specific job. " 86 American Friends Service Committee 
field workers told employers in 1950 not to pay attention to quotas or 
percentages but merely to hire and promote the best qualified people.87 
When employers did maintain quotas they used them for the most part as 
devices to prevent Negroes from becoming overrepresented in any job 
category, including that of janitor. But while quotas set a maximum num-
ber of black employees, they seldom set a minimum and so could only work 
against black job seekers. 88 
Prior to 1960 quotas were regarded as restrictive devices (although 
the Urban League occasionally advocated them as a way to insure a mini-
mum number of jobs for blacks) that fair employment forces opposed, not 
only for practical reasons, but because they believed hiring blacks in pro-
portion to their percentage in the population was "discriminatory, since 
it is based not on the individual's particular capacities but on his ethnic 
group identity. " 89 But when in the 1960's militant black leaders began ad-
vocating benign quotas, it was the businessmen who appealed to the 
classic fair employment ideal of employing the best man for the job as a 
reason for not hiring specific numbers of black workers. In its equal em-
ployment policy the Babcock and Wilcox Company stated that it would 
not "foster unsound practices such as: .. . offering of employment oppor-
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tunities without regard to individual classifications of ability, for the pur-
pose of achieving correlation between the company's employee population 
and the population of the community on a racial, religious, or other 
basis. " 90 
Section 703 (j) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 clearly stated that the 
law could not be interpreted to require hiring to correct "an imbalance 
which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons 
of any race .... " Thus employers were entirely within their legal rights 
to reject calls for quotas. But reality was more complex than the letter 
of the law. President Johnson's Secretary of Labor, Willard Wirtz, con-
tinually reiterated the government's position that "there will be neither 
passing nor acceptance of the idea of quotas as far as the administration 
and government is concerned, and as far as the President's Committee is 
concerned and as far as Plans for Progress is concerned. " 91 But Wirtz's · 
pious adherence to the fair-play ideal of the American Creed did not 
square with the observations of more impartial students of the black em-
ployment scene. In 1965 Ray Marshall said, "Federal agencies sometimes 
have [implicitly] sanctioned quota systems and have at least left the im-
pression that Government contractors are expected to give preferential 
treatment to minorities. "92 According to one account, affirmative action 
as called for by Executive Order 10925 required the employer to have 
"minority representation ... [that] is significantly representative of the 
population ratio of white to minority in the community location of the 
facility." This proportional representation was to be carried out "in all 
divisions of the work force'' and in the income of minority employees.93 
In part as a response to the demands of . the civil rights groups and of 
the government, and in part because they wanted some guideline to insure 
fair employment, firms began to accept the idea of establishing racial 
quotas. In some cases, the quota was seen as a minimum. For example, 
two northern companies stated that their Negro employment goals were 
"to employ at least one Negro sales clerk at all times," and "to hire 
Negroes in all major job categories."94 The Bekins Van and Storage Com-
pany placed the minimum in strict percentage terms. It told its district 
managers, "Our goal is a minimum of ten percent this year. Any office with 
ten or more salaried personnel should have at least one. Operations crews 
should have a minimum of ten percent. "95 Some of the more outspoken ad-
vocates of black employment defended this kind of strict minimum quota 
system. Although they acknowledged its inherently undemocratic nature, 
they contended it was the only way of insuring fair employment.96 
In most instances businessmen rejected strict numbers or percent-
ages, but were willing to accept the idea of a guideline or hiring target. A 
personnel director whose department split over the question of a numeri-
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cal target "decided that no specific number should be spelled out-it might 
be misconstrued as another form of discrimination-but, informally, we 
are reviewing exactly how many Negroes are in how many jobs, which 
jobs, and at what pay, and are stressing the necessity for getting closer 
to racial balance. "97 
The civil rights revolution forced new methods of recruitment and 
selection on the business community. Where such affirmative action was 
limited to finding additional qualified biack workers, the employer faced 
no new problem in placing black workers on the job. Where, however, 
standards were altered or relaxed in order to increase the number of ac-
ceptable Negro applicants, companies had to alter their training methods 
in order to accommodate the new employees. 
One of the main thrusts of the new interest in training Negroes was 
an increased business concern with the quality of vocational education 
available to blacks. When blacks served only in menial capacities, business-
men paid little attention to Negro schooling,98 but as circumstances forced 
them to begin hiring more blacks at higher levels, the business community 
began to pay increasing attention to the public school system. Inland 
Steel's vice president William Caples thought that industry's first job was 
to "convince Negro youth that business is a realizable, satisfying and re-
warding career." Once having motivated young blacks, Caples urged that 
business "take a continuing interest and involve itself in public education, 
general, technical and vocational at the primary and secondary level. " 99 
Businessmen had a long history of involvement with some aspects of 
public vocational training, particularly through participation in "coopera-
tive education" programs which enabled students to work part-time during 
school hours in order to give them experience and to demonstrate to them 
the applicability of academic subjects. Once employers began hiring 
Negroes into the kind of jobs taught in high school vocational classes, it 
was logical to extend cooperative education programs to minority stu-
dents. While the traditional cooperative programs enriched the regular 
school curriculum of the average student, the new programs directed their 
attention to the drop-out or potential drop-out. The antidrop-out coopera-
tive programs were not limited to Negro students, but they included large 
numbers of minorities since minorities constituted a disproportionately 
large segment of drop-outs. 
The nature of the plans varied widely. Some were actually counsel-
ing or tutoring programs, not strictly cooperative programs. Rather than 
giving the students jobs, managerial personnel donated their time as big-
brothers who would give advice about vocational, educational, and per-
sonal problems. Most plans, however, followed the pattern of Carson Pirie 
Scott and Company's "Double E" program. Carson's had been one of the 
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first of the major Chicago department stores to hire minority workers, and 
store president C. Virgil Martin admitted that he was thus able to hire the 
best black workers available. Carson's created the Double E program to 
help what Martin called " the 'other· Negroes-those who, because of 
youth and lack of education and training and cultural deprivation, were 
hardly equipped to compete for any job," 100 In the name of morality and 
good business, Martin demanded that businessmen stop "skimming the 
cream of high school and college graduates . . . allowing the under-
privileged and mediocre to find what th ey can. " 101 Carson Pirie Scott be-
gan its Double E (Educat ion and Employment) program in August, 1961. 
With money fro m the Ford Foundation (for the initial experiment) and 
with teachers from the Chicago school system, Carson 's provided class-
room space and jobs for high school drop-outs who wanted another 
chance. 102 
Businessmen also helped school systems by assisting them in their 
vocational education programs. Because acting as an adviser required less 
commitment than participating in a cooperative program, the advisory 
approach to helping schools was extremely popular among businessmen . In 
some cases a school and a particular firm had an understanding that the 
school could call on the company for information about jobs, for speakers, 
and for career guidance conferences with the students. As early as 1963 
General Electric had such an arrangement with Benjamin Franklin High 
School in Philadelphia. 103 The use of employers as vocational program 
advisers spread, and after the riots of 1967, a number of firms in Michi-
gan "adopted" schools to which they gave time, manpower, and material 
aid in order to strengthen the schools' programs. 104 
The most widely adopted business-school plans were the vocational 
guidance programs which industry ran for high school counselors. While 
such programs existed prior to the establishment of the Plans for Pro-
gress, 105 it was not until Plans for Progress introduced its Vocational 
Guidance Institutes that the idea became widespread. The first institute 
was held at Wayne State University in Detroit in the summer of 1964. Ac-
cording to the official description, the three-week institute for high school 
guidance counselors was designed to "increase the counselor's knowledge 
about changing employment conditions and opportunities for Negro and 
other minority groups." The institute's Jlanners also hoped to set up con-
tinuing communication between schools and businesses; to educate the 
counselors about the "attitudes which disadvantaged youths have toward 
such matters as employment, education, family life, their place in society, 
and the world beyond their experience" ; and "to provide opportunities for 
youth by making employers and schools aware of matching potential to 
job demands. " 106 
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The wide acceptance of the institutes by counselors, spurred no doubt 
by the academic credits and stipends which some early participants re-
ceived, led to a proliferation of institutes during the summers of 1967 and 
1968. Both the business participants themselves and outside evaluators 
agreed that the Vocational Guidance Institutes performed a valuable ser-
vice. Hugh L. Gordon of Lockheed believed the most important thing 
businessmen learned from the institutes was "how uninformed are the 
counselors of these young people as to business opportunities, and how the 
public school systems in general are so unprepared to provide career coun-
seling to our youth and how much they need the assistance of the business 
community." 107 Theo Volsky, who evaluated the first institutes, concluded 
that "no other organized segment of society has the kind of commitment 
and organizational ability that business has to lend to education in its 
efforts to prepare youth to enter into society and the job market. " 108 
But, just as businessmen had never depended totally on the public 
schools to train their white workers, they did not limit their educational 
activity to public education when it came to training black workers. As 
firms began to desegregate their job classifications, they also stopped dis-
criminating against blacks in company job training programs. In training, 
as in recruitment and selection, merely granting blacks equal access was 
not enough. Members of the Plans for Progress were expected to take 
affirmative action in the area of training primarily by encouraging minority 
employees to take advantage of company training and apprentice pro-
grams.109 
Special training programs for adult minority workers do not appear 
to have been at all widespread until after the urban disorders of 1967 and 
the creation of the National Alliance of Businessmen. 110 Until the riots 
most companies were preoccupied with taking affirmative action in re-
cruiting. Bus,inessmen were busy finding the qualified black worker or, at 
most modifying· job requirements so that they could hire the black candi-
dates they found. In either case Negroes did not need special training pro-
grams. Firms could place the new black employees in the same training 
programs in which they placed new white employees. 
Through the early 196O's special training programs for Negroes were 
usually ad hoc courses designed to bring a particular individual up to par 
so the company could hire him. Such programs were used only by firms 
which wanted to increase their black work force but which could not find 
qualified blacks. 111 But for the most part, unless a company made a prac-
tice of hiring large numbers of unskilled Negroes, companies had no 
special training programs for blacks. 
Secretarial training was the one area in which there was a concerted 
business effort to prepare unqualified blacks for employment. Business 
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suffered from a chronic shortage of secretarial help, and special programs 
for the training of minority women appeared to be the solution for a num-
ber of firms. Some companies, like Aetna Life & Casualty, operated their 
own courses which taught typing, shorthand, and remedial English. 112 New 
York University ran a similar course with the support of several large New 
York City firms. The companies recruited for the training sessions through 
the Urban League, and in at least one case partial funding came from an 
outside foundation. 113 Although these courses successfully trained compe-
tent secretaries, they also proved to be expensive, and similar programs 
for other skills did not appear until the riots, government pressure, and 
government financing of 1967. 
The civil rights revolution of the 1960's had a profound impact on 
management personnel policies in the area of Negro employment. Pressure 
from the government and from the streets forced business to abandon its 
recently achieved ideological integrity. For a few years in the late fifties 
the business community could be true to both the American Creed and 
the Capitalist Ethic, but an integrated philosophical system was a far cry 
from an integrated economic system, and employers bent to the demands 
for increased Negro employment even if it meant renewed ideological in-
consistency. Businessmen were most willing to accept affirmative action 
in the area of recruiting already qualified blacks. They were more reluc-
tant, however, to modify their overall employment standards, to modify 
their standards · for Negroes in particular, or to give time, effort, and 
money to bring substandard workers up to an employable level. Although 
the number of blacks employed as a result of the growing acceptance of 
affirmative action was still not enough to significantly diminish the vast 
sea of underemployed blacks, the change was, nevertheless, a revolution 
in management's thinking and even a revolution in management's action 
when compared to the inactivity of the 1950's. 
11 
Voluntarism as a Rear-Guard Action 
During the early 1950's businessmen in several cities formed vol-
untary equal employment councils in order to head off state FEPC legisla-
tion. Employers reasoned that if they could practice fair employment 
without legal compulsion the legislators might spare them the burden 
of an additional regulatory law, while at the same time the business 
community would be demonstrating its commitment to the American 
Creed.1 The voluntarist approach to the Negro employment problem 
remained popular through the Eisenhower years, although businessmen 
did not organize and coordinate their individual efforts into councils 
until the Kennedy administration. Like the voluntary fair employment 
councils of the 1950's, the voluntary efforts of the 1960's were a response 
to the threat of legislative sanctions, but unlike the earlier period, the 
voluntary equal employment activity of the 1960's came after, not 
before, the enactment of compulsory legislation. In addition, the extra-
legal inducement of urban racial violence spurred the formation of vol-
untary merit employment councils during the mid-sixties. 
As Ray Marshall has observed, "There is something about the threat 
of prosecution that seems to make voluntary programs work much 
better."2 The threat of prosecution began in 1961 with President Ken-
nedy's Executive Order 10925, which demanded affirmative action from 
government contractors, and the threat increased sharply after the pas-
sage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The number of voluntary programs 
increased steadily through the 1960's to reach a climax with the estab-
lishment of the National Alliance of Businessmen (NAB) in late 1967. 
NAB, a national voluntary organization of businessmen, was the ultimate 
voluntary response to the ultimate act of pressure-rioting. 
A variety of factors influenced the growth of voluntary fair em-
ployment efforts during the Kennedy administration. In addition to the 
pressure from the government and the civil rights movement, business 
organizations began to urge employers to help solve the problems be-
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setting society. The business community acted partly in the spirit of 
the New Frontier, doing what it could for its country, but also out of 
the more traditional fear of what its government might do instead. 
Both the National Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States lent their support to the voluntary equal 
employment effort. NAM president W. P. Gullander warned that business 
was "letting government take too big a role in leadership." NAM believed 
that thirty years of federal action had failed to solve social and employ-
ment problems, but "in hundreds of communities throughout America 
those same 'unsolvable problems' have been effectively and successfully 
solved by local action groups dealing with probler.i.s of local dimensicns. " 3 
In 1964, NAM began to act as a clearinghouse for local voluntary programs 
that dealt with problems of high school drop-outs, training, and emplcy-
ment. NAM called its program Solutions to Employment Problems (STEP) 
and published more than seventy studies of successful local voluntary 
efforts to solve employment problems and distributed hundreds of thou-
sands of copies to interested businessmen.4 
Although numerous firms responded to the growing demands for 
more black employment by individually adopting affirmative-action per-
sonnel policies, the dominant trend during the 1960's was tcward collec-
tive action. Rather than merely acting alone, businessmen organized 
councils through which they could pool their resources (or, at least, behind 
which they could hide their individual responsibility) to work to improve 
the eccnomic conditions of blacks. In 1966, the Task Force on Economic 
Growth and Opportunity of the Chamber of Commerce of the United 
States issued a report which, among other things, recommended that 
"local chambers of commerce and individual businessmen should initiate 
full employment programs tailored to the needs of their ccmmunities. " 5 
The report gave no rationale for this suggestion other than a classical 
Capitalist Ethic call for an "effective use of all our resources,"6 but an 
earlier report by the New York Chamber of Commerce shed additicnal 
light on the thinking of organized business groups. The New York report 
noted that legal redress through FEPC had reached the point of diminishing 
returns, which explained why black groups were exerting pressure directly 
on the business community. The report concluded that businessmen 
could not escape the problem of black employment. But neither should 
businessmen want to escape because the business community could "best 
organize and administer job training programs designed to qualify Negroes 
for better jobs. The business community can set the tone and style of a 
new acceptance of the Negro on all levels of life."7 
The composition and activity of voluntary equal employment associa-
tions which grew up after 1961 varied widely. Some were composed only 
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of businessmen, and, within this group, some only of federal contractors. 
Others were more community-oriented and contained representatives 
from labor and civil rights organizations in addition to employers. 
The history of the Milwaukee Voluntary Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Council ( MVEEOC) provides an excellent case study of the activity 
and motivation of local voluntary fair employment groups prior to Plans 
for Progress becoming a national organization in 1966. "We Milwaukee-
ans"-an informal group of white businessmen and Negro community 
leaders formed to facilitate intergroup communications-first discussed 
the idea of a voluntary council in 1963.8 Although many of MVEEoc's 
charter firms were individual members of Plans for Progress and held 
government contracts, government pressure does not appear to have 
provided the primary impetus for the council's formation. 9 In both private 
correspondence and public announcements MVEEoc's founders justified 
their organization as good for the economy and excellent for continued 
civic peace. Emphasizing the element of the Capitalist Ethic which stressed 
long-run rather than immediate benefits, MVEEOC argued that employing 
blacks would save the urban taxpayer money. "It is a fact," said R. A. 
Burns, one of MVEEoc's founding fathers, "that a low economic status of 
seven percent of cur population tends to lower the strength of the entire 
community, reflects a higher than necessary cost for unemployment 
compensation, welfare costs and social agencies. " 10 Burns noted that cities 
experiencing racial incidents had their "public and industrial images" 
adversely affected. 11 "In many locations," he continued, "prearranged 
major industrial installations have been cancelled because the sponsor 
believed he could not wittingly become part of a community which could 
not, or would not, take affirmative control of its civil rights responsi-
bilities." Burns congratulated the city for avoiding incidents but warned, 
"Fires are smoldering."t2 
Although a desire to prevent racial demonstrations apparently moti-
vated some of MVEEoc's founders , the council's official pronouncements 
never cited black activism as one of the reasons for its existence. Even a 
comprehensive discussion of business attitudes by a MVEEOC founder, 
which included virtually every other possible reason for creating a vol-
untary council from manpower utilization and morality to Plans for 
Progress and "the world-wide ideological struggle," failed to mention 
threats or demonstrations or riots. 13 No single event precipitated the 
formation of MVEEOC in December, 1963, but there can be little doubt 
that the civil rights movement which had moved north and begun to focus 
its guns on business was a major contributing factor. Businessmen formed 
the council in response to a changing national mood. It represented the 
business sector's participation in the spirit of the New Frontier, a spirit 
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which dictated understanding rather than opposition to the black 
revolution. 
In its first official prospectus MVEE0C listed five objectives: 1) to elimi-
nate employment discrimination, 2) to persuade employers to affirm this 
purpose and openly support it, 3) to communicate this policy to the Negro 
community, 4) to encourage Negroes to get education and training in 
order to qualify for jobs, and 5) to gather statistical data to measure the 
progress of the first four objectives. 14 By becoming a member of MVEE0C 
a company agreed to subscribe to the council's objectives and to take 
several steps toward implementing them. All MVEEOC members were to 
adopt a formal written policy of nondiscrimination and to "impress upon 
employment and supervisory personnel the responsibility of insuring 
compliance. . . . " Members agreed to advertise as "equal opportunity 
employers" and to use black media and organizations for recruitment 
of minority personnel. In a final catch-all promise, member firms agreed 
to "participate in other programs and activities designed to promote 
minority group knowledge of the Milwaukee business community and 
employment opportunities-such as plant tours, school career days, school 
co-op, and summer employment programs.15 It is clear that tv.!VEEOC knew 
what attitudes individual members should have, and generally what actions 
they should take to implement them, but was rather hazy about what 
its own role as an organization should be. 
Two months after its founding, MVEEOC moved to establish its first 
practical program. It set up a one-day seminar for industrial relations 
and personnel directors. Assuming that the personnel men might be 
reluctant to take even the first step toward integrating, the workshop 
sought to convince them that voluntary equal employment was a good 
idea. In his introductory remarks Elmer Winter, president of Manpower, 
Inc., and chairman of the MVEE0C governing board, urged the participants 
to "put up the 'Welcome' sign" and tell Negro applicants, "\Ve will work 
with you on upgrading your skills and qualifications so that you may 
be better prepared to meet the challenges of the future." And Winter 
reminded the executives that they had an opportunity to say to Con-
gress, "We do not need the sanctions of Federal legislation to force us 
into fair employment practices. We are prepared to meet our responsi-
bilities fairly and with dignity. " 16 
Speaking at the same meeting Peter G. Scotese, a vice president 
of Federated Department Stores ( the Boston Store) and a mainstay of 
MVEE0C, urged businessmen to support MVEE0C as a way of countering 
radical black politics. Scotese observed that the "distinctions between 
'morals' and 'economics' " were becoming blurred, and that what once 
had been do-good humanitarianism was now essential for maintenance of 
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the system. Scotese pointed out that "within 10 years the dominant group 
in most large American cities will be Negro." The one-man one-vote 
ruling of the Supreme Court meant that "the largest single bloc of votes 
in the House will be controlled by the Negro voter." Scotese observed that 
this bloc had been so alienated, so deprived, that "relying on the common 
ground of mutual interest with mutual goodwill that has tended to unite 
us in even the most violent political arguments will be risky." Having 
raised the specter of black consciousness, Scotese went on to explain 
how it could be destroyed. This "potentially dangerous bloc" had to be 
prevented from "developing either physically or psychologically." This 
could be done by the "combination of economic opportunity and physical 
mobility that broke up the other ethnic blocs which have from time to 
time exerted a powerful force on America politically." Integration was 
no longer a humanitarian ideal; it had become an essential act of 
sociopolitical co-option. With perhaps more prescience than he realized 
in that year before Watts and "black power," Scotese warned his 
audience, "In order to have the free enterprise system, opportunities for 
the Negro citizen must be found, so that this 10% of our population will 
not oppose the system he cannot participate in. " 17 
MVEEOC concentrated much of its early energy on black education 
problems. Although the council rejected recommendations that it establish 
scholarships to assist poor minority students, it did develop several other 
educational programs. Council leaders recognized that city high schools 
aimed their "career days" at middle-class white students and that these 
vocational programs had little meaning for black students. An investi-
gating committee recommended that members of the council and the 
school board meet to plan a wholly new program of career information 
and motivation as well as to explore all other work-related aspects of 
academic and vocational education. 18 But before they could plan for 
activities for the school year of 1965, a number of MVEEOC members felt 
that the council should face the challenge of unemployment for ghetto 
youth during the summer of 1964. Winter suggested that council members 
offer jobs that would give black students an opportunity to experience 
meaningful, interesting work.19 The advisory committee sent letters to all 
MVEEOC members requesting summer positions for disadvantaged students. 
This was the first real test of member commitment. The committee asked 
council members to voluntarily participate in a program that would serve 
the dual purpose of giving students jobs and an insight into the business 
world and of showing the Milwaukee community that the business sector 
was willing to help the problems of the black unemployed. Of the more 
than one hundred members of MVEEOC only ten companies offered any 
jobs. In all, companies offered fewer than one hundred jobs, more than 
186 Black Men and Businessmen 
half of which were in the telephone company. Given the unwillingness 
of MVEEOC members to participate in the council's job program, it is not 
surprising that when the publisher of the Milwaukee Journal began a 
general campaign to find summer work for Milwaukee youth, the advisory 
committee refused to support the drive because it did not "fall within 
the scope of the activities of the MVEEOC since it is not directed at the 
problem of racial discrimination in employment. "20 
Unable to get any support from the council advisory committee for a 
summer employment program, Elmer Winter launched his own venture. 
Winter's company, Manpower, Inc., created and sponsored Youthpower, 
Inc. to find jobs for black young people. Volunteers staffed the Youth-
power offices, which successfully served as special employment centers 
for students seeking summer work. Manpower, Inc., offices in many other 
cities copied the Milwaukee Youthpower idea, frequently with the support 
and cosponsorship of other organizations. 21 
Aside from two seminars (a second seminar was held on May 9, 
1964) and an active speakers bureau, MVEEOC entered its first summer, and 
seventh month, with very little to show beyond its press clippings. 22 By 
generating wide publicity and expectations, and at the same time doing 
nothing concrete, MVEEOC was setting itself up for a nasty fall. Without 
programs in the community which blacks could see and appreciate, 
MVEEOC was taking on the appearance of a publicity stunt. As one MVEEOC 
leader noted, "The council has received much favorable publicity for 
its activities, and this in itself has stimulated many questions as to the 
impact on minority employment. Ultimately we will have to measure our 
performance or lose our effectiveness in the Negro community. " 23 
The original charter called for gathering information to measure 
effective progress, but the advisory council had been reluctant to ask 
its members for a minority head count. Their reluctance was based upon 
the fear that member companies would refuse to cooperate, first because 
divulging such information would be in violation of company sovereignty 
and second because if such information fell into their hands, civil rights 
groups might use it against the individual firm. The advisory committee 
devised a plan that avoided these pitfalls by having members report 
statistics to an independent auditor who released only cumulative figures. 
The survey was supposed to demonstrate progress in black hiring, and 
"for companies plagued by demands for employment information from 
militant civil rights groups, participation in this program will offer an 
additional reason to not comply. "24 Despite advisory committee support 
and guaranteed anonymity, the membership responded very slowly to the 
request for information. Only ten of the more than one hundred members 
reported figures for 1964.25 The refusal of council members to cooperate 
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voluntarily with the advisory committee prevented the council from 
gathering the statistics it would need when the organization was attacked 
as ineffectual. 
Although in March, 1964, the advisory committee had stated, 
"[Education] should not be a significant function of this committee,"26 
within a year MVEEOC expanded its educational activity well beyond the 
original intentions of its founders. Beginning in the summer of 1964, 
council members cooperated with the Milwaukee public schools in a 
work-study program which gave sixty students on-the-job experience 
during school time. 27 In early 1965, the heads of MVEEOC's advisory sub-
committee met with principals and guidance counselors to determine how 
the business community could participate in career guidance.28 The 
council and the school board established a "buddy" system between 
executives and vocational counselors at inner-core schools. Each executive 
"agreed to work with the counselors at two schools on a regular and 
continuing basis for the purpose of assisting counselors in doing a more 
realistic and effective job and to be available to these individuals when 
they wish to discuss their plans, problems and programs with the industry 
representative. "29 
MVEEOC found the buddy system of counselor advising so successful 
that when Plans for Progress approached Milwaukee Plans for Progress 
members to set up vocational guidance institutes, the advisory committee 
turned down the idea as unnecessary. Of course, the fact that Plans for 
Progress seminars would have cost members five hundred to a thousand 
dollars each and the buddy system cost practically nothing might have 
had something to do with the decision, but monetary considerations aside, 
the council believed it was getting an equal product for a lower price.30 
Besides the two personnel seminars and the school counselor program, 
MVEEOC was the sponsor of only one other project, the "man-marketing 
clinic." The genesis of the clinics is unclear, particularly in light of the 
insistence of many council founders that training was not properly 
within the council's purview. The idea probably came originally from the 
"man-marketing clinics" that had been held in New York City since 1933 
to assist unemployed executives find new jobs,31 but why MVEEOC tried 
to use a management device for blue-collar workers remains a mystery. 
The clinics did not train an individual in a new skill, but taught him how 
best to utilize the skills he had-how to market himself. Volunteer in-
structors from fifteen member companies conducted the council clinics. 
Both MVEEOC and the instructors considered the clinics a success, and 
they were continued through 1966 as the "How to Get a Job Program."32 
However, there was never any objective measurement of the usefulness 
of the sessions. 33 
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During 1965, MVEE0C moved the clinics into the core-area schools. 
Having already established close contact with the school counselors, par-
ticipating companies were able to integrate the How to Get a Job Pro-
gram and the counselor-adviser program into a total approach to voca-
tional information and motivation. Like the original clinics, the school 
How to Get a Job Program contained two sessions. The first meeting 
consisted of an assembly presentation during which businessmen gave the 
students tips on how to dress and act during an employment interview. 
The second part of the program took place in the classroom, where the 
businessmen distributed sample applications, explained how to use the 
classified ads, and answered any questions the students had. 34 Originated 
in five core-area schools, the program proved so popular with school ad-
ministrators that in the spring of 1966 MVEE0C expanded it to twelve 
other schools, including a number of predominantly white schools.35 
While the council basked in the glory of such an obviously successful 
program, none of its members mentioned that holding such programs in 
white schools certainly exceeded the original purposes of the council. 
MVEEoc's glory was not merely local. The Wisconsin Industrial Com-
mission lauded "this educative, information, direct action program .... " 
A federal commissioner from the United States Equal Employment Op: 
portunity Council reported MVEE0C was doing "the outstanding job in 
the country." The plan received national press coverage, and Winter 
presented the Milwaukee program to six hundred members of the Plans 
for Progress. Although he obviously realized its shortcomings, Elmer 
Winter was not reticent about describing the program and its accom-
plishments. He traveled to Washington several times to collect official 
accolades and to explain the council's program to businessmen from 
across the nation.36 Toward the end of 1965, Winter apparently began to 
have second thoughts about the extensive publicity. At a meeting of the 
advisory committee he "reported the MVEE0C is receiving nationwide 
recognition, perhaps to a greater extent than deserved." But his doubts 
were not strong enough to prevent his continued proselytizing.37 
There were signs that the black community was getting fed up with 
what appeared to be MVEE0C's meaningless and self-serving projects. Pri-
vately, Negro leaders told the advisory committee that MVEE0C responded 
only when the government brought pressure, and that blacks were tired 
of programs like the man-marketing clinic which were all talk. Such 
projects did not provide jobs and they did not bring money into empty 
pockets.38 Finally on January 15, 1966, Negro resentment broke into the 
open. The Milwaukee Star, a black newspaper, printed an article by 
Walter Jones which observed that the emperor's clothes were not nearly 
as resplendent as the reports out of Washington would lead one to be-
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lieve. The paper noted that all the pledges and clinics and educational 
programs were so much "ballyhoo" without producing jobs. Jones ac-
cused MVEEOC employers of continuing to discriminate against blacks by 
saying that they were not qualified for the available jobs. The paper 
pointed out that the job openings advertised in its pages were for tech-
nicians, keypunch operators, auditors, programmers, statisticians, etc., 
jobs for which most blacks had no training. Jones demanded that council 
members move beyond simple equal opportunity and begin to practice 
affirmative action. "The real solution," said Jones, "is to seek out the 
unemployed and the unemployable Negro and to teach him a skill." The 
paper then called for programs of vocational training, remedial educa-
tion, job counseling, realistic employment standards, and more entrance 
jobs.39 
Much to the council's discomfort, the state Industrial Commission, 
which had previously praised MVEEOC, decided that maybe the council 
was not so great after all. Joseph C. Fagan, chairman of the state com-
mission, accused some members of the council of hiding behind the 
announced policy of the organization. As a result of a survey of minority 
employment conducted by the Industrial Commission, Fagan concluded 
that some council members "have been sitting on their haunches . . . 
because they joined they feel they don't have any more duties or obliga-
tions. "40 
MVEEOC responded to these attacks with less than total candor. The 
chairman of the advisory committee called the Industrial Commission 
report inaccurate and inconclusive and refused to comment further on 
the charges.41 Internal reaction, however, was both more forceful and 
more honest. The chairman reported to Winter that while there were 
statistical problems with the commission's report, "unless some startling 
corrections occur we definitely will not look very good as an organiza-
tion." He concluded that MVEEOC was on a "hot spot which requires 
some prompt and effective concrete action on our part. "42 The chair-
man noted that the Wisconsin State Employment Service and the Urban 
League had over a thousand names of unemployed men in their files, 
most of whom could not qualify for existing openings. He suggested a 
crash employment program, with all members of MVEEOC pledging to 
hire at least one unqualified man for on-the-job training. Employers 
would hire blacks on the spot at an inner-core location. The chairman 
believed that he could obtain "a substantial number of commitments 
from employers," and the resulting employment would redeem MVEEoc's 
tarnished reputation.43 
At the same time Milwaukee CORE charged the council with hypoc 
risy for running a How to Get a Job Program and then having no 
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jobs to get. CORE called MVEEoc's approach ten years too late and said it 
was time for the business council "to put up or shut up." Disturbed by 
these attacks, Winter wrote a circular letter strongly urging member 
companies to examine their personnel practices to insure that they fairly 
recruited, hired, and promoted minority workers. However, lest they 
feel too guilty about their role in the employment problem, Winter as-
sured the executives that he had talked "to many Milwaukee Negroes 
who tell me to disregard the complaints of the few." Thus, Winter im-
plied, by not ignoring the complaints of the "few" the businessmen could 
once more demonstrate their progressive and humanitarian concern.44 
The adverse publicity the council suffered as a result of the Star 
article did not produce any significant changes in council activity. 
Rather it forced council members to recognize that MVEEOC was not the 
final answer to racial employment problems in Milwaukee. The black 
community was dissatisfied, and if MVEEOC could not be the great black 
hope, it could not be the great white hope either. But rather than spur-
ring increased activity, the criticism merely generated a brief surge of 
good intentions which died in the planning stages. 
' During the summer of 1966, Plans for Progress companies through-
out the country began to join local employers' councils designed to co-
ordinate the activities of member concerns. The employers' councils also 
planned to participate in community programs of training, motivation, 
and placement. In other words, national Plans for Progress councils said 
they would embark on the trail MVEEOC had blazed, but MVEEOC was at 
the point of admitting that it had lost its way in the woods. 
MVEEOC modified its purely voluntary nature somewhat when mem-
bers hired a permanent staff in the spring of 1967-about the same time 
that Father James Groppi and the NAACP Youth Council were beginning 
to stir things up in Milwaukee with their demonstrations. When Mil-
waukee civic leaders became aware of widespread unrest during the 
early part of the summer, they initiated a program to employ inner-city 
youth for the month of August. While in 1965, MVEEOC had refused to 
cooperate with a general drive for summer jobs and had responded 
weakly to a spring 1967 drive for employment of inner-core youth, now 
under the pressure of daily marches, the members of MVEEOC not only 
came up with as many jobs in July as they had during the earlier drive 
(which took place during the period of regular summer hiring) , but 
companies which no longer had openings donated almost seven thousand 
dollars to pay the wages of youths to work for the city.4S 
By the end of 1967 MVEEOC had settled down into a fairly unobtru-
sive position. Although it continued to participate in various programs 
initiated by CORE, the Board of Education, and the Milwaukee Chamber 
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of Commerce, the pioneering spirit which had permeated MVEEOC in its 
early days could not be revived even by Milwaukee's first riot. The pro-
liferation of problems simply overwhelmed this precursor of voluntary 
collective business action, and the growth of similar councils throughout 
the nation stole MVEEoc's thunder. 
Two other business councils, the Business and Industrial Coordinat-
ing Committee of Newark, New Jersey, and the Association of Hunts-
ville Area Companies of Huntsville, Alabama, began in almost the same 
month as MVEEOC and demonstrate the diverse nature of voluntary busi-
ness organizations, both geographically and in terms of their structures 
and programs. During the summer of 1963, civil rights groups in Newark 
picketed the building site of the city's new $5,000,000 Barringer High 
School. The complaints about discrimination at the high school sparked 
general dissatisfaction, and the civil rights groups began to discuss picket-
ing downtown department stores-which were not directly related in any 
way to the construction project. The senior vice president of Bamberg-
er's, one of the department stores, recalled that "while there had been 
no violence up to this point, there was a belief that the Negro community 
could erupt at any time." He was afraid that a failure to "proceed along 
the road of an open door policy of hiring nonwhites . . . would probably 
'bring economic and social chaos to the city. "46 
Led by the department stores, the business community of Newark 
formed the Business and Industrial Coordinating Committee (BICC) in 
the fall of 1963. Membership was open to civil rights groups, govern-
ment agencies, private welfare agencies, and labor unions as well as to 
businesses. Perhaps because they previously had been so out of touch 
with the problems of the black community, the businessmen seemed 
most impressed by the communications aspect of the new organization. 
The first objective of BICC was "to take positive action in a forum where 
open communications will be available at all times between business, 
industry, labor and civil rights organizations to openly discuss problems 
of mutual interest."47 In a more immediately practical vein BICC also 
pledged to train, place, and promote unemployed and underemployed 
Negroes and Puerto Ricans.48 
Member firms began to list job openings with the Urban League 
and actively recruit minority applicants.49 BICC placed approximately five 
thousand applicants in full-time jobs during its first four years.50 How-
ever, four thousand of these applicants received their jobs during the 
first year.51 The radical drop-off in the placement rate may have resulted 
from either a declining interest in the program52 or from a quick drying 
up of the underutilized skilled manpower pool. Prior to the BICC drive 
underutilization of black skills may very well have been widespread. 
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Western Electric, for example, reported that it found "Negroes with 
college degrees were working at menial jobs; many others were under-
employed and over-qualified for the jobs they held" in its Newark op-
eration.53 
During its first year, BICC members adhered to a strict Capitalist 
Ethic interpretation of the American Creed and turned away applicants 
who failed "to meet specific job requirements because of educational de-
ficiencies, environmental background gaps, inadequacies in vocational 
training and possible discrimination."54 Subsequently, BICC took a more 
affirmative-action approach and launched projects to get members to 
reevaluate their testing procedures and job requirements and sponsored 
a number of crash courses to help marginal workers bring their skills up 
to an employable level. Industry financed thirteen training courses and 
mcc cooperated with federal agencies to finance other programs to 
train minority workers. 55 
Late in 1966, one of mcc's founders, Charles Garrison, attributed 
the falling off of Negro attendance at mcc's monthly meetings partly to 
the improved job situation for blacks. "With more and more Negroes 
finding full time employment," said Garrison, "their concern and free 
time for civil rights activity is lessening. " 56 But all the Bicc's programs 
were a pathetically small gesture when contrasted to the widespread 
unemployment and other kinds of economic, social, and political ex-
ploitation suffered by Newark's black community. In the summer of 
1967, the "economic and social chaos" that the founders of BICC were 
trying to head off erupted in Newark. Fear of riots and the threat of 
picketing had been enough to get the business community moving, but 
a job placement rate of fewer than a thousand people a year in a city 
with more than two hundred thousand black people could not stem the 
angry tide. 
Voluntary groups in Rochester, Milwaukee, and Newark all grew up 
independently of the forces of the federal government. They were responses 
to direct or indirect pressures from the civil rights movement. Their 
purposes and programs, while uninspired, were local in origin and de-
signed to meet what the business community in each city saw as its unique 
problems. During the fall of 1963, at the same time that the Milwaukee 
Voluntary Equal Employment Opportunity Council and Newark's Business 
and Industry Coordinating Committee were emerging, the business com-
munity in Huntsville, Alabama, created a third association which was to 
have the widest impact on the national scene. 
Sixteen federal contractors formed the Association of Huntsville Area 
Contractors (AHAC-the final word was later changed to "companies") 
in the Alabama missile town which had grown from thirty thousand to 
Voluntarism as a Rear-Guard Action 193 
one hundred and fifty thousand population in fewer than twenty years. 
Firms such as Chrysler, IBM, Lockheed, General Dynamics, Douglas, 
Boeing, Sperry Rand, and Xerox joined together to bring pressure on the 
community to improve the environment so that they in turn could benefit 
from larger numbers of qualified black workers. All of the companies held 
government contracts, were members of Plans for Progress, and claimed 
they did not discriminate against Negroes. However, they were located in 
the heart of the Deep South and they were under federal pressure to show 
an increase in minority employment. Qualified Negroes from the other 
parts of the country were Jess than enthusiastic about moving to Alabama, 
and local facilities had not been geared toward producing highly trained 
black workers. 57 
AHAC referred to itself as a "community resources development asso-
ciation" and in this respect departed somewhat from the standard business 
council concerned solely with Negro employment. Most of AHAc's efforts 
were directed at' various training and educational programs which would 
directly contribute to the alleviation of the manpower shortage, although 
the association also became involved in improving Negro housing, in 
working to end discrimination and segregation in public facilities , and 
in improving social welfare. AHAC itself actually ran very few programs. 
It called itself a "catalyst for community action for the disadvantaged" 
and either relied on existing local agencies, private and governmental, or, 
if such agencies did not exist, tried to see to it that the community created 
them.58 Since AHAC sought to be a coordinator and initiator rather than 
implementer, it is difficult to judge the association's effect. AHAC appears 
to have spent most of its time "cooperating with" or "assisting" local, state, 
and federal programs to improve education, housing, and employment for 
blacks.59 However, given the importance of AHAC's members to the Hunts-
ville area, it seems safe to assume that their expressed interest in a par-
ticular program was of considerable help to its eventual success. 
More so than most employer groups, AHAC had objectives directed 
at the basic needs of the community. In no uncertain or equivocating 
terms, it proposed to act for the "relief of the poor, the distressed and 
the underprivileged; to improve the housing and standard of living of 
disadvantaged groups ; to lessen neighborhood tensions, to eliminate prej-
udice and discrimination; to promote the availability of public and com-
munity facilities for disadvantaged groups; and [to advance] education, job 
training and apprenticeship programs for disadvantaged groups."60 
The federal contractors in Huntsville formed their first Plans for 
Progress community council in 1963, during the period when the civil 
rights movement was beginning to turn its attention to the problem of 
employment discrimination against blacks, but the idea did not spread 
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to other cities until 1966, when the national Plans for Progress Advisory 
Council began encouraging the formation of community "merit employment 
councils." The national Plans for Progress Advisory Council assumed 
that the nature of local unemployment differed widely from area to area, 
and that local, rather than national, direction would be most effective in 
coping with the problems of unemployment among minorities. In 1966, 
there were seventeen local councils affiliated with Plans for Progress; by 
early 1968 this number had grown to more than eighty.61 Although Plans 
for Progress advocated local councils as a way of introducing a flexible 
response to unique local employment problems, in fact most of the councils 
appear to have been little more than paper organizations created along 
lines laid out by the national Plans for Progress. 
As the first local council composed of Plans for Progress companies, 
newly formed Plans for Progress groups frequently looked to AHAC for 
guidance in establishing structure and programs, and AHAC was more than 
pleased to assist. As a result of its paramount position AHAC's philosophy 
dominated numerous local councils, many of which adopted whole-cloth 
a "Suggested Constitution and Bylaws" that the Huntsville association 
published. As the local council's first objective the "suggested constitution" 
called for an "organized, orderly and reasoned approach" to "achieve a 
community climate necessary for growth and development," which would 
be headed by business leaders who were "uniquely equipped to assist 
citizens in a community in an enlightened approach to community prog-
ress." Having tied fair employment to economic development and to the 
aggrandizement of business leadership, the suggested constitution went 
on to explain what the council would do to achieve these worthy ends. 
It would support training and recruiting of "bypassed disadvantaged" 
people on the nondiscriminatory basis of "individual qualifications and 
merit." Not only would the council work with community groups but it 
would also communicate to the community the "willingness and sincerity" 
of the businessmen to live up to the objectives of the council.62 
Most Plans for Progress councils elected not to adopt AHAc's sug-
gested rationale, although they did accept its five basic objectives. It 
would seem that after 1966, outside of the Deep South, the ideal of 
economic equality for Negroes was widely enough accepted not to require 
an apologia. The basic objectives of the standard voluntary council were 
to:63 
1. Make certain that there is no employment discrimination in the 
community on account of race, color, religion, or national origin. 
2. Persuade all area employers to affirm this purpose and to openly 
support the principle and practice of nondiscriminatory hiring, promotion, 
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training, and compensation of employees on the basis of individual quali-
fication and merit. 
3. Convincingly communicate to the Negro community and other 
minority groups the willingness of employers to hire quaiified Negro and 
other minority group applicants and the availability of jobs, and thus 
establish a community knowledge that attaining of essential qualifications 
leads directly to equal employment opportunity. 
4. Directly encourage Negroes and members of other minority groups 
to obtain necessary education and training to qualify for existing and 
future jobs and to aspire to upgraded employment status. 
5. Establish a systematic method of assembling and disseminating 
data and information among area employers relating to minority group 
employment and progress made in achieving plan objectives. Encourage 
individual employees to evaluate, on a continuing basis, the level of minori-
ty group employment within their own firms in order to ascertain whether 
the aims of the plan are being met. 
The failure of most merit employment councils to develop either 
original rationales or original programs was symptomatic of both the basic 
lack of commitment on the part of most employers and of the powerful 
influence of the "fad" mentality which gripped the business community 
searching for an answer to the racial upheaval of the late 1960's. One 
observer noted that community programs were more likely to succeed 
than individual plans because "employers feel freer to take affirmative 
action when they are part of a concerted movement. No employer feels he 
is taking an individual risk."64 Businessmen believed that merit employ-
ment councils impressed the minority community and involved no in-
dividual risk, which is another way to say they involved no individual 
responsibility. 
The mushroom growth of merit employment councils attested to the 
business community's sensitivity to the demands of society. The black 
community, the white community (the press), and the government all 
expected businessmen to demonstrate their commitment to the problem 
of urban black unemployment. Membership in merit employment councils 
admirably served that purpose. The lack of meaningful activity on the 
part of most firms and councils indicated the shallowness of the business 
commitment and the hope that the councils could talk the problem away. 
Reluctance to accept individual responsibility for solving black employ-
ment problems could on occasion take extreme forms. In 1965, Cincinnati 
businessmen along with representatives of local civil rights groups formed 
a Committee of 28. Its members included the heads of the city's most 
important businesses. No one could accuse the Cincinnati business com-
munity of producing publicity instead of jobs, for the Committee of 28 
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created neither. It met in secret for two and a half years without doing 
anything. When black leaders asked for jobs an~ training programs for 
the unemployed, a committee member responded in pure Capitalist Ethic 
terms by saying, "Business is not going to create temporary jobs for those 
who are unqualified, and business is not going to lower its standards; if 
anyone does that it will have to be government on a WPA basis."65 Ac-
cording to another businessman the purpose of the committee was not to 
take action, "but to change attitudes"-of the Negroes.66 
The Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry ran a merit em-
ployment program which went a step beyond the Cincinnati approach. 
Like Cincinnati the Chicago group did not attempt to do anything, but 
unlike the Committee of 28, the Chicago Merit Employment Committee 
prided itself on its efforts. In 1964 the Chicago Association of Commerce 
and Industry's Committee on Full Employment was in charge of the 
association's equal employment activity. The Committee on Full Employ-
ment published a "Merit Employment Manual" and conducted a voluntary 
survey of its members to ascertain the state of black employment in 
Chicago.67 The survey disclosed that "as a laggard in providing job oppor-
tunities for the Negro" the nation's Second City was second to none.68 
To meet the challenge of Negro underemployment the association 
formed the Chicago Merit Employment Committee (CMEC) in June, 1965. 
CMEC took over the task of equal employment action from the Committee 
on Full Employment. CMEC met the challenge of black underemployment 
squarely by denying that it existed. CMEC claimed, "Most businessmen are 
convinced that merit employment is good business-and are practicing it." 
Having thus disposed of the major obstacle to full fair employment the 
committee defined its job as having "to communicate this knowledge to 
minority groups to motivate them to prepare themselves."69 Perceiving its 
job as propaganda production, CMEC bent its efforts to telling the black 
community-through newspaper features, radio spots, a school Youth 
Motivation Program, and lectures to black service organizations-about 
the success of Negroes employed by CMEC members. The depth of business 
commitment to the program was best summed up in CMEC's own words, 
"There are no required dues or other costs for Merit Committee members. 
Nor is any personal or company involvement in Committee activities 
required."70 
John D. deButts, chairman of CMEC and president of Illinois Bell 
Telephone Co., explained that while CMEC members did not have to do 
anything, membership had some definite advantages. Members signed a 
Statement of Merit Employment which deButts said was "considered a 
sign of good faith by minority group leaders. Government agencies too 
have taken the position that if an employer is on record for equal oppor-
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tunity employment, they will assume that he is as he represents himself 
to be."71 
The Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry believed that its 
.Merit Employment Committee "made gigantic strides in meeting the needs 
of the unemployed and the under-employed among the city's minority 
groups." It received awards from the Chicago Commission on Human 
Relations, Plans for Progress, and the Federal Equal Employment Oppor-
tunities Commission, which "cited the Committee's work as the outstand-
ing local voluntary program in the nation."72 That CMEC should receive 
these accolades was indicative of the uninspired nature of the programs 
sponsored by most other local voluntary merit employment councils. 
Just as most local councils accepted a standard set of objectives, they 
also stuck pretty closely to the prepackaged, low-risk, easy-to-present pro-
grams, most of which came from national Plans for Progress advisory com-
mittee. The key words in most councils' statements of objectives were "per-
suade," "communicate," and "encourage." In other words, Plans for 
Progress councils were talkers rather than doers. Responsibility for specific 
action rested with the individual company, while the council usually limited 
its activities to seminars, conferences, institutes, and motivation programs, 
all of which may have proved valuable in educating both management and 
minority youth but did not directly provide employment for anyone. In the 
following summary of the different kinds of programs Plans for Progress 
councils sponsored in 1968, only 2, 3, 11, and 18 placed blacks in jobs, 
and the vast majority of councils concentrated their efforts on the other 
fifteen kinds of programs.73 
1. Vocational Guidance Institutes-instruction of high school guidance 
counselors in the needs of business. 
2. Work-study and co-op programs for high school students in which 
they worked part-time and went to school part-time. 
3. Job fairs-mostly for graduating seniors. 
4. Liaison with high school teachers to let them know what industry 
expected from students. 
5. Coordination of minority employment programs in the community. 
6. Speakers' bureaus. 
7. Career days to introduce high school students to the kinds of work 
available in industry. 
8. Youth motivation programs- including speakers, panels, skits, and 
instruction in how to apply for and keep a job. 
9. Scholarships for minority students going on to college or advanced 
vocational training. 
10. Publicizing available training opportunities conducted by both pri-
vate and public agencies. 
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11. Jobs Now program-a placement program for the hard-core un-
employed originated by the National Alliance of Businessmen. 
12. Local research on community problems. 
13. Sponsoring local chapters of the Opportunities Industrialization 
Center, the vocational training program started in Philadelphia by the 
Rev. Leon Sullivan. 
14. Developing a roster of organizations which offer services to 
minorities. 
15. Preschool kindergarten programs (run with Ford Foundatio~ 
funds) to allow black women to work. 
16. Open forums to allow minority groups to present grievances to 
the government and the business community. 
17. Veterans' transition program. 
18. Placement of graduates from local training programs. 
19. Adopting schools with disadvantaged students. 
The Greater Cleveland Plans for Progress Council was fairly typical 
of Plans for Progress councils in its emphasis on propaganda rather than 
on job placement.74 Formed in September, 1965, the Cleveland council 
pioneered in a student motivation program in which black employees of 
council member firms spoke to assemblies in city high schools. These talks 
tied in with a national Plans for Progress advertising campaign based on 
the theme, "Things are changing." The speakers explained their jobs and 
encouraged students to stay in school so that they too could succeed. In 
addition the Cleveland council supplied speakers to individual classes, 
civic groups, churches, and other organizations which asked for them. 
With similar emphasis on talk rather than action, the Cleveland coun-
cil held a ''manpower development seminar" to "inform employers of the 
various federally assisted educational and training programs to help dis-
advantaged persons to prepare for jobs." And, like many other councils, 
the Cleveland group sponsored vocational guidance institutes to inform high 
school teachers and counselors about the availability and nature of jobs 
open to black students. It was only after the Hough riot of 1966 that the 
council directly participated in a program to find jobs for blacks. It spon-
sored an emergency job hiring center in the riot area. Thirty-one companies 
interviewed applicants for jobs in this one-shot response to the trouble.75 
There were, of course, scores of councils, and in specific cases some 
of them, especially non-Plans for Progress councils, deviated from the 
general pattern of talk rather than job placement. Indianapolis, for example, 
had a unique program in which businessmen not only found jobs for the 
unemployed but went door to door looking for them. The Indianapolis 
business community also provided individual counselors for new black 
employees for several months to help work out personal and job-related 
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problems which might otherwise have led to a high job turnover among 
program participants.76 The Businessmen's Interracial Committee on Com-
munity Affairs in Cleveland also went beyond the ordinary. It procured 
special federal and private foundation grants to prepare and place the 
hard-core unemployed, worked closely with the local school system on a 
number of problems, and became involved in the area of minority housing.77 
Although the Plans for Progress councils all declared that the elimina-
tion of discrimination in hiring was one of their major objectives, very few 
of them actually became directly involved in recruiting or placing black 
workers. Employment is a highly individual process, and the voluntary 
nature of the merit employment councils meant that they were not in a 
position to dictate employment policy to member firms. Those councils 
which were created in response to a riot in the local community were 
usually much more sensitive to employment problems than were those 
which merely jumped on the Plans for Progress bandwagon. Black activism 
played a major role in persuading merit employment councils in Rochester 
and Newark to begin to find jobs for blacks. Black pressure also played a 
significant role in getting jobs, rather than propaganda, from the councils 
in Cleveland and Miami, and the "threat of a flare-up over a police inci-
dent" in Buffalo, New York, in 1966 transformed that city's Job Oppor-
tunities Council from a do-nothing group into a catalyst and coordinator 
of federally financed training projects for a thousand jobs offered by 
Buffalo firms. 78 Similarly in Los Angeles before 1965 a number of business-
men had been discussing the value of coordinating efforts for fair employ-
ment, but it took the Watts riot of August, 1965, •to transform a number 
of loosely organized groups into a single Los Angeles Management Council 
for Merit Employment, Training and Research.79 Originally the Plans for 
Progress section of the council had run a standard educational rather than 
action program.80 But after the riot, under the leadership of H. C. McClel-
lan LAMEC placed unusual emphasis on the employment and job-training 
aspects of the program and, according to one report, placed almost five 
thousand blacks on jobs in the six months following the Watts riot.81 
Having died out after an initial attempt to stop state FEPC legislation 
in the 1950's, voluntary employment councils reemerged in the 1960's in 
response to the pressures of the civil rights movement, government con-
tract requirements for affirmative action, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
With only a few exceptions, however, the councils were mainly propaganda 
agencies which allowed members to avoid individual responsibility by 
hiding in the collective security of the community council. Whereas the 
voluntary councils of the 1950's had attempted to blunt the impact of the 
fair employment movement by seeking to prevent FEPC legislation, the 
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voluntary business efforts of the 1960's sought to blunt the impact of the 
FEPC legislation once it had passed and to cool the anger of the black 
community once it had been aroused. 
12 
Voluntarism: Centralization and Doubt 
The changing attitudes, policies, and actions of the business com-
munity during the 1960's produced a proliferation of voluntary plans and 
associations designed to assist businessmen in coping with growing de-
mands of the government and the civil rights organizations. As one 
voluntary employers' organization observed in its "General Statement," 
"Management, as well as the entire country, has been made more aware 
of the problem by government decree and by concerted action from those 
victims of the problem. " 1 The heavy hand of federal coercion was behind 
practically every step the business community took to improve employ-
ment opportunities for blacks. The federal government forced Lockheed 
to develop the first Plan for Progress in 1961, which set the pattern for 
company affirmative-action personnel policy for a decade. The federal 
government encouraged its other contractors to draft their own Plans for 
Progress and then suggested that Plans for Progress firms combine 
locally into Plans for Progress councils. Finally, the federal government 
created the National Alliance of Businessmen to coordinate business 
urban reform activity after the riots of 1967. A nationwide voluntary 
organization of socially concerned businessmen, NAB was the culmination 
of organized business response to the needs of black workers. 
Since businessmen created almost all of the voluntary associations of 
the 1960's in order to facilitate compliance with the demands of the 
government, there is a sadly comic aspect to that small school of busi-
nessmen who insisted on maintaining the fiction that voluntarism was 
good because it was a way to preclude government interference in busi-
ness affairs. It might have made some sense for Sara Southall to warn in 
1950, "If organized business is unwilling to provide economic oppor-
tunity for qualified individuals, it cannot expect freedom from govern-
ment interference. " 2 But Executive Order 10925 in 1961 and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 should have put an end to exaggerated warnings 
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about the threats of government interference and the saving grace of 
voluntary business action. Employers continued to praise voluntarism as 
an alternative to government control, however, because voluntarism 
provided a valuable theoretical vehicle with which businessmen could 
justify their participation in such dubiously "voluntary" programs as the 
Plans for Progress, the Plans for Progress councils, and NAB. Thus, even 
after the passage of the Civil Rights Act, G. A. McLellan, administrative 
director of the Advisory Council of Plans for Progress, could say, "There 
is the feeling that solutions can be found better by private enterprise 
than by government. " 3 
Plans for Progress (PFP) was the program behind all the publicity, 
and some of the progress, in equal employment prior to the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. PFP saved a billion dollar contract for the Lockheed corpo-
ration and became the prototype of voluntary compliance plans for all 
government contractors. At the beginning of World War II Lockheed 
employed no Negroes in its California production facilities. "Not that 
the late chairman or his brother ... had any prejudice against using 
Negro workmen," as one writer delicately put it, "it was simply that 
aircraft building had never been on a mass production basis and that the 
skill requirements were far beyond the ability and training of the few 
Negro applicants."4 Either because of streamlined mass production tech-
niques or because of Roosevelt's wartime FEPC, the firm did begin to 
employ black workers after 1941.5 
In 1951 the Lockheed corporation opened a gigantic facility in 
Marietta, Georgia. Whatever its employment policies in California, 
Lockheed had no intentions of upsetting local customs in Georgia. Lock-
heed's director of industrial relations, E. G. Mattison, explained, "If we 
were not careful in gaining community acceptance, we might have some 
unpleasant incidents and unfavorable publicity with which to contend." 
With unwarranted moderation Mattison noted, "We went about [integra-
tion] very quietly and slowly; not timidly, but wisely. " 6 Presumably as 
part of this "wise" policy, J. P. Lydon, director of administration, said 
in 1957, "We just don't feel we can push Negroes into higher jobs just for 
the sake of doing it. I dread sudden moves, particularly now when emo-
tional tension is so high throughout the community."7 Apparently there 
was some token hiring of blacks in nontraditional positions before 1961,8 
but according to NAACP meaningful num~ers of blacks were hired only 
in unskilled and semiskilled positions. In addition, Lockheed barred 
blacks from the firm's apprenticeship program, blacks were made to use 
separate rest rooms and dining rooms, and blacks were members of a 
segregated union. 9 
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Although Negroes had filed complaints against Lockheed since 1956, 
investigations by the Nixon Committee "found the company to be com-
plying with existing regulations. " 10 One week after President Kennedy 
issued Executive Order 10925, despite Lockheed's segregated facilities, 
segregated union, and long history of charges of employment discrim-
ination, the Defense Department announced it was awarding a billion 
dollar contract to the firm to build the C-141 cargo plane.11 On the day 
the Executive Order took effect, April 7, 1961, NAACP filed a complaint 
with the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity 
charging Lockheed with flagrant violations of the executive order. Jerry 
R. Holleman, vice chairman of PCEEO told NAACP that if, after investiga-
tion, the company were found in violation of the executive order the 
committee would recommend cancellation of the contract. 12 
This was the situation which prompted the company to introduce 
what a Lockheed executive later called "a voluntary program" rather 
than to submit to "forced" integration under the executive order.13 
This, of course, was an inaccurate interpretation on the part of the 
company official since the committee had no power to force the firm to 
do anything but could merely recommend cancellation of the contract 
if the company failed to live up to its contractual obligations, one of 
which was complying with Executive Order 10925. On May 25 Lockheed 
announced that it had signed an agreement with the government, the 
first Plan for Progress, in which it promised to undertake a "company-
wide program to expand and strengthen its efforts to promote equal 
employment opportunity. " 14 As a start the company eliminated its segre-
gated facilities. On some, like the rest rooms, it removed the signs. On 
others, like the cafeterias and the drinking fountains, Lockheed elimi-
nated the segregation by eliminating the facility. Mobile hot food carts 
were substituted for the cafeterias, and the company replaced the foun-
tains with taps and paper cups-according to one report at the rate of 
63,000 cups a day.1s 
In addition to eliminating the gross forms of discrimination Lock-
heed agreed to: 
I) disseminate its policy widely and emphasize the need for imple-
menting it at all levels, 
2) "aggressively seek out more qualified minority group candidates" 
and make sure that its sources of manpower were informed of its non-
discriminatory policy, 
3) "re-analyze its openings for salaried jobs to be certain that all 
eligible minority group employees have been considered for placement 
and upgrading" and attempt to hire more minority teachers for summer 
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jobs and otherwise inform the school system of the opportunities for 
blacks in the firm, 
4) "support," "secure," "encourage," and "make certain" that 
minority workers participated in the company's various training pro-
grams at all levels, 
5) desegregate all facilities and institute periodic checks to insure 
that the policy was being implemented. 16 
The impact of the Plan for Progress on Lockheed's hiring appears 
to have been significant. Segregation in the plant disappeared. Negroes 
were actively recruited and promoted, and the company extended its 
activity into the community, working closely with local black secondary 
schools and colleges. But the immediate implementation of the Plan for 
Progress in Lockheed plants was not nearly as important as the impact 
the Plan for Progress had on the business community in general. By 
pressing other federal contractors to establish Plans for Progress, the 
Kennedy administration was able to enhance its image in the black 
community. At the same time, the "voluntary" nature of the Plans for 
Progress strengthened the administration's position with the business 
community as being reasonable and not antibusiness. For the participating 
businessmen, the Plans for Progress had the admirable quality of giving 
them a glowing equal employment image, with reams of free publicity, 
while legally not binding them to do anything. 
In the six months following Lockheed's Plan for Progress, four more 
aerospace contractors, Boeing, North American, Douglas, and Martin, 
plus the Radio Corporation of America, all signed Plans for Progress. 17 
Then, in February, 1962, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson announced 
that an additional thirty-one defense contractors would come to the 
White House to participate in a mass signing of Plans for Progress. Only 
one contractor demurred from the public baptism, indicating that he 
preferred to "avoid the hoopla. " 18 The number of companies that joined 
Plans for Progress continued to grow. In 1963 Plans for Progress formed 
an advisory council to coordinate individual efforts, and the advisory 
council promoted the formation of local voluntary community councils. 
By the end of 1967, there were more than four hundred member firms.19 
While some company plans, like that of General Electric, were "unspe-
cific and little more than a polite response to the panel's invitation to 
cooperate,"20 most adhered to the form of Lockheed's original plan.21 
The 1963 Plans for Progress formal statement of purpose neatly 
summed up all the justifications that businessmen had used to defend equal 
employment for the previous twenty years: 
1) morality: "Enriching our free society by advancing human rights," 
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2) the American Creed: "Providing equal job rights for all Ameri-
cans," 
3) long-run economic benefits: "Developing the full potential of our 
nation's human resources," 
"Reducing the costs to the nation of unemployment, underdevelop-
ment, health and welfare programs, increasing crime and delinquency 
rates, and deterioration of urban areas," 
"Improving the economic conditions necessary for continuing pros-
perity, thus increasing the gross national product by many billions of dollars 
and raising the standard of living," 
4) community citizenship: "Promoting better community conditions 
in order to provide an environment for dignity and tranquility in our daily 
lives," 
5) voluntary action: "Contributing through private endeavors to-
ward solutions of a major national problem."22 
Significantly the simple Capitalist Ethic justification of the short-run 
economic benefits is missing from the list. In 1963 most businessmen were 
not about to admit they wanted to make a buck on black employment-
but perhaps more to the point, there was no way such an argument could 
be formulated. While it may have been great public relations, hiring blacks 
was not necesarily good economics. Joining Plans for Progress, however, 
allowed firms to have their cake and eat it too. Through membership in 
PFP employers could reap the rewards of being socially conscious while 
actually doing nothing. H. W. Wittenborn, personnel vice president of 
Cook Electric Co., urged members of the American Management Associ-
ation to become members of Plans for Progress. He contended that industry 
had been willing to let the "sleeping dog" of economic discrimination "lie 
while the community customs remained static or changed slowly. But now," 
he warned his listeners, "community customs are changing and changing 
fast. The business executive is faced with a dilemma. More and more he 
is feeling the squeeze between the external pressures ( the government, 
racial groups, interracial groups, and the community) demanding change 
and internal structured customs within his organization demanding status 
quo." According to Wittenborn one way to resolve the conflict was to 
"seize the initiative" and join the Plans for Progress as "evidence of their 
affirmative action."23 
The business community enjoyed taking the credit for participating in 
PFP and for the great advances in black employment that businessmen 
claimed would result from PFP activity. A Lockheed official commented 
that Plans for Progress was a "public declaration by the heads of com-
panies who are not accustomed to failing or half-heartedly pursuing their 
objectives. "24 In fact, however, many businessmen appeared much more 
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interested in posturing for the press than in actively participating in the 
program. Most firms viewed the plan as protection against the President's 
Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity which enforced Executive 
Order 10925. A contemporary observer suggested that "the signing o.f the 
Plans by the president or the chief executive officer usually received enough 
publicity in national, state, local, and company press to make it abundantly 
clear that the organization's executives were fully committed."25 Although 
PFP firms were supposed to periodically review their progress and all 
government contractors had to report to the PCEEO, there is evidence that 
many firms viewed joining Plans for Progress as an end in itself. A majority 
of steel companies interviewed by one student of industrial racial policies 
believed that simply by joining PFP they had instituted an effective equal 
employment policy and had proven they were not discriminating.26 Another 
study found that companies which claimed they had taken affirmative 
action to assist blacks, including joining Plans for P.rogress, were actually 
attempting "to give an impression of having more employment integration 
than actually existed."27 Thus it is not surprising that companies which had 
signed Plans for Progress used them as a defense against black protest 
groups who demanded increased minority employment.28 
There is no reason to assume that black protest groups were impressed 
by a firm's membership in Plans for Progress, since Negro groups had been 
suspicious of the program from the beginning. Initially blacks feared that 
the government was using Plans for Progress as a substitute for a strong 
civil rights bill.29 Herbert Hill, NAACP labor secretary and the most per-
sistent critic of the Plans for Progress, charged that PFP companies were 
more interested in "publicity than progress," and that many companies that 
signed the plans regarded them as "a way of securing immunity from real 
compliance with the anti-discrimination provisions of their Government 
contracts."30 Hill condemned Plans for Progress as "simply a euphemism 
for what a previous Administration called voluntary compliance."31 
Robert A. Troutman, an Atlanta lawyer, friend of President Kennedy, 
member of PCEEO, and the man credited with originating the idea of Plans 
for Progress, was a special target of critics of the program. Hill claimed that 
Troutman was "an avowed Southern segregationist" and was very closely 
involved with "two of the leading racists in the United States Senate," 
Richard B. Russell and Herman E. Talmadge, both from Troutman's home 
state of Georgia.32 Troutman was head of a PCEEO subcommittee con-
cerned with Plans for Progress, and his strong emphasis on the voluntary 
nature of Plans for Progress did nothing to enhance his reputation with 
the critics. 33 Because most members of Plans for Progress were govern-
ment contractors, although others were permitted to join, they were under 
pressure not only to give their word, but to live up to it. Perhaps to elimi-
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nate even this subtle form of compulsion, Troutman recommended that 
the Plans for Progress be "severed from the committee [PCEEO] and 
operated as a private organization supported by private funds."34 
There was a running debate on the actual effectiveness of the Plans 
for Progress. Its supporters were able to prdouce figures of individual PFP 
companies that showed significant increases in the proportional representa-
tion of Negroes in their work forces after signing a plan.35 On a national 
basis there was an impressive increase in the number of white-collar 
Negroes employed by all Plans for Progress companies, and a correspond-
ing _ decrease in the proportional number of blacks being hired into 
traditional black jobs between May, 1961, and January, 1963.36 
In fact, some firms hired substantially more Negroes in nontraditional 
positions than the Plans for Progress cumulative figures indicated because 
southern Plans for Progress companies virtually ignored their commitment. 
A survey of PFP companies in the Atlanta area undertaken by the Southern 
Regional Council in 1962 found that of twenty-four member firms only 
seven had taken affirmative action and of these only three, Lockheed, 
Western Electric, and Goodyear, demonstrated what the council called "a 
vigorous desire to create job opportunities."37 Most of the Atlanta-based 
managers who were even aware that their firms had signed Plans for Prog-
ress believed that the sales and service offices that they ran were exempt 
from the Plan's provisions. It was their understanding that the Plan was 
designed for production facilities only. Implicit in this was the belief that 
integration was acceptable only in low-status, blue-collar production jobs.38 
For example, at the Atlanta office of PFP member Continental Motors, an 
official assured investigators that they allowed "no discrimination whatso-
ever." He went on to explain that three of his twenty-six employees were 
black. "Back in the back, where we work these three Negroes, there are 
eight whites," said the official. He then went on to describe the firm's non-
discriminatory practices: "One of the Negroes is a porter and general 
helper .... The other two are engine teardown and cleanup men. We term 
them 'mechanic's helpers.' Their restroom is called the 'janitor's room.' 
They're not told to go anywhere; they just go where they want to go.''39 
A follow-up of the Southern Regional Council report by the con-
tracting agencies, the Army, Navy, and Air Force, did not support the 
council's full findings. The armed services investigators claimed that there 
were no companies unaware of their obligations under Plans for Progress 
(perhaps because they all had been previously visited by the council), and 
furthermore that those that were in violation of the agreement were usu-
ally deficient on technicalities such as posting equal employment signs.40 
The armed forces report did not significantly undercut the council findings 
since the definition of affirmative action was somewhat open to interpreta-
208 Black Men and Businessmen 
tion and the armed forces did find that the firms were ignoring black com-
munity resources for recruiting workers. Moreover, the council had taken 
the companies to task for not living up to the Plans for Progress, while the 
government was merely investigating compliance with the executive order, 
a less demanding document. 
The Plans for Progress, Eisenhoweresque emphasis on voluntarism, 
education, and cooperation between government and business not only con-
tinued the discredited philosophy of the Nixon Committee but conditioned 
both business and government to expect conciliation rather than forced 
compliance from the Civil Rights Act of 1964. While Plans for Progress 
continued to add firms to its list of members, it ceased to be a central ele-
ment in the federal fair employment enforcement scene after the passage 
of the Civil Rights Act. Since many businessmen had viewed their member-
ship in Plans for Progress as a way of softening the impact of Executive 
Order 10925, which had required affirmative action from government con-
tractors, one corporate vice president concluded that once "the Civil Rights 
Act had been passed, he didn't see any need for the Plans for Progress 
Program."41 
Between the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 and the riots of 
the summer of 1967 the business community took no significant national 
action to further the employment of black workers. However, the riots of 
1967 set off a chain of business and government responses leading to the 
formation of the National Alliance of Businessmen, which marked the cul-
mination of formal business involvement in minority employment problems 
during the postwar period. Somewhat paradoxically, the riots also gave 
rise to the Urban Coalition, an organization with strong business support, 
which called for increased government intervention in the problems of the 
cities, the first such concerted business support for federal action in twenty 
years. 
The Detroit riot of late July, 1967, prompted Detroit businessmen to 
found the New Detroit Committee (NDC). But rather than remain merely 
another local merit employment council, NDC provided the model and 
leadership for a national merit employment council, the National Alliance 
of Businessmen. To a large extent industry in Detroit meant automobiles, 
and with the exception of Ford, auto employment policies were less 
than enlightened prior to 1967.42 Because many other major cities had 
riots prior to 1967 while Detroit remained calm, some of its business 
leaders were a little too quick to praise their own limited equal employment 
activity. In 1964, Richard E. Cross, chairman of the board of American 
Motors, said Detroit had avoided racial disorders because top manage-
ment had taken an affirmative attitude toward the problem of Negro 
employment and had maintained good communications with the black 
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community.43 Arjay Miller, president of Ford, echoed these sentiments the 
following year, praising Detroit for the (unspecified) steps it had taken 
and lauding the federal government for its war on poverty. However Miller 
covered himself by warning that past peace was no guarantee of future 
calm.44 Douglas Fraser, head of the United Auto Workers' Chrysler de-
partment, said after the July, 1967, riot, "Everybody was so cocky, includ-
ing myself, that a riot could not happen here, because we had probably 
done more than other cities."45 
As had been the case in cities where blacks had rioted previously, 
Detroit responded to the violence by creating a community council. Des-
pairing of additional federal help, Governor George Romney and Mayor 
Jerome P. Cavanagh appointed a citizens' committee "to mobilize the pub-
lic and private resources" of Detroit.46 Along with fourteen businessmen 
the New Detroit Committee consisted of labor leaders and representatives 
from the black community, including three strong black nationalists.47 
Neither NDC nor its program was radically different from the merit 
employment councils that had sprung up around the country during the 
previous four years, except that Noc followed one of the worst of the 
urban riots and contained some of the most powerful industrial leaders in 
the country, including the heads of the three major automobile companies. 
Similar to the Association of Huntsville Area Companies, Noc did not 
intend to operate any programs itself but rather was "oriented to helping 
the community utilize its existing agencies more effectively in both the 
private and the public sector."48 The committee believed that action was 
needed to improve communications, to improve community service includ-
ing health, welfare, and police protection, to improve education, employ-
ment and job training, to clean up after the riot, and to build new housing 
for Negroes.49 The most immediately successful of the programs was Noe's 
plan to find ten thousand jobs for the hard-core unemployed in two months. 
Working with the Greater Detroit Board of Commerce, NDC persuaded 
many employers, especially the automobile companies, to lower, or virtually 
eliminate, normal hiring standards and to actively recruit in the inner city.50 
By the beginning of 1968, General Motors and Ford together had hited 
almost ten thousand Negroes, many of them, according to the companies, 
hard-core unemployed. 51 Their success was temporary and, even then, 
unique in all the nation. 
Within half a year of its founding, dissension was tearing NDC apart. 
First, moderate Negro members of the committee complained that NDC 
leader Joseph Hudson was working too closely with the radicals, and they 
threatened to boycott his department store. 52 Then the black nationalists 
pulled out of the group and accused the businessmen of not allowing them 
to formulate their own programs. 53 An evaluation report in the spring of 
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1968 concluded that the committee's achievements, except in the field of 
employment, were "woefully inadequate" to meet the city's needs.54 For 
all the good they did, the businessmen concluded that the private sector 
could not cope with the manifold problems of the cities, and that "unless 
vast sums of money are made available to the cities by the federal govern-
ment, which alone possesses the necessary taxing and distributive power, 
and unless central planning and guidance are provided to assure consistency 
and to prevent offsetting effects, there is little hope for arresting the growth 
of inner city hopelessness and despair."55 
The idea that the government should assist business in assisting the 
blacks became an increasingly common contrapuntal theme to the standard 
business contention that private voluntary activity was the best way to 
solve black employment problems. As long as employing blacks was a 
problem that had to be settled between the businessman and government 
agencies, or between businessmen and local black protest groups, the busi-
ness community could afford to insist that the problem might be solved 
through voluntary action. But when the riots demonstrated that unemploy-
ment was merely one symptom of the complex syndrome of urban decay, 
and that to solve even that one problem would require truly extensive 
employer commitment, the business community began to moderate its 
grandiose claims about the power of voluntary action and looked to govern-
ment for support. 
After the riots businessmen recognized that solving the black employ-
ment problem meant hiring large numbers of hard-core unemployed. This 
meant increased costs, which in tum meant lower profits, and very few 
employers were willing to commit themselves to a program which would 
eat into their profits. 56 Thus, when they were confronted with the full 
economic implications of relieving the economic plight of black workers, 
the Capitalist Ethic once more stopped businessman from hiring blacks. 
Unlike the forties and fifties, when costs due to racism were the source of 
rejection, the economic bar to blacks during the sixties lay with the inability 
of many blacks to meet traditional employment standards. As they had 
during the Great Depression, businessmen began to tum to the govern-
ment to rescue them from the trap of their own making. William G. Caples, 
vice president of Inland Steel, believed that industry would "accept some 
of the hard-core burdens," but he felt it was "naive to expect that industry 
can accept large numbers of individuals for hard-core employment with-
out subsidy and incentive when the responsibility of business management 
is to wisely use capital and produce profit."57 
During 1967, the federal government launched two programs which 
took tentative steps toward meeting these demands. Through the Concen-
trated Employment Program (CEP) the government attempted to cen-
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tralize the various federal programs that dealt with the hard-core unem-
ployed. CEP spent most of its first year trying to decide who the hard-core 
unemployed were and where and how they lived. 58 The second program 
was an experimental one designed to encourage business to move into the 
ghetto and to provide training for the "seriously disadvantaged." By making 
it easier for such firms to land government contracts and by assuming the 
full cost of training and bonding hard-core employees, the experimental 
program hoped to mitigate some of the economic disadvantages associated 
with inner-city operations.59 But, as the New York Times pointed out edi-
torially, the program merely made it easier to do a difficult job. It did not 
guarantee a profit. For the long term, the Times called for "substantial tax 
incentives. "60 
Other representatives of the business community continued to call for 
making social responsibility more profitable and therefore compatible with 
the Capitalist Ethic. Fortune magazine not only suggested tax incentives 
but in effect called for a kind of new National Recovery Administration by 
which the government would suspend antitrust action against all companies 
"engaged in 'public service operations' from the same competitive base."61 
The Advisory Panel on Private Enterprise to the National Advisory Com-
mission on Civil Disorder picked up and elaborated the tax incentive idea. 
The advisory panel, which was made up of the heads of Litton Industries, 
North American Rockwell, General Mills, the Bank of America, and the 
National Industrial Conference Board, declared that statements supporting 
business involvement with urban problems were "more than mere rhetoric." 
If for no other reason, the panel believed that business would voluntarily 
enter the fields of job training and employment, housing, economic develop-
ment, Negro enterpreneurship, education, and attitudinal change "because 
they recognized that the price of inaction may well be continued tension 
and disorder and the ultimate breakdown of the tranquility which underlies 
our entire social fabric and economic growth."62 The panel's justification 
was the long-run benefit interpretation of the Capitalist Ethic, which held 
that what was good for society was good for business. Becoming somewhat 
more realistic, however, the panel added, "But we believe that a truly 
massive number of companies could be induced to participate only if 
appropriate monetary incentives are provided by the federal government 
to defray the unusual costs of participation."63 The panel then went on to 
detail the kind of income tax write-off that it thought would best help both 
business and the hard-core unemployed.64 
On January 24, 1968, President Lyndon Johnson delivered a special 
message to Congress which proposed legislation to combine monetary in-
centives and the voluntary programs that the Plans for Progress companies 
had developed. The President called for an increase in the scope of the 
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Concentrated Employment Program, but more importantly he announced 
that Henry Ford II had agreed to head a new National Alliance of Busi-
nessmen (NAB). NAB was to administer a program known as JOBS (Job 
Opportunities in the Business Sector), which would attempt to persuade 
companies to employ 100,000 hard-core unemployed by June, 1969, and 
500,000 by June, 1971. 
Based on a successful experiment the government conducted in five 
cities in 1967, the President believed that business would participate in the 
NAB-JOBS program, given certain economic encouragement. The President 
foresaw business and government working in a partnership in which "the 
Government will identify and locate the unemployed. The company will 
train them, and offer them jobs. The company will bear the normal cost 
of training, as it would for any of its new employees. "65 The economic 
incentive came with the government's agreement to compensate business 
for the cost differential between the normal expenses of training and the 
additional effort required for the hard-core unemployed.66 
In each of the fifty cities where NAB chapters were initially established, 
local firms loaned managerial staff who worked with Department of Labor 
personnel to find jobs for the hard-core unemployed. 67 Once NAB obtained 
business commitments the Labor Department was supposed to find job 
seekers vocationally unqualified enough to be eligible for the special pro-
grams which would be financed by federal funds. 68 
The JOBS program fell between two stools. It did not provide a genu-
ine profit incentive which would attract large numbers of business partici-
pants, and it placed enough restrictions on its reimbursements to alienate 
employers who feared government scrutiny. The payment for extra costs 
incurred did not meet the demands of those businessmen who believed that 
real commitment would come only with guaranteed profit. 69 If the NAB 
program could not provide positive incentives for hiring and training the 
hard core, it at least tried to assure business that it would not suffer any 
unusual financial burden by working for black economic equality, but 
businessmen did not participate in the reimbursement program. Only be-
tween 20 and 25 percent of the companies which hired hard-core un-
employed under the JOBS program signed contracts with the federal govern-
ment for reimbursement of training costs. Some employers steered away 
from federal involvement because they feared government interference. 
According to one NAB official, "Employers do not like the rigid guidelines 
of a Government contract or do not want people looking over their 
shoulders, or do not like filling out government forms."70 The JOBS pro-
gram employers may not have wanted anyone looking over their shoulders, 
however they may also have been shy about accepting money because 
many of them were training busboys, porters, maids, parking lot attendants, 
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housekeepers, laborers, and baggagemen, jobs which, contrary to the pur-
pose of the program, did not offer much promise of promotion.71 
Nevertheless, private efforts at training the hard-core unemployed did 
increase after the formation of NAB. By late 1969, more than seventeen 
thousand companies had signed training contracts with the Labor Depart-
ment. Coupled with firms which trained hard-core unemployed without a 
contract, this represented a degree of business participation well above pre-
riot proportions. 72 
Although the idea for NAB had originated with the federal government 
and impetus had come from the riots, many businessmen tended to see 
the JOBS program as an abdication of government responsibility and an 
example of their own leadership ability. 73 William F. Raven, vice president 
of Pan American World Airways and chairman of the JOBS program in 
Miami, Florida, observed, "The government tried to do the job but with 
no spectacular success. So President Johnson, in effect tossed the ball to 
the private sector of business."74 To some businessmen the spectacle of 
government coming to industry for help looked like a last chance for the 
business community to retain control over minority employment. Gerald 
L. Phillippe, chairman of the board of General Electric, told the National 
Association of Manufacturers that "the price of not acting now in this crisis, 
of not contributing in concert all of the business skills we can muster, will 
be to abdicate our position as leaders."75 
The actual success of the NAB-JOBS program was open to question even 
before the 1970 recession, when firms openly stopped hiring the hard-core 
unemployed.76 Because NAB wished the JOBS program to appear successful, 
the alliance placed great emphasis on numerical goals in hiring the hard-
core unemployed. "It's a numbers game we all play," said one NAB official. 
"We play it because that's what bw~inessmen understand more so than 
talking to them about social problems or reminding them of their social 
responsibilities."77 The fact that local NAB groups established quotas, albeit 
voluntary quotas, apparently had a negative effect on some businessmen 
who adhered to the American Creed, calling quotas "antithetical to the 
ideal of equal employment."78 The stress on numerical goals led to the 
counting of normal hiring of blacks as "hard-core," multiple counting in 
high turnover positions, and other statistical devices which rendered NAB's 
figures unreliable. 19 
While the extent of hiring-policy change brought about by the JOBS 
program may not have been very great, the fact that hundreds of firms 
from all over the country were willing publicly to commit themselves to 
hiring the hard-core unemployed demonstrates that positive action in favor 
of Negroes had become the acceptable norm. As a national voluntary pro-
gram dedicated to finding and hiring people whom businessmen had tradi-
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tionally viewed as unemployable, the NAB-JOBS program climaxed the post-
war fair employment movement. Whereas in the late forties businessmen 
feared public reaction if they hired any blacks at all, by the late sixties 
employers sought public acclaim by joining a nationwide movement which 
required businessmen to break with the Capitalist Ethic by hiring the least 
qualified workers, and to break with the American Creed by giving those 
workers special consideration. 
The National Alliance of Businessmen's drive to hire the hard-core un-
employed represented the business community's new attitude toward the 
employment of blacks. But NAB was the result of twenty years of mounting 
pressure for more black employment that had finally exploded in the riots 
of 1967. The riots exposed not only the extent of the black unemployment 
problem, but also the multitude of other economic and social diseases 
afflicting the inner city. The business community responded to the non-
employment urban problems by supporting the Urban Coalition (uc), a 
national organization which sought to mobilize both the public and private 
sectors to fight the deterioration of city life. 
uc both lacked a clear rationale and a consistent method of operation, 
which was indicative of the businessman's own loss of bearings in the late 
1960's. For twenty years employers had claimed that economic problems 
could be best solved by allowing the private sector to handle things in its 
own way. Even when moved to act by government pressure, employers 
argued that the actual technique of working out a problem was best left 
to businessmen. The riots, however, undermined the business community's 
faith in the absolute efficacy of voluntarism; yet employers were not sure 
they were willing to leave the field of social action entirely to the govern-
ment. The ambiguity of the business position emerged clearly in the com-
ments of Henry Ford II, who was a founder of both NAB and uc. At the 
same time Ford seemed to feel both that businessmen could save the coun-
try and that only increased government action could solve urban problems. 
When Henry Ford II introduced the NAB program he said that business 
would have to take the burden of "bringing these disadvantaged people out 
of the ghettos and into the mainstream of the American economy."80 How-
ever, Ford was contradicting a stand he had taken just five months earlier. 
As one of the members of a thirty-two-man steering committee which for-
mulated uc's "Statement of Principles," Ford had presumably committed 
himself to the concept that "when the private sector is unable to provide 
employment to those who are both able and willing to work, then in a free 
society the government must of necessity assume the responsibility and act 
as the employer of last resort or must assure adequate income levels for 
those who are unable to work."81 
Except for a kind of interlocking directorate typified by Ford's 
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membership in both groups, uc and NAB were independent organizations. 
An emergency coalition of mayors and business, labor, church, and civil 
rights leaders created uc in August, 1967. Whereas NAB limited its mem-
bership to businessmen and dealt exclusively with the problems of minor-
ity hard-core unemployment, local uc units had a broader base and were 
supposed to be concerned with the whole spectrum of urban ills. In addi-
tion to attacking unemployment, UC called upon the nation "to provide 
a decent home and suitable living environment for every American 
family with guarantees of equal access to all housing, new and existing," 
and to "create educational programs that will equip all young Americans 
for full and productive participation in our society to the full potential 
of their abilities. " 82 
Given the increasingly favorable public attitude toward business 
social responsibility, especially in regard to minority employment, uc 
was almost a reflex reaction to the riots of 1967. It extended to the national 
level the kind of local coalitions that had begun to appear in individual 
communities over the previous five years. The coalition was new only in 
the sense that it represented the first such national-level coalition of 
"liberal" business, government, and private groups since the National 
Civic Federation of the Progressive Era. 
The uc was formed explicitly in response to the rioting of the 
summer of 1967. Its statement of principles started with a litany of the 
urban violence since 1965 (with the usual condemnations). It went on to 
advocate action "directed to the deep-rooted and historic problems of 
the cities."83 The first uc chairman, John W. Gardner, expressed the 
underlying fears of the men who founded the coalition when he said, 
"We believe that the private sector of America must directly and vigor-
ously involve itself in the crisis of the cities by a commitment to invest-
ment, job training, and hiring, and all that is necessary to the full enjoy-
ment of the free enterprise system and also its survival. "84 
Gardner's comments accentuated the dichotomy which permeated the 
voluntary action movement in the business community in the late 1960's. 
The original "Statement of Principles'' adopted by the emergency coali-
tion had placed its major stress on a call for the federal government to 
act. It seemed to call for more and bigger programs along the lines of 
President Johnson's "Great Society."85 On the other hand, as chairman, 
Gardner appeared to place increased emphasis on the voluntary element 
of the program. The New York Times commented that many of the 
coalition's staff members, like Gardner himself, were ex-public officials 
who had "transferred their hope for a better society from the public to 
the private sector. " 86 Gardner did not officially abandon the idea that 
the federal government should deal with the problem. He outlined the 
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three purposes of the coalition as: 1) lobbying, 2) problem solving, that 
is, generating new ideas to solve urban problems, and 3) familiarizing the 
businessmen with the needs of the city because, Gardner said, "The closer 
business people get to the problem the more they see the need for new 
and more effective federal legislation. " 87 
The original "Statement of Principles" of the emergency coalition 
also reflected the tension between what the government and the private 
sector should do. The first section called upon the government to provide 
an emergency work program to give socially useful jobs to everyone who 
wanted to work. The statement also called for government-financed 
training programs to insure upward mobility among the marginally skilled. 
It then outlined the action corporations should take to help solve urban 
problems. Some of the suggestions amounted to asking industry to 
participate in proposed new government programs. Others were a reitera-
tion of the kinds of affirmative action that Plans for Progress companies 
had presumably been taking for seven years and which would subse-
quently be reemphasized by NAB. These included recruiting in the inner 
cities, youth motivation, special training, and development of black-
owned businesses. 88 
Because many of the uc local units were actually preexisting coun-
cils of one kind or another, the activities which they undertook tended to 
emphasize the local voluntary effort rather than the grandiose federal 
programs envisioned in the original meeting. 89 The New York Coalition, 
for example, by applying for Internal Revenue Service tax-exempt status, 
which legally precluded lobbying, explicitly rejected the national uc's 
call for the business community to exercise its political influence.90 
The formation of the National Alliance of Businessmen and the 
Urban Coalition were the culmination of twenty years of slowly develop-
ing commitment to the problems of the black worker. Both organizations 
emphasized voluntarism as a means of solving the problems so forcefully 
spotlighted by the riots. Their voluntarism was consistent with the con-
servative antigovernment ideology traditionally held by American busi-
nessmen . The fact remains however that the National Alliance of Busi-
nessmen was created in response to government pressure, and the Urban 
Coalition, although born within the business community, called upon the 
government to participate more actively in solving social problems. The 
two organizations were a somewhat unsuccessful attempt to salvage the 
businessman's image of himself as a leader by tying the voluntarist form s 
of the past to the obvious need for government action in the future. 
13 
Conclusion 
Business attitudes toward the employment of Negroes underwent a 
revolution in the twenty-five years which followed World War II. At the 
beginning of the war Negroes received only dangerous, arduous, or 
unpleasant unskilled jobs no matter what their education, training, or 
ability- when businessmen would employ them at all. By the end of the 
1960's employers were actively recruiting and hiring blacks who were 
unqualified for employment by traditional standards. 
Like all human beings, businessmen have a fundamental need to 
maintain a degree of consistency between what they do and what they 
believe. When circumstances force an individual to alter his actions, 
he must absorb his new activity into his established set of reasons for 
doing things- his values. He could, of course, reject his traditional 
values and adopt a new ideological framework in which to operate, but 
such a revolution in personal beliefs is infinitely more difficult than 
trying somehow to fit the new actions into the old values. The explana-
tions which employers used to justify their radical change in black 
employment policy are an illustration of the rationalization process 
which men go through to reconcile their values with their actions. 
The American businessman operates under two theoretically com-
plementary set of values, the American Creed and the Capitalist Ethic. 
The American Creed promises the individual equality of opportunity. It 
is the fundamental belief that all Americans are entitled to "life, liberty, 
ano the pursuit of happiness," unencumbered by artificial barriers. The 
idea of individual freedom contained in the American Creed directly 
contributes to the Capitalist Ethic. In the Capitalist Ethic the idea of 
individual freedom is translated into entrepreneurial freedom. With 
"happiness" economically defined as long-run profitability, the business-
man is able to cite the American Creed as justification in his pursuit of 
long-run profits. 
But however complementary the American Creed and the Capitalist 
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Ethic are in theory, they have not always been mutually inclusive in 
practice. There were three distinct sets of business attitudes toward the 
employment of blacks after World War II, and the two value systems 
were compatible in only one of them. In the first period, between the 
war and 1954, aversion to black workers was so strong that businessmen 
did not dare apply the American Creed to employment practices. They 
feared that the costs to their businesses would be too high, and the 
Capitalist Ethic, i.e., profitability, took precedence over the American 
Creed. During the second period, 1954 to 1963, public acceptance of 
blacks in nontraditional positions had moderated sufficiently to allow 
businessmen to begin employing Negroes in token numbers. Moreover, 
there were enough well qualified black workers in the labor pool to make 
this change in employment policy profitable for the firm. Thus there 
was no necessary conflict between the American Creed and the Capitalist 
Ethic during this period. Finally, after 1963 pressure from the civil rights 
movement and the government forced employers once more to abandon 
the American Creed, but this time in the direction of actively assisting 
black job seekers rather than in the direction of discriminating against 
them. In particular the riots of the mid-sixties convinced the business 
community that it must act to save the system. In this instance the 
Capitalist Ethic demanded that business absorb certain short-run costs 
of hiring the hard-core unemployed rather than risk the long-run dangers 
of economic and social upheaval. 
To say that businessmen became increasingly willing to hire blacks 
in the postwar period is to say that Negro employment became an 
accepted form of social responsibility. Although rejected by some ideo-
logical conservatives, throughout American history businessmen have 
widely accepted the concept of social responsibility. The idea that business-
men should accept some responsibility for the general welfare of society 
reflected four needs felt by most businessmen: first, businessmen wished 
to be leaders; second, they wanted to exercise power; third, they wanted 
society to accept them; and fourth , they wanted to do what was morally 
right. Social responsibility was thus a process through which the business-
man achieved status in the community, and by definition acts which were 
contrary to popular expectations could not be socially responsible. 
Until 1954 progress in hiring blacks in nontraditional jobs was 
slow and limited to rare instances of tokenism. In the period before the 
Eisenhower administration, the Capitalist Ethic worked against the 
employment of Negroes. Businessmen believed that the risks of em-
ploying blacks were so high that sound business practice required dis-
crimination against Negroes. Many employers were personally biased 
against blacks and accepted stereotypes which characterized Negroes as 
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racially incapable of succeeding in nontraditional jobs. Even those em-
ployers who did not harbor personal racism believed that their white 
employees and their customers would object to Negro workers and, 
therefore, they could hire blacks only at the cost of harmonious personnel 
relations and sales. 
The unwillingness of most businessmen to assume leadership in 
the employment of blacks before 1954 reflected the generally negative 
attitude which the public held toward black employees. Obviously 
businessmen could not have led in the field of Negro employment until 
there were people willing to follow- followers are what separate leaders 
from eccentrics. But when we discuss the followers of businessmen we 
are talking about two distinct groups, the general community and the 
business community. At no point in the postwar era were businessmen 
leading society in general. Broad social expectations, as reflected in gov-
ernmental action, always preceded business activity in the field of fair 
employment. However, there had to be some businessmen who led the 
way in employing blacks within the business community, and these men 
were in a very real, if limited, sense leaders of their peers. 
Although the drive for a permanent federal fair employment practice 
law failed after the end of World War II, several states and cities did 
pass such legislation. These early successes in the equal employment 
movement, while they did not represent a flood tide of popular support 
for black employment, did indicate that some change in public sentiment 
had taken place. These straws in the winds of change were enough to 
prompt a few pioneering businessmen to hire their first black workers 
in nontraditional jobs. Those businessmen who participated in voluntary 
fair employment programs to forestall state or local FEPC action hired 
blacks not out of a sense of leadership but rather to prevent the govern-
ment from eroding their power to employ whom they pleased. However, 
some pioneering businessmen were motivated by a desire to do good. 
The business community was not the employers' sole point of reference. 
For many pioneering businessmen their roles as church members were 
as important as their membership in the business community. Religiously 
committed employers found that the combination of their belief in a 
religious code of ethics and in the American Creed was stronger than 
the Capitalist Ethic which dictated no Negro employment when there 
might be extraordinary costs to the firm. It should, however, be remem-
bered that religious morality did not widely influence business practice 
until the public had begun to show preliminary signs of accepting fair 
employment practice. 
The level of pioneer placement increased after 1954 as the Eisen-
hower administration lent its support to voluntary fair employment 
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policies. The Nixon Committee's emphasis on educating businessmen 
and the public in the values of equal employment made it easier for 
businessmen to begin to accept black employment as a form of social 
responsibility. With the imprimatur of a conservative Republican ad-
ministration, businessmen could pursue voluntary equal employment 
with a fair certainty that their efforts would be rewarded with public 
acceptance. And since, during at least the mid-fifties, there was an 
available supply of qualified blacks, the American Creed and the Capital-
ist Ethic combined into a fully integrated set of values. 
President Kennedy's Executive Order 10925 accelerated the rate 
of Negro employment that had begun voluntarily during the Eisenhower 
administration. The Kennedy order called upon government contractors 
to go beyond mere equal employment. The federal government asked 
them to take affirmative action to find and employ black workers. Al-
though it asked employers to look for black workers, the government did 
not demand that businessmen lower their employment standards for 
Negroes. This request may have bent the equal opportunity meaning of 
the American Creed but it did not break it. Numerous voluntary fair 
employment practice councils sprang up in the wake of the federal action 
and the beginnings of the civil rights movement. These groups did help 
place blacks in pioneering positions, particularly in technical, profes-
sional, and managerial jobs. However, the voluntary fair employment 
councils mostly produced propaganda. That in itself was a clear sign 
that black employment had become a totally accepted form of social 
responsibility. Whatever their actual employment practices, businessmen 
worked actively and collectively to convince the public that they were 
equal opportunity employers. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the formation of the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission sanctified with law the concept of 
fair employment which the business community had come to accept over 
the previous decade. But beginning in 1963 and continuing through 1967, 
the black community began pushing for a more radical interpretation of 
fair employment. Sound personnel policy and the Capitalist Ethic de-
manded that the employer hire only the best qualified workers and this 
rule was not seriously challenged until mid-decade. The combination of 
the Capitalist Ethic and the American Creed which prompted some 
businessmen to start hiring Negroes in the late fifties had the ironic 
effect of giving other employers an excuse not to hire blacks during the 
early sixties. Whereas before 1954 employers simply ignored the American 
Creed when they excluded blacks from their firms, by the sixties they could 
claim that the American Creed demanded equal treatment for all appli-
cants, and since most blacks were unqualified by traditional standards, 
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they could not be hired. Recognizing that businessmen were using the 
concept of equal employment opportunity to reject unqualified black 
workers, the civil rights movement put pressure on employers to hire 
the so-called unemployables. Blacks, and to some extent the federal 
government, called upon business to move beyond the American Creed 
by changing the nature of jobs, lowering standards, or providing training 
for unqualified blacks. 
Aside from a handful of unusually dedicated individuals, business-
men rejected the demands for unequal treatment of black and white 
applicants. Employers may have been willing to go out and look for 
black workers, but they were unwilling to lower their standards to hire 
them. Not only were black demands a clear violation of the American 
Creed, but the costs involved were in direct conflict with the Capitalist 
Ethic. The riots of the mid-sixties provided the impetus necessary to 
move the business community to an acceptance of extra help for the 
hard-core unemployed. The National Alliance of Businessmen and the 
Urban Coalition both advocated going the extra mile. Employing the 
hard-core unemployed would burden the firm with additional costs, and 
normally these expenses would have been considered a violation of the 
Capitalist Ethic. Businessmen, however, suddenly recognized that unless 
they were willing to assume some short-run costs, they might find them-
selves in a long-run period of social and economic chaos that would be 
far more expensive. The American Creed was forgotten once again, but 
this time in order to employ rather than reject blacks. 
For all their hopeful statements about the way business would solve 
the urban crisis, NAB and uc began to see that voluntarism was not going 
to cure the problem. Businessmen found in NAB and uc all the elements 
which defined social responsibility-leadership, power, acceptance, and 
morality-but no solution to the problem of Negro unemployment. In 
twenty years voluntarism had come full circle. In the 1940's businessmen 
had attempted to prevent FEPC laws by forming organizations which 
would voluntarily provide jobs for Negroes. Those groups served only 
to demonstrate the real need for legislation. In the 1960's businessmen 
formed organizations to provide jobs for unemployed blacks. Like their 
predecessors the latest groups proved unable to deal with the f:;.~ • ..: ...... .;11tal 
problem and served primarily to highlight the need for a legislative 
remedy. 
The creation of NAB and uc was the climax of twenty-five years of 
postwar business thinking. The end of the sixties not only witnessed the 
bankruptcy of voluntarism as a solution to the black employment prob-
lem, but it also saw the end of economic expansion, escalating black 
pressure, and 9rowing federal fair employment activity. The election of 
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Richard Nixon in 1968, the reduction of black violence after the riots 
of 1968, and the beginning of a recession the following year all contributed 
to a relaxation of pressure for increased black employment. Although 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and other federal agen-
cies continued their affirmative action policies of the 1960's, the sense 
of immediacy was gone, and the economic downturn which lasted 
through 1972 made it increasingly difficult to hire hard-core unemployed 
blacks while regular workers were laid off. In the end the Capitalist Ethic 
remained the dominant force in determining personnel policy. 
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